Master Strategist Turning Attack Into Opportunity

Saddam Hussein’s foreign policy gambits are usually driven by a combination of fear and opportunity. In 1980, he invaded Iran because he feared that the Ayatollah Khomeini’s brand of Islamic fundamentalism would sweep him from power, and because he saw in the chaos of the Iranian revolution a chance to make himself the hegemon of the Persian Gulf. In 1990, he invaded Kuwait because he feared that Iraq’s economic straits could cripple his country, and because Iran’s defeat during the Iran-Iraq war created an opportunity for him to seize a coveted prize.

Iraq’s latest offensive following the U.S. and British airstrikes in December follows his pattern. Saddam fears that Operation Desert Fox may have created dissension in the ranks of his loyalists. Saddam’s first concern is always his control of Iraq. It is his scrupulous attention to his internal position--and his skill in doing so--that has allowed him to survive 30 years in power and countless coup attempts. The key to this survival is his ability to maintain the loyalty of those around him.

Saddam’s loyalists do not enjoy seeing Iraq battered by the U.S. military without being able to mount any resistance. For this reason, Saddam has backed down quickly on every prior occasion since the Gulf War that the U.S. either used force or credibly threatened to do so. This time, Baghdad did not back down because the United States would not let it.

During Operation Desert Fox, the Iraqis suffered the worst pummeling they have taken since the Gulf War. Worse still, this time the United States targeted those things most precious to Saddam’s power base: Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, its air force and the regime protection forces (the Special Security Organization, the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard). Thus, Desert Fox went after Saddam’s supporters themselves.

Meanwhile, Iraq was unable to muster any real resistance, and American and British military forces bombed with impunity. All the Iraqis could do was sit and take it.

Now, Saddam is scrambling to demonstrate to his supporters that the four days of airstrikes they endured were somehow worth it. Even before the bombing stopped, he announced that Iraq would cease all cooperation with the U.N. arms inspectors. Since then, he has challenged the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq on three occasions; two involved groundfire against patrolling U.S. and British planes, and this week there was an aerial engagement. Most recently, he has barred American and British personnel from participating in the U.N. programs to distribute humanitarian supplies. And he may have other ideas up his sleeve.

Saddam is betting that if he can unilaterally abrogate the U.N. inspection regime, force the coalition to end the no-fly zones and assert his control over the U.N.’s distribution system by gaining the right to determine its composition, he will be able to show the kind of tangible gains that will convince his supporters that it was worth waiting out four days of harrowing airstrikes.

However, Baghdad no doubt sees opportunity here as well. The no-fly zones are a particularly vulnerable target. They were established after the Gulf War to prevent Saddam from repressing Iraqi Kurds and Shiites as demanded by the U.N. However, there is no resolution specifically authorizing the no-fly zones themselves, and so Iraq has been able to claim that they are illegal.

So, too, many Arabs see the no-fly zones as part of a U.S.-led conspiracy against Iraq.

Saddam likely believes that an attrition strategy toward the no-fly zones will eventually put enough pressure on the U.S. and Britain to end them. Saddam’s attacks have forced the U.S. and Britain to greatly increase the numbers of no-fly zone sorties since Desert Fox. This increase in operational tempo could strain the British-American air forces if it drags on. Moreover, every time U.S. and British aircraft attack an Iraqi air defense site it further rankles those countries who oppose these zones and those people who see them as symbols of overbearing American aggression. Saddam may well try to take periodic shots at U.S. and British aircraft to keep these various pots simmering.

The U.S. also should see the current situation as one of pitfalls and opportunities. Saddam’s obsession with his internal security often prompts him to take actions that bolster his domestic position but undermine his international position. To some extent, he has done exactly that: His unmitigated bellicosity, his insistence on immediate concessions and his attacks on aircraft in the no-fly zones have exasperated erstwhile supporters like France and Egypt. Nevertheless, the U.S. cannot allow Saddam to achieve any of his current ambitions.

If, in the end, all the United States can boast from four days of airstrikes is that we set back Iraq’s missile program by one year, while Iraq can crow that it ended the inspection regime, undermined the no-fly zones and secured its control over the U.N. humanitarian distribution program, Saddam and his loyalists won’t be the only ones claiming that he was the real victor of Operation Desert Fox.