Success Could Hinge on Albright’s Style

Wrapping up her first official trip to the Middle East just over a year ago, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright uttered the words that would come to haunt her attempts to mediate the Arab-Israeli peace process: She intended to remain active in the effort but would not return endlessly to the region to “tread water.”

In many ways, it was a sensible standard. As Washington’s senior diplomat, Albright faces other crises more pressing than haggling with Israelis and Palestinians over the minutiae of a peace settlement that should have been implemented years ago.

Albright made good on her promise. She has spent far less time in the region than any secretary of State in the last three decades. And critics contend that her reluctance to appear to be wasting her time on an intractable dispute has allowed the chronic suspicions that Israelis and Palestinians harbor toward each other to harden into a deadlock that has halted all progress for more than 18 months.

Albright’s unorthodox way of playing the Middle East game is being put to its most important test this weekend as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat and President Clinton conduct peace talks at a secluded conference center near Chesapeake Bay. Although the policies of Netanyahu and Arafat are by far the most significant factors in determining the success or failure of the Wye Plantation summit, Albright’s diplomacy also weighs heavily.

Unlike her immediate predecessor, Warren Christopher, who visited the Middle East once every eight weeks, on average, Albright has made just four trips to the region. Only the first, in September 1997, and the fourth, just last week, were focused primarily on Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

While Albright’s supporters say she has found other ways to have an impact on the peace process, many Middle East experts say there is no substitute for a secretary of State’s presence in the region.

“She delayed too long in going to the Middle East,” said a retired diplomat who watches the region closely. “She didn’t go [the first time] until about seven months after she came into office. By that time, trust had eroded among the parties so much that they couldn’t even agree on areas of negotiations, much less on matters of substance. I think she has to bear some of the responsibility for that.”

The former policymaker said Albright appears to have underestimated the significance to Middle East leaders of constant attention by the secretary of State.

Travel is not the only issue. In May, during back-to-back meetings with Arafat and Netanyahu, Albright issued an ultimatum: If the participants failed to accept a U.S. formula for settling an interim territorial dispute, the United States would consider ending its mediator role and pointing the finger of blame at the most intransigent party. Arafat accepted the U.S. plan in principle, but Netanyahu rejected it. Albright backed down.

“I think there was a decision made in the White House by the domestic advisors that under no circumstances would there be a fight with Israel,” said Judith Kipper of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “We don’t help Israel by enabling it to drag this out.”

Stephen Cohen, vice chairman of the Center for Middle East Peace in New York, agreed: “I think she was on the right track until May 4, when she threw down the gauntlet in London. When she couldn’t back that up, the strategy crumbled, and it took a long time for them to put something back into shape.”

The Czech-born Albright was primarily an expert in European affairs when she joined the Clinton administration, first as U.N. ambassador and later as secretary of State. Her supporters and critics agree that she has shown a more deft hand in handling European issues such as the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

But Middle East affairs have been a pressing responsibility of the secretary of State at least since Henry Kissinger negotiated a separation-of-forces agreement between the armies of Israel and those of Syria and Egypt after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Kissinger defined the concept of “shuttle diplomacy,” which has been a staple of U.S. Middle East policy ever since.

Albright sought to put the responsibility back on the Israelis and Palestinians, reiterating that “we cannot want peace more than the parties themselves” so often it became a mantra.

It goes without saying that there will be no peace without an agreement between Israel and its Arab adversaries. But that minimizes Washington’s stake in the process. Middle East peace is important enough to the U.S. national interest to justify the use of some muscle on recalcitrant parties, observers argue.

“We should not underestimate our own real interest in seeking greater Arab-Israeli peace,” a former diplomat said. “That is the only way that we can balance our strong interest in the security and survival of Israel with our other interests in the region.”