The Russians Face a War Without End

The results of today’s Russian parliamentary elections will almost certainly be hailed by the Kremlin as a great political victory for President Boris N. Yeltsin and Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin. The expected strong showing by pro-Kremlin Unity, at the expense of anti-Yeltsin forces led by Moscow Mayor Yuri M. Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov, will be interpreted by many as a stamp of approval for the policies of Putin’s government, first and foremost, the popular war in Chechnya, which the Russian military has promised to end victoriously before the end of the year.

It is conceivable, indeed likely, that the several thousand Chechen defenders of Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, will sooner or later be overwhelmed by the tens of thousands of Russian troops surrounding them, though not before inflicting heavy losses on their foes. Russian generals will declare victory, and their achievement will be celebrated by a population longing to restore Russia’s territorial integrity, as well as its injured pride and honor after years of humiliation by the despised Chechens. Few will stop to think of the cost already paid by Russia’s fragile democracy. Fewer still of the onerous payments due in the future. For this “victory,” and the manner in which it was achieved, is so fraught with disturbing implications for Russia and its place in the world that it may come back to haunt the victors in short order.

When a conflict in neighboring Dagestan started in August, few criticized Moscow for acting quickly to put down the armed incursions and banditry of criminal gangs proclaiming themselves Islamic militants from Chechnya. Nor was there a reserve of sympathy for Chenhnya, whose government had failed to impose law and order during its independence, thereby threatening the entire region. Yet, the initial Russian plan to cordon off Chechnya and then seek a political solution from a position of strength was soon abandoned, according to former Prime Minister Sergei V. Stepashin, and the generals were allowed to run the show as they pleased.

The campaign against a “handful of terrorists” was promptly transformed into a take-no-prisoners war against the Chechen people. Systematic destruction of the civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate bombing and scorched-earth tactics became the favorite military tactics of the 100,000-strong Russian force deployed. The heavy toll among Chechen civilians has already forced a quarter of the population to flee into neighboring Ingushetia, and the original handful of terrorists rapidly multiplied in military communiques to encompass much of the able-bodied male population. Seven thousand “terrorists” have already been killed, notes a Russian general proudly, and another 15,000 are yet to be liquidated. Many Chechens now believe that the Russians are bent on exterminating them.

Chechens are not the only victims. Freedom of information, perhaps the greatest achievement of the post-Soviet era, has all but disappeared when it comes to the war. Virtually all media parrot military-scripted propaganda that would do the Soviets proud. Some of it falls into the theater-of-the-absurd category. Putin wants to find a political solution, but only after all terrorists have been eliminated. Emergencies Minister Sergei K. Shoigu vows that the Duma elections will take place, even as Russian artillery pounds voters in Grozny around the clock.

The Russian brass has also displayed a new political assertiveness in Chechnya that is troubling in a democracy. Handed full control over the war effort, the generals have issued undisguised warnings to the political leadership not to interfere. Some are even characterizing previous political negotiations and agreements with the Chechens as a national betrayal. A new bellicosity is also evident in relations with neighbors and the West. On the heels of some saber rattling by Yeltsin and Putin, deputy chief of the general staff, Gen. Valery L. Manilov, warned foreign military attaches that Russian military doctrine calls for a nuclear response to nonnuclear threats.

While the West may dismiss such rhetoric as bluster, growing threats and pressure on Russia’s neighbors in the Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan cannot be so easily downplayed. Persistent if groundless accusations against Tbilisi of supporting the Chechens and constant violations of Georgia’s airspace by the Russian air force, combined with Moscow’s documented support for Georgian separatists and demand for military bases, should worry the West. The Russian military and its sympathizers are not reconciled to the loss of their strategic preeminence in the oil-rich Caspian and Transcaucasian region and the pro-Western policies of their neighbors. A successful campaign in Chechnya could stir up more trouble, or, if victory turns out to be elusive, the military might be tempted to destabilize the area.

Chances of that are better than even. Contrary to the military’s sanguine assertions, the fall of Grozny will mark not the end of the war but the beginning of a new and more costly stage in the conflict, one in which the Chechens are likely to show greater staying power than the mighty Russians.

To understand this, a brief excursion in history is necessary. A tiny but proud warrior nation of less than 1 million, the Chechens have been the victims of Russian imperialism to an extent greater than any other Russian ethnic group. They have dished out as they have received. As imperial Russia imposed its rule in the Caucasus in the mid-19th century, the legendary Chechen warrior Imam Shamil fought the Russians to a standstill during nearly 30 years of constant warfare. Later, Chechens refused to submit to their new Soviet overlords, and guerrilla warfare continued in the mountains for decades, culminating in a full-scale rebellion and declaration of Chechen independence in 1940. Four years later, Josef Stalin took his revenge and brutally uprooted and deported the entire Chechen people to Central Asia on the pretext of their collaboration with the Nazis, who never set foot in Chechnya. Half of them perished. When they were allowed to return to their ancestral land in the mid-1950s, many found their homes occupied by Russian settlers.

With the latest events reinforcing their almost genetically programmed hatred of Russians, the Chechens will now withdraw to the mountains that cover 40% of their country and again resort to a guerrilla war. Chances are that it will also be accompanied by a terrorist campaign in Russia proper.

For the Russians, controlling Chechnya will prove a daunting task. Unable to find many Chechens willing to collaborate, they were forced to settle for a jailed Chechen embezzler as the quisling figure needed for foreign consumption. To maintain Russian rule, every single settlement will have to be occupied militarily. This is, in fact, what the Russian command has in mind in announcing a planned permanent deployment of large forces in the country.

How feasible this is politically and economically, let alone militarily, is open to question. Four-fifths of the Russian people currently support the war, which they are told will be quick and victorious, and is being conducted virtually without Russian casualties. What the reaction will be when it becomes clear that success is not near and when body bags start piling up is far from certain. It is difficult to escape the impression, though, that, yet again, Russia has bitten off more than it can chew and will end up paying a high price.