The Iranian Revolution, Part II, Comes Into Focus

Two decades after Iran stunned the world by using religion to end 2,500 years of monarchy, a new generation of students has finally dared to put the revolution back on its original course.

They’re also proving that the revolution, in the end, was not about fundamentalism, about a reactionary and intolerant worldview or about returning to a way of life dating back to the seventh century when Islam was founded by the prophet Muhammad.

At its core, Iran’s revolution was really no different from movements fighting apartheid and colonial rule in Africa, military dictatorships in Latin America or communism in Eastern Europe. It was part of the underlying theme of the 20th century: Empowerment. Participation. Democracy. Iranians wanted the rights and freedoms that had swept the rest of the world--the rule of law, basic human rights and a say in determining their individual and national destiny.

The vast majority of Iranians turned to religion in 1978-79 because Islam was a vehicle--at the time, the only legal vehicle since real opposition was outlawed--to fight an authoritarian dynasty. When it succeeded, the values of Islam also became integral in crafting a new system.

The original generation was, in that sense, no different from other societies that used religion to encourage or induce change. At various times, virtually all the world’s great faiths--Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism and others--provided ideals such as universal equality and human dignity to shape political movements, define goals, offer an infrastructure to mobilize opposition and help shape a new order. Christian values played a big part in America’s revolution.

Unfortunately, Iran’s 1979 revolution was quickly hijacked by conservative clerics who crafted a constitution delegating ultimate power to a religious Supreme Leader. To ensure their continuing control, they have since manipulated elections, purged, imprisoned or blocked serious opposition, imposed rigid social restrictions and, for several years, supported extremist tactics against opponents on five continents.

The bold protests that began on the normally tranquil, tree-lined campus of the Tehran University on July 8, and eventually spread to 18 cities in six short days, are again focusing national attention on the rights and freedoms Iranians originally sought during 14 months of unrest that forced the shah to abandon the Peacock Throne.

Even the slogans are the same. “Down with dictators” and “Death to despots” were again rallying cries during this new generation of student protests. So were chants of “Freedom, independence and dignity.”

The 14 demands outlined by the United Student Front embody, indeed echo, many of the revolution’s original goals, including freedom of the press, release of political prisoners, open trials, accountability of state institutions and public investigations into intelligence and security operations against dissidents.

They are not seeking a counterrevolution--yet. What they are looking for is reform that makes the Islamic Republic more of a republic than a theocracy.

In a telling move, however, the students also demanded the transfer of key institutions--including the military and parastate foundations that account for up to 40% of Iran’s economic activity--from the control of religious officials or bodies to executive branch control.

What makes the unrest particularly interesting--and particularly legitimate--is that many protesters are offspring of the original revolutionaries. The higher education system has long given preference to applicants with Islamic “credentials”--the offspring of veterans or ‘martyrs’ from the eight-year war with Iraq, as well as children of clerics, civil servants and bazaar merchants who financed the revolution and the poor in whose name the revolution was undertaken.

Because of growing challenges from students, conservatives in Parliament last year pushed to increase the presence on university campuses of Basij volunteers, young militants who served as human minesweepers during the war and who have since helped enforce Islamic purity.

“Someone close to the system once told me that the biggest problem for the regime in general was its own children, who are not in tune with them,’ reflected Haleh Esfandiari, an Iranian and Mideast project director at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “It must be chilling to see their own children rising up against them.”

The week-long uprising also had legitimacy because Iran’s young are the majority. Indeed, ironically, the revolution actually created its own challenge.

When the mullahs came to power, they called on Iranian women to breed an Islamic generation. The women more than complied. In 1979, Iran’s population was 34 million. A generation later, it’s 62 million. Some 65% of Iran is now under age 25, making its population one of the world’s youngest. This is also the most educated class of young people in Iranian history. From 1979 to 1999, literacy went from 58% to 82%.

But in trying to predict the Islamic Republic’s future, the critical variable may ultimately be the voting age. Iranian youth begin voting at 15. They were the critical component in the stunning upset victory of reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997.

The burgeoning power of Iran’s young can’t be overestimated, as conservatives in Parliament acknowledged when they tried, unsuccessfully, in 1998 to change the voting age to 18.

The current unrest--and the regime’s ferocious reaction to it--plays out in that context. Iran faces critical elections for Parliament next February. The last two votes for the presidency in 1997 and the first ever municipal elections this year were swept by reformers. Conservatives who have used Parliament as the primary platform to block reforms will be fighting for their political life.

The anger and frustration of the young can’t be exaggerated. At least 70% of Iran’s unemployed are aged 15 to 24. Courtesy of the baby boom, some 900,000 young join the job market every year in an economy that produces some 300,000 jobs for all ages. Universities can provide places for only one out of 10 applicants. More than eight million Iranians of marriageable age are unable to afford the costs of a wedding, independent living or children.

The regime has pulled out all stops to quell the unrest. It’s banned further protests without government permits. It’s supplemented police with Basij and intelligence agents deployed on the streets. It mobilized tens of thousands, reportedly including military troops in plainclothes, for an impressive counter-demonstration on Wednesday. It’s pledged more arrests and threatened the death sentence for the protesters’ “counterrevolutionary” activities.

There is also growing evidence that regime agents or allies played a pivotal role in escalating peaceful protests into riots that resulted in significant destruction at the University of Tehran as well as public facilities, according to Iranians who witnessed the trouble.

The provocateurs’ goal was to discredit the students as lawless, portray Khatami as powerless, create conditions that either force the reformist leadership to resign or justify impeaching him and his Cabinet--all in the name of blocking further challenges to the purist version of the world’s only modern theocracy.

Late last week, several newspapers published a statement from Khatami supporters accusing his opponents with trying to drive him from office.

“Since the formation of the Khatami government, certain groups have made the destruction of his reform agenda their principal goal. Through orchestrated crises they want to make the Iranian people regret going down the path of freedom, democracy and political progress. They are creating the necessary conditions for a political and military coup d’etat”’ the statement charged.

“The closer we get to February’s legislative elections, the more these groups are stepping up their efforts to bring reform to a dead end and to postpone or cancel the elections.”

Short-term, the sweeping crackdown may indeed dampen the most serious unrest since the 1979 revolution. Khatami’s clout and credibility--even his ability to stay in power--may be undermined.

But he has always been the byproduct of the public’s desire for change, signified by his 70% share of the vote in a four-way contest. They put him there. The movement for reform will survive his political fate.

Meanwhile, the students’ 14-point demands will remain on the table.

And, in the background, is Iran’s century-long struggle for democratic reforms--first, during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-12; then, the National Movement of 1951-53; and, finally, the 1979 revolution. Each prodded the forces of history along. The student movement is but another step.

“Today there is such a volcano of national rage erupting in the university,’ the United Student Front said in a statement late last week, after the unrest ended. If the demands of this nation are not heeded by the tyrannical forces, the flame of this inferno shall burn all of the present authorities of the regime.”

The issue no longer is whether Iran will undergo reform--but how long and how messy that process will be.*