Advertisement

Clinton Rightly Boosted Spending

Share
M. Thomas Davis, a retired Army colonel, is a senior defense analyst at Northrup-Grumman in Washington and the author of "Managing Defense After the Cold War" (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1997)

Last week President Clinton announced a decision to increase defense spending by $12 billion in his budget for next fiscal year as part of an approximately $110-billion increase over 2000-05. It was a courageous move. Not only did the president place himself at odds with many of his own political constituencies, but he implicitly acknowledged the inadequacy of previous defense budgets and the growing signs of erosion within the military.

The 14-year downward trend in military spending had to end, the heavy deployment demands on combat forces had to be recognized, the increasingly difficult recruiting environment had to be addressed and the expanding need for replacing and modernizing aging equipment had to faced.

Those who oppose this defense increase have raised numerous arguments supporting their views. Some have merit. As last month’s operation against Iraq indicated, we are on the cusp of new military capabilities evolving around increasingly more precise, unmanned systems. The Pentagon should pursue such approaches with greater enthusiasm than it has so far demonstrated.

Advertisement

But other criticisms--that current spending equals that of the Cold War, that it exceeds that of the next five largest defense spenders combined and that many of the shortages are caused by congressional pork-barreling--are much less compelling.

Several defense authorities have noted that today’s defense budget, in constant dollars, equals the defense spending at the “height of the Cold War.” This height is commonly described as 1975, which makes the observation literally true. But 1975 was a low point for defense spending. It was the year South Vietnam fell to the North, the year the nation faced a major economic and energy crisis and the year the armed forces were transitioning from the draft to an all-volunteer force. This time frame was the dawn of the “hollow force,” when the military looked good on the outside but was plagued by shortages on the inside. Recovering from this required a tremendous rebuilding expense; defense spending, in fact, increased 56% during the Reagan administration.

As tense and dangerous as it was, the Cold War was a set-piece condition where our forces were largely stationed abroad and followed a very stable operating and training regime. Today’s condition, in which a relatively more expensive volunteer force deploys frequently to meet global demands, badly skews comparisons to the Cold War era. But if the height of the Cold War is considered to be 1985 rather than 1975, defense spending actually has decreased 37%, yielding a cumulative savings to the taxpayers of nearly $1 trillion.

A second common rationale for opposing increased defense outlay is that our spending equals that of the next five major spenders combined. Again, this is literally true. The defense budgets of Russia, China, Japan, France and Germany reflect the conditions of countries that have largely regional interests; none plays a global role in keeping international order.

Global power projection, precision strike capability and defending against threats from tank armies to terrorists--all of these are expensive. But is there anyone better suited than the United States to play this leadership role?

Finally is the argument that the Pentagon would have all the money it needed if Congress would stop diverting funds to various pet projects. Members of Congress are elected by their constituents to serve their interests. That is the essence of a democratic process. Compared with the entire defense budget, pork can be viewed as a 2% marginal tax that is paying for democracy. Given the alternatives, we should be pleased to pay it.

Advertisement

In fulfilling the responsibilities it has accepted, the U.S. has increasingly been forced to rely on its military instrument. When it does so, the national expectations are high that the missions will be performed effectively with minimal loss of life. Maintaining a military force capable of projecting power on short notice and protecting it from hostile threats while doing so is costly. Unless we are willing to reduce our role or lower our expectations, we have little alternative to paying the bill it creates.

Advertisement