Non-Kohl Must Learn to Lead

In national elections last Sunday, Germans, for the first time since World War II, ousted a sitting chancellor. Helmut Kohl’s 16-year reign over both German politics and the evolution of Europe has come to an end. The chancellor-elect, Gerhard Schroeder, will lead the Social Democrats back to power, testing the ability of Germany’s new left to guide a country in the midst of profound social change and a continent in the midst of geopolitical transformation.

Schroeder’s victory and the rise of the Social Democrats are unlikely to produce radical changes in domestic or foreign policies. As in the United States and Britain, Germany’s left has moved to the center. Moreover, the election was about people, not ideas. Schroeder won primarily because he was not Kohl.

Despite the likelihood of continuity in German policy, however, Kohl’s departure from Europe’s largest democracy will send shock waves across the continent and the Atlantic. Kohl, in close cooperation with successive U.S. leaders, presided over the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany and the integration of Europe. He did so with tact and without bluster, a must in a Europe that, for historical reasons, still fears German power. Because U.S. leadership will be in short supply thanks to President Bill Clinton’s domestic woes, Schroeder must not only fill Kohl’s shoes, but he must pick up the slack left over from a wounded America. The key question is whether Schroeder is up to the task of providing the leadership so sorely needed to guide Europe’s evolution and help stabilize the world economy without raising new fears about German ambition.

Since the 1950s, partnership with Europe’s democracies has anchored U.S. relations with the outside world. European integration has, over time, succeeded in removing geopolitical rivalry among Europe’s major states, enabling them to cooperate not just with each other, but also with Washington. Even as German power increased and the country unified after the fall of communism, Germany remained deeply embedded in a peaceful Europe.

Kohl is in large part responsible. His genius lay in an ability to lead without appearing to do so. The excessive geopolitical ambition that Germany demonstrated under Adolf Hitler has made both Germans and their neighbors phobic about German power. The paradox is that Germany is the continent’s most influential state, and Europe’s continuing experiment with political and economic integration through the European Union depends on the exercise of German leadership.

Kohl deftly navigated this dilemma by embedding German power and leadership in something bigger than the German state. He successfully convinced Germans that their national interests were aligned with those of a broader Europe. Before taking any major initiative, Kohl made sure that Germany’s European partners--France, in particular--were on board. In the eyes of the German public and its neighbors, the European Union, not Germany, was in command. But behind the scenes, Kohl was at the helm.

Schroeder faces formidable challenges as he seeks to forge a brand of leadership that satisfies both the constraints of the past and the demands of the future. Generational change is producing a German electorate somewhat more comfortable with the exercise of German power. Younger Germans, precisely because they did not live through World War II and its aftermath, do not share Kohl’s visceral aversion to the open pursuit of national interests. It is no accident that during the campaign, both Kohl’s party, the Christian Democrats, and Schroeder’s attempted to woo voters by emphasizing German, not just European, power.

Next year’s move of the capital from Bonn to Berlin will further complicate matters. Bonn’s unassuming and bucolic setting contrasts sharply with Berlin’s imposing grandeur. The return to Berlin is meant to symbolize Germany’s return to normality, readiness to move beyond the past and ability to govern responsibly from the city that spawned the horrors of World War II.

The international community should welcome Germany’s gradual emergence as a normal power, one that wields influence and takes on responsibility commensurate with its size and wealth. Indeed, the United States needs a Germany that is more comfortable with itself and more willing to help provide international leadership.

But it is by no means clear that Schroeder is the right man to manage this nuanced shift in the German polity and the character of its power. He has virtually no experience in foreign affairs. Out of power for 16 years, his party did not bother to cultivate a cohort of specialists schooled in statecraft. Unlike Kohl, Schroeder is not in complete command of his party. He shares power with the left-leaning Oskar Lafontaine, making it almost impossible for Schroeder to replicate Kohl’s single-handed mastery of Germany’s internal and external affairs.

To make matters worse, Schroeder’s Social Democrats are likely to build a governing coalition with the environmentalist Green Party. Guided by a strong tradition of pacifism, the Greens will complicate Schroeder’s efforts to forge a new brand of German leadership.

Even if the Social Democrats succeed in formulating a foreign policy that is more assertive but also reassures neighbors that German intentions remain benign, Germany’s relationship with France could foil Schroeder’s efforts to build on Kohl’s tradition of quiet leadership. Schroeder has a greater affinity with the British than with the French and has hinted that he might downplay the Franco-German coalition in favor of a new Anglo-German partnership.

Although a tilt toward London would help draw a reluctant Britain more deeply into the EU, a tilt away from France would be a grave error. The Franco-German coalition is at the heart of a peaceful Europe. That France and Germany check one another’s power in a tight embrace is one of the main reasons Europe’s smaller states live comfortably alongside the continent’s major players. Kohl was guided by the recognition that Germany and France must always move in lock-step. He understood that because of history and geopolitics, no country, including Britain, could replace France as Germany’s principal partner in Europe.

Schroeder appears to be coming around. His first foreign trip after last Sunday’s election was to Paris, where he met with both President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin.

Schroeder’s actions aside, France may prove to be a more intractable partner than during Kohl’s era. The French government is currently split between a president from the right and a prime minister from the left. The government is virtually paralyzed over how to address towering unemployment and a bloated state sector that continues to dampen economic performance. The French are going through their own generational change, with younger politicians wondering about the value of the coalition with Germany and the necessity of the economic discipline imposed by the EU.

Especially because the Franco-German coalition has always been appreciated more by elites than by the broader public, Schroeder needs to pay the closest attention to his dialogue with Paris. Getting policy right will not be enough. Schroeder and his French counterparts need to launch public-education campaigns to ensure that the Franco-German coalition has deep roots in society.

The final challenge facing Schroeder, and one that has the most immediate implications for Americans, is tackling reform of the German economy and contributing to stabilization of global markets. Kohl was far more concerned about geopolitics than economics. Under his watch, unemployment in Germany reached a postwar high and needed reforms of the welfare state were neglected.

Schroeder will bring to the job more interest and expertise in the domestic economy. But he will have to navigate a minefield of competing domestic interests. To keep his party rank and file happy, Schroeder campaigned on the promise to restore “social justice” and maintain, if not expand, Germany’s extensive welfare system. But he also promised to prepare the country for globalization, reduce unemployment and create an environment that would enable the private sector to increase competitiveness.

Staking out what Schroeder likes to call this “new middle” will be far harder in Germany than it has been for Prime Minister Tony Blair’s center-left government in Britain. The main reason: Margaret Thatcher. During the 1980s, Prime Minister Thatcher oversaw just the sort of domestic restructuring that Germany has ahead. Blair now enjoys the support of a wide center largely because Thatcher did much of the heavy lifting for him.

Schroeder is not so lucky; the Social Democrats continue to rely on a traditional labor base. But Schroeder must not allow himself to be held hostage by party faithfuls. Instead, he must capitalize on his leverage within the party to push through painful economic reforms. As the German population ages, its current welfare system will prove unsustainable. And German industry will continue to export jobs and lose its competitive edge if the economy is not further deregulated.

Not just the health of the German economy is at stake. Schroeder’s leadership will be needed to ensure that the introduction of a single European currency goes smoothly. The United States also desperately needs German help in bringing stability to global financial markets and getting Russian reform back on track. With the Japanese economy in dire straits and U.S. politics tangled in scandal, enormous responsibility falls on Germany’s--and Schroeder’s--shoulders.

Schroeder’s win marks a turning point in postwar Europe’s political landscape. Kohl’s defeat represents not just the bowing out of the man who has anchored Europe for well over a decade, but the passing of a generation of leaders whose outlooks were forged by the experience of World War II.

Europe, and America with it, are entering uncharted waters. Now more than ever, the United States needs a steady Germany that is increasingly ready to help share the burdens and responsibilities of international leadership.