Security in an Era Without Enemies

Now that the Senate has approved the expansion of NATO, we may ask: What sort of NATO is expanding?

NATO was founded as a military alliance to cope with the Soviet threat to Western Europe after World War II, and it grew into the most highly organized and successful multilateral alliance in history. The Soviet Union collapsed seven years ago, and Russia does not currently constitute a serious threat to Europe. Why expand an alliance whose threat has disappeared? Indeed, many experts expected early in this decade that NATO would decline or even dissolve.

If NATO were simply a military alliance, the most plausible interpretation of its expansion would be aggressive: that NATO members were taking advantage of Russian weakness to expand NATO’s sphere of influence at Russia’s expense. No wonder Russian politicians and generals have been vehemently opposed to NATO’s plans.

NATO expansion makes more sense if we see NATO as in the process of being transformed from a military alliance to a “security management institution.”

Security management institutions develop procedures that facilitate joint operations and promote trust among the bureaucracies of the countries involved. But they differ from alliances in two crucial ways.

First, security management institutions respond to risk rather than threat. That is, they are not oriented toward a specific country that might launch or threaten an attack, but toward the possibility that disputes, in a context of mutual suspicion, could lead to war. The risks facing NATO include the possibility of conflict between Hungary and Romania over Romanian treatment of Hungarians, civil wars in Eastern Europe and, of course, the possibility of war between NATO members Greece and Turkey. Security management institutions do not deter attacks; instead, they foster transparency and create structures for negotiation and cooperation.

Second, security management institutions are inclusive rather than exclusive. Rather than being focused against sources of threat, they are designed to include sources of risk. The idea is that risks can be managed better if the potential troublemakers are within the institution rather than outside of it.

After major wars in Europe, the victors attempted to develop security management institutions to reduce the risks of repetition: the Concert of Europe in 1815, the League of Nations in 1919, the United Nations in 1945. NATO’s expansion constitutes a fourth try at implementing this historic ideal.

If NATO is viewed as a security management institution, its expansion looks different than from the perspective of military alliance. This difference argues for expanding it even further.

The major risks of war within Europe lie to the east and south of the new members of NATO--the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland--in Romania, Ukraine, Moldova and in Russia itself. If NATO is to be an effective security management institution, it must include these countries. Russia should become not the target of NATO expansion but a potential member. Russia does not yet meet the key requirements for admission: stable democratic government, an orderly market system, absence of border disputes and fair, peaceful treatment of minority groups. If Russia meets these requirements, it should be admitted.

At that point, NATO will have been fully transformed. Article 5 of the treaty, guaranteeing collective response to external attack, will have to be revised because NATO no longer will be a military alliance and could not be expected to defend against attacks from outside Europe. European peace would have been institutionalized and to a large degree secured.

In fact, NATO’s transformation from defense to security management already has begun. Among current members, the emphasis in military planning has been on the development of combined joint task forces: military assets capable of engaging coalitions of willing members in cooperative conflict prevention and conflict management. This military capability stands in stark contrast to NATO’s Cold War capacity for massive response to external attack. And in announcing the decision to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic last year, NATO declared that neither permanent military infrastructure nor nuclear weapons would be deployed on the territory of the new member states. This is a clear break with NATO’s military stance as an alliance and a decisive step toward the very different mission of security management.

A final advantage of viewing NATO as a security management institution pertains to the interim period before Russia is included. Holding out the prospect of inclusion provides an incentive for Russia to move toward democratic governance and fair treatment of minority groups--as it has for the Eastern European countries formerly part of the Soviet empire.

Viewing NATO as an emerging security management institution makes sense of U.S. policy. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said last year, “NATO does not need an enemy. It has enduring purposes.” Alliances are pointless without enemies; security management institutions seek to create situations in which enemies do not arise. NATO’s future as a security management institution could be even brighter than its past as a military alliance.