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Don’t Downplay Threat From Moscow’s Arsenal

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Igor Khripunov is associate director of the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia. Jonathan B. Tucker directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies

In the Hollywood thriller, “The Rock,” disgruntled soldiers steal chemical weapons and threaten to launch them against San Francisco unless their demands are met. Although this plot may seem far-fetched, it could become a reality in today’s Russia.

Moscow is struggling to destroy a Cold War chemical arsenal that includes more than 40,000 metric tons of blister and nerve gases. These super toxic agents are stored at seven depots throughout the country, where security measures are poor and could be penetrated by terrorists or secessionist rebels. Because of Russia’s economic crisis, the chemical weapons destruction program is underfunded and at a near standstill.

For the past several years, the U.S. and some of its European allies have provided financial assistance to help Russia destroy its chemical weapons. The centerpiece of the U.S. effort has been the design and construction of a pilot nerve-agent destruction plant at a weapons depot near Shchuchie, in an effort to jump-start the destruction program.

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On Aug. 6, however, a House-Senate conference committee voted to eliminate all $125 million slated for the Shchuchie project and to reallocate $20 million to enhance security at chemical weapons storage sites in Russia. The decision was based largely on the premise that, in the words of Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), “Chemical weapons pose more of an environmental threat to Russia than a security threat to the United States.”

This is ostrich-like reasoning. Russian chemical munitions are in good condition and have excellent agent-dispersal ability. They are portable and could easily be stolen by terrorists. Moreover, chemical warheads can be placed on Scud-type missiles, which many countries possess.

The political turmoil gripping Russia is demonstrated by President Boris N. Yeltsin’s decision to fire the government for the fourth time in 17 months. The hostilities in the northern Caucasus indicate that the threat of terrorism is real. Investing $20 million to enhance security measures at the chemical weapons depots is a Band-Aid solution. Only destruction of the weapons will remove the threat.

Beyond the specter of chemical terrorism, failure to begin prompt destruction of Russia’s chemical stockpile will have other negative consequences for U.S. security. It will seriously undermine the Chemical Weapons Convention, the main legal bulwark against the further spread of chemical arms. Unable to comply with the obligations to destroy its chemical stockpile, Russia may have no choice but to withdraw from the treaty.

For these reasons, U.S. financial and technical support for Russian chemical disarmament should not only be kept alive but expanded, with the goal of getting the Shchuchie plant up and running. Rapid completion and operation of the facility would demonstrate to concerned local communities in Russia that chemical weapons destruction is possible in a safe, environmentally sound manner.

Greater U.S. financial involvement at Shchuchie should be conditioned, however, on a basic rethinking of Moscow’s plan to build destruction facilities, costing more than $1 billion apiece, at each of its seven depots. In the wake of the August 1998 economic crisis, this plan is no longer affordable. The Russian government must implement the first, less costly phase of its chemical destruction program, namely, building facilities at Gornyi and Kambarka to destroy blister agents stored in bulk tanks, which are in danger of leaking and cannot be moved. Nerve agent weapons would then be transported from the other storage sites to the destruction plant at Shchuchie and possibly another central location.

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Additional foreign assistance would concentrate on designing and building dedicated transport routes for moving the weapons safely. These routes later could be converted into highways or railways. International financial institutions may be more amenable to funding this than building several costly weapons destruction facilities that would have little economic value once the weapons are gone.

In sum, U.S. assistance for the Shchuchie facility should go forward concurrently with talks with the Russians on restructuring their chemical disarmament program to make it more realistic. Failure to destroy these deadly weapons could lead to a scenario like that in “The Rock,” played out by terrorists in Russia or, perhaps, even on American soil.

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