To the Marines: Don’t Go to Nago

Not to be confused with Nagano, the small town of Nago on the Japanese island of Okinawa has also been in the news.

U.S. and Japanese officials would like to move the Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station, located in a city on the southern part of the island, to an offshore facility near Nago. But the Okinawan people and residents of Nago are deeply ambivalent about the idea.

In December, Nago residents voted against the new base. On Feb. 6, Okinawan Gov. Masahide Ota, who came to office early this decade on a platform to reduce U.S. bases on the island, cited the Nago referendum and a 1996 prefectural assembly resolution to declare his opposition to the new facility. On Feb. 8, however, Nago residents narrowly defeated a candidate for mayor who staked his claim to office exclusively on his opposition to the base. What to make of this?

It suggests that most Okinawans are of a mixed mind: less extreme than Ota, who has declared that he would like all U.S. bases off Okinawa by 2015, but unhappy with the modest changes offered to the status quo.

The issue of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa is a highly sensitive one. The tragic rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by American servicemen in 1995 brought problems to a head, but trouble had been brewing for years. About 20,000 Marines and 7,000 Air Force troops--more than half the total U.S. troop strength in Japan--are based on Okinawa. U.S. bases cover almost one-fifth of the densely populated island. Okinawans feel they are exploited and opinion polls show that most other Japanese agree with them. Were another heinous crime to be committed by U.S. troops on Okinawa, the fallout could be enormous.

Why are U.S. force levels on Okinawa so high? First, American officials correctly value Okinawa as an excellent staging area for air transport, equipment storage, fighter jet operations and any amphibious assault operation that might be necessary in the region (notably against North Korea). These are good arguments for keeping the Kadena Air Base and military equipment on Okinawa, but not for stationing large numbers of Marines there.

Second, officials worry that any reduction in U.S. troop strength in Japan would signal a weakening of our commitment to the region’s security. That reasoning is flawed. In addition to the Marines on Okinawa, the U.S. stations 25,000 other personnel in Japan and 37,000 troops in South Korea. Thousands more regularly sail through the western Pacific. The U.S. base network in Japan, Korea and Guam would allow for rapid reinforcements in a crisis.

Moreover, the Marines do not need to come home. The United States could base 5,000 on Okinawa, at least 10,000 in Australia and perhaps a few thousand more in South Korea. By taking Australia up on its interest in hosting Marines, the U.S. would gain a useful hub for operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and virtually unlimited space for training.

The Marine Corps itself expects future combat to be more like the “stepchild of Chechnya” than a replay of Desert Storm or the Korean War, and is busy preparing for urban operations throughout the world’s coastal areas. Such conflicts could just as easily be on the Indian subcontinent or in Indonesia as in northeast Asia.

This approach could help solidify U.S.-Japan security relations in another important way if the Korean confrontation ends. Many Japanese would resist hosting U.S. troops that appeared to be directed primarily at China. If, however, U.S. forces in Japan were seen as part of a broader network focused not just on deterring China but also on counterterrorism, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief throughout the region, the alliance should remain on strong ground in Japanese politics.

Further, Marines based in southern Korea could be the kind of U.S. military presence that Koreans would welcome after reunification, since it might be less apt to antagonize China than large numbers of forces based further north.

After a cooling-off period, American and Japanese officials should close the Futenma Air Station and return Marine Corps barracks and training ranges on Okinawa to local control. Only the 2,000-strong 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, as well as Marines manning expanded equipment storage and staging facilities, would remain. The 31st MEU could use the Air Force’s Kadena facility from time to time, and Okinawa’s international airport should a major operation be needed. Japan might be willing to pay for the lion’s share of the costs of relocating the Marines. The U.S. might incur some added expenses, but they would amount to about 1/10th of 1% of the U.S. defense budget. That is a tiny price to pay for a stronger alliance.