Avoid Doomsaying, but Indulge in a Little Healthy Paranoia

Sixteen years ago, I wrote an essay for this newspaper addressing the dangers and difficulties of calibrating the right level of preparedness needed to prevent or respond to potential terrorist attacks. A report released last week by the commission on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction headed by former CIA Director John Deutch renews this issue, but now the dilemma we face over terrorism has deepened. While we must be ready for a variety of doomsday scenarios, we cannot succumb to a corrosive paranoia.

The question is not, as it was in 1983, whether we should be parking snowplows in front of the White House to block the path of suicidal truck bombers; Pennsylvania Avenue was closed to all traffic four years ago for security reasons. The question is how much we as a nation should be doing to prepare for possible use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states or terrorists, attacks that, if they occurred, could involve thousands or tens of thousands of deaths.

The answer rests upon whether we consider such a possibility to be a clear and present danger or consign it to the realm of millennial anxieties. Absent something we can define, we too easily end up doomsaying. Of course, we must try to deal with threats--even if we don’t know exactly what they are or where they will come from--in a thoughtful and measured way. But we must not spiral into a frenzy of fear that would waste resources, threaten civil liberties and put the whole nation behind mental barricades.

In December 1983, when I wrote the essay for The Times, a barrage of dramatic terrorist attacks had provoked palpable fear in America. That October, a suicide truck bomber smashed into the building housing U.S. Marines in Beirut, killing 241 servicemen. A month later, a bombing carried out by a radical domestic group caused heavy damage at the U.S. Capitol. A month after that, another suicide bomber crashed into the American embassy in Kuwait, killing four and injuring 59. In an atmosphere of fear and alarm, precautions were taken as a matter of prudence, even though the highly visible security measures only added to the anxiety. It felt as if we were under siege.

“We must take precautions not only against terrorist attacks,” I wrote in 1983, “but also against the psychological effects of terrorism, and of the measures we take in the name of security.” The problem is, as I said in that article, there is no line “between prudence and paranoia.” This is the dilemma we confront in preparing for events that, although perhaps unlikely, were they to occur, could have serious physical and psychological consequences for the nation. Prudence requires preparedness. At the same time, we risk creating a climate of fear that not even terrorists could improve upon. The dilemma is even more apparent when it comes to weapons of mass destruction.

There is ample cause for concern. The impoverishment of the Soviet Union’s once-mighty scientific establishment along with growing organized crime and corruption in Russia raise concerns about the security of its nuclear arsenal. A number of foes or potential foes of the United States--Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Yugoslavia--are conducting research on chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Mentions of anthrax in the press increased twentyfold during the 1990s. Not surprisingly, we have suffered a spate of anthrax hoaxes.

Public discussion by government officials and scientists, sensationalist coverage in the news media, not to mention novels and movies, reinforce popular fears.

But on what basis do we prepare for a feared disaster? Extraordinary security precautions at airports were a necessary response to hundreds of hijackings and attempts to sabotage commercial airliners. A proposed $14-billion program to improve embassy security is justified by last year’s bombings of two American embassies in Africa, as was closing six U.S. embassies just weeks ago because they were believed to be possible targets of further terrorist attacks.

But, fortunately, we do not have a rich history of serious chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism. We do not know that any of America’s foes are planning to use such weapons, nor can we be confident that we would know if they were. In other words, we lack a validated threat. Instead, we are dealing with what-ifs. If the consequences were not horrendous, we might be able to wait and see. However, the concern is not about the loss of an airplane or an embassy but, in the worst case scenario, the loss of an American city.

Therein lies the dilemma. Raising the level of preparedness may be prudent, but rousing a noisy democracy and penurious Congress to action, absent an actual disaster or a clearly identified enemy on the horizon, risks publicizing the concerns, cataloging infinite vulnerabilities and projecting worst-case scenarios. It encourages doomsaying. And that, in turn generates anxiety that can lead to misguided responses.

As we move away from comfortable Cold War concerns toward a still uncertain array of dangers, we will need to refocus our intelligence efforts, reorganize our security structure and improve our ability to effectively respond to new contingencies.

The Deutch report should be viewed as a sober call to arms, not a cause for public panic.