The Most Top-Secret of Secrets Have Their Own Way of Getting Loose

The case of former Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee brings to mind an incident that occurred nearly 50 years ago.

For years after World War II, the United States made every effort to keep its then-limited stockpile of fissionable materials extremely secret, hoping to keep the Soviets from knowing the magnitude of our retaliatory power in the event of war. In the early 1950s, while with the Rand Corp. in Santa Monica, I was assigned to work part time in an Air Force planning shop in the Pentagon as the in-house nuclear weapons expert.

I was given a very special, extremely restricted, top-secret security clearance, which allowed me to obtain information about the current and projected stockpiles of uranium-235 and plutonium that went into our atomic bombs. To be able to use this information, I would go to the office of a colonel, who had the relevant documents in his almost-inaccessible office safe. Then, in his presence, I would read through those documents and scribble two columns of numbers to take back to my Pentagon office, but not back to Santa Monica. Nothing else. These numbers represented the number of kilograms of these vital materials for some period into the future.

Back at Rand, a colleague had conducted a classified nuclear bombing study, which required using these stockpile numbers. Since he did not have the clearance that I had, nor did Rand’s president, he supposedly was forced to use unclassified sources in the open literature whose accuracy he was in no position to certify. One day, he briefed the Rand staff on his classified study, during which he wrote on a blackboard the precise ultra top-secret numbers I had obtained in the Pentagon, stating that these numbers were his personal estimates.

I was horrified, for anyone in the audience could have put these numbers in an article for a professional journal. Any number of hostile countries, especially the Soviet Union, could utilize this material. Here, on the blackboard, was one of the most egregious security violations imaginable and I felt, as a loyal American, that it was necessary to apprehend this person.

There was one problem. If I did turn this person in to the Pentagon, heaven only knows what might happen to Rand. The think tank was a true asset to the Air Force, which at that time held sole control of Rand’s budget. After considerable thought, I decided to break security myself and report the matter to Rand’s president. I swore him to secrecy. His Solomon-like solution was simple. All reports on the study containing the vital data were to be withheld and destroyed and the briefer was ordered to never again release these numbers to anyone. It worked (or did it?); but I still have pangs of conscience over my comportment, which was a terrible security violation that went unreported.

Regarding the case of Wen Ho Lee, apparently the U.S. government has concluded that there is no credible evidence that he has committed espionage. However, Lee has been indicted and arrested for secretly moving large amounts of classified nuclear warhead data from a highly secure computer into a more accessible area and downloading most of the data onto a number of tapes, some of which are missing. Thus far, there is nothing to indicate that this classified material has fallen into the wrong hands. If convicted, Lee could spend the rest of his life in prison. This would be an unbelievably harsh punishment for a security infraction that very possibly has produced no tangible harm to the U.S. and perhaps never will.

One of the major objections made by those opposing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty relates to the alleged deterioration of nuclear warhead reliability should testing not be allowed. In principle this sounds logical but in reality we are concerned with a stockpile that: (a) we don’t know how to use other than for annihilating tens of millions of noncombatants and destroying their economic base; and (b) has been so overdesigned by unrealistic requirements from the military as to virtually ensure some degree of unreliability in the warheads.

On this basis, why would China or India or Pakistan wish to incorporate America’s most sophisticated technology into its warheads? Such countries might gain somewhat by exploiting aspects of U.S. warhead technology, but the bottom line is that they will develop warheads that fit their specifications, not ours. In this respect, even if Lee’s misbehavior regarding classified material were to result in some, or even all, of this material falling into the wrong hands, how does one prove that his actions have significantly hurt his country?

The government should drop all charges against Lee and allow him to apply his considerable talents in the U.S. private unclassified sector. Everyone would come out ahead, except for those die-hards in Washington who might suffer hurt feelings. And possibly the government might consider acting rationally on nuclear matters, which it doesn’t really understand and never has.