‘The Managers . . . Merged Two . . . Issues’

Excerpts from the Senate presentation of White House special counsel Gregory Craig:

Article I accuses the president of having given “perjurious, false, and misleading” testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of four different subject areas:

First, when he testified about the nature and details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; second, when he testified about his testimony in the [Paula Corbin] Jones deposition; third, when he testified about what happened during the Jones deposition when the president’s lawyer, Robert Bennett, made certain representations about Monica Lewinsky’s affidavit; and fourth, when he testified about alleged efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and impede the discovery of evidence.

It is noteworthy that the second and third subject areas are attempts to revisit the president’s deposition testimony in the Jones case.

There was an article that was proposed, alleging that the president also committed perjury in the Jones case, in the Jones deposition. That article was rejected by the House of Representatives, and there were very many good reasons for the House to take that action.

Those allegations have been dismissed, and you must not allow the managers to revive them. Last week they tried to do that. The managers mixed up and merged two sets of issues: allegations of perjury in the grand jury and allegations of perjury in the Jones case. These are very different matters, and I think the result was confusing and also unfair to the president.

Flaw in Article I

But the most striking thing about Article I is what it does not say. It alleges perjury generally, but it does not allege a single perjurious statement specifically. The majority drafted the article this way despite pleas from other members of the committee and from counsel for the president that the article take care to be precise when it makes its allegations.

Such specificity, as many of you know, is the standard practice of federal prosecutors all across America. And that is the practice recommended by the Department of Justice in the manual distributed to United States attorneys, who enforce the criminal code in federal courts throughout the nation.

In the past, when the House has returned articles of impeachment alleging perjury with respect to a federal judge, you will see that the House has followed this practice. And if you go back through American history and review the articles that have alleged perjury and that have been approved by the House and the Senate, you will find that the statements that are alleged to be perjurious are specifically identified in the articles.

Now, the failure of the House to be specific in its charges of perjury has in fact violated the president’s right to due process and fundamental fairness.

2 Separate Remedies

[The Founding Fathers] made an important distinction that we should recognize and respect today between conduct in official capacity and conduct in private capacity. And they created two different ways of dealing with these two very different kinds of conduct. Impeachment was to protect the country from abuse of official power by an out-of-control president or by someone who is so abusive and assaultive on the system of government that he had to be removed to protect the government.

The criminal justice system was to vindicate the rule of law. And the clearest indication that one was not meant to be a substitute for the other can be found in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the Constitution: “Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.”

If the president’s conduct in his official capacity is so grave as to be a serious assault upon the system of government, so serious as to subvert our constitutional order, so serious as to require the nation to be protected from the damage that he would do if he were to continue in office, the remedy is impeachment and removal by a political process. If, however, the president’s conduct does not implicate the office or the powers of the presidency, the remedy is in a legal process involving prosecution, conviction and punishment in the courts.

Excerpts from presentation of White House Deputy Counsel Cheryl Mills:

It is a particular honor for me to stand on the Senate floor today. I am an Army brat. And my father served in the Army for 27 years. I grew in a military world where opportunity was a reality and not just a slogan. The very fact that the daughter of an Army officer from Richmond, Va.--the very fact that I can represent the president of the United States, on the floor of the Senate of the United States, is powerful proof that the American dream lives.

As a lawyer, as an American and as an African American, it is a principle in which I believe to the very core of my being. It is what many have struggled and died for, the right to be equal before the law . . .

If you love the rule of law, you must love it in all of its applications. You cannot only love it when it provides the verdict you seek; you must love it when the verdict goes against you, as well. We cannot uphold the rule of law only when it is consistent with our beliefs; we must uphold it even when it protects behavior that we don’t like or is unattractive, or is not admirable, or that might even be hurtful. And we cannot say we love the rule of law but dismiss arguments that appeal to the rule of law as “legalisms” or “legal hair-splitting.”

I say all this because not only the facts but the law of obstruction of justice protects the president. It does not condemn him. And the managers cannot deny the president the protection that is provided by the law and still insist they are acting to uphold the law.

His conduct, while clearly not attractive or admirable, is not criminal.

The Big Picture

The big picture is this: The president had a relationship with a young woman. His conduct was inappropriate. But it was not obstruction of justice.

During the course of their relationship, the president and the young woman pledged not to talk about it with others. That is not obstruction of justice. . . .

One day, however, long after he had ended the relationship, he was asked about it in an unrelated lawsuit, a lawsuit whose intent, at least as proclaimed by those who were pursuing it, was to politically damage him. That was their publicly announced goal. So he knew, the president knew that his secret would soon be exposed. And he was right. . . . That is the real big picture. That is the truth. And that is not obstruction of justice.

Discussion of Gifts

Ms. Lewinsky told Ms. Currie that she had a box of gifts that the president had given her that she wanted Ms. Currie to hold because people were asking questions. . . .

Ms. Currie agreed to hold the box of gifts. . . .

Ms. Currie did not raise Ms. Lewinsky’s request with the president. . . .

On Dec. 28, Ms. Lewinsky and the president met in the Oval Office to exchange Christmas gifts, at which time they discussed the fact that the lawyers in the Jones case had subpoenaed all of the president’s gifts.

Ms. Lewinsky asked the president whether she should “put away the gifts outside her house someplace or give them to someone, maybe Betty.” At that time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the president said, “Let me think about it.”

No one claims he ordered, suggested or even hinted that anyone obstruct justice. At most, the president says, “Let me think about it.” That is not obstruction of justice.