Taipei Sows Distrust, Not Real Solutions

Taiwan has been a sensitive issue in the U.S.-China relationship since 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist forces retreated to Taiwan from the mainland. After more than two decades of unremitting hostility and recurring crises involving Taiwan, a truce was reached in 1972. In the Shanghai Communique of that year, the United States stated that it “does not challenge” the position of both Beijing and Taipei that there is but one China.

In subsequent comments and clarifications, together with the 1979 normalization agreement and the arms sales agreement of 1982, the United States urged Beijing and Taipei to negotiate their differences, insisted that a settlement must be by peaceful means and added that it would accept any implementation of the “one China” principle agreed to jointly by the two sides. It declared there should be no unilateral steps to change the situation.

With the Shanghai Communique, these documents are called the “three communiques.” Together with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act--a U.S. domestic law that declares that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, [is] a threat to this peace and security of the Western Pacific and is of grave concern to the United States”--they are the policy framework that has preserved a peaceful environment under which all parties have prospered.

A Close Friendship

Though there have been several periods of considerable tension, the U.S. and Taiwan have retained a close friendship and bilateral economic relations have thrived; Taiwan has become one of the “Asian tigers.” The periods of tension have resulted mostly from a belief by one of the three parties that the “envelope” described by the three communiques was being stretched by one or more of the others. A serious episode of that was the period 1995-96. The Chinese, after publicly saying that the U.S. had overstepped by giving Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui a visa to speak at Cornell University, tried to intimidate the Taiwanese from voting during 1996 presidential elections. That intimidation caused the U.S. to move two carriers to the area as a warning and raised tensions to a high level.

Now another such crisis has arisen, resulting from a statement by Lee on July 18 that discussions between Taiwan and China should be recognized as state-to-state talks. That, in effect, repudiates the “one China” concept because it strains logic to have two-state talks within a one-state framework.Taiwan explains its new formulation principally as a need to expand its “international” space, i.e., obtain increased diplomatic recognition by the international community. The fact is, however, that except for the few who can be bought with generous Taipei economic contributions. few countries will challenge China on this issue, whatever Taiwan calls itself. An additional but unspoken explanation may well be that the new formulation is a response to local Taiwan political developments in the run-up to next year’s elections.The Chinese are greatly concerned that Taiwan might declare its independence. They have made clear that such a declaration would be an intolerable threat to which they would respond militarily. However, there is serious doubt that they could successfully subdue Taiwan by force now, and they know that any such attempt would run a substantial risk of confrontation with the United States.

It is perhaps for these reasons that China has been relatively relaxed about the terms and timetable of a possible reunification, but very rigid about independence. Indeed, were the Chinese reassured about the Taiwan independence issue, they would be likely to be more accommodating about other Taiwanese concerns.

Helped by Status Quo

Taiwan’s security and prosperity have been nurtured by the status quo. To put those most essential features of sovereignty at risk for a domestic political ploy is not responsible. To try unilaterally to thwart U.S. policy without notice or consultation is deeply troubling. To have done so at a time when China-U.S. relations are seriously stressed over other issues it strikes at the heart of the relationship between Washington and Taipei.

Are the three communiques a relic of the Cold War? If so, they have guaranteed peace and prosperity by effectively ending a civil war and improving the quality of life for millions of Chinese on Taiwan and the mainland. They have ensured that the question is not whether or how Taiwan is absorbed by China but on what basis the two governments and peoples associate. Meanwhile, they have provided a stage on which China and Taiwan have acted to steadily improve cross-strait commercial and people-to-people links. Rigidities and suspicion on both sides of the strait have given way to a uniquely Chinese process of gradual rapprochement. Taiwan should be ready to deal from the strength of its democracy, pressing China for imaginative solutions.

China is undergoing profound economic and political changes. These trends are decidedly in Taiwan’s interest. Patience and persistent dialogue will allow both governments to be swept along by commercial ties, cultural bonds and the shared interests of a new generation that has little use for ideologies. Chinese will find a uniquely Chinese accommodation that assures prosperity and opportunity. Americans have a profound interest in the results of this process, but we must not allow ourselves to be exploited by those on either side who seek to widen the old gaps or fuel suspicions. No one should be tempted to play an America card.

The Best Response

How then should the United States respond to this declaration by Taipei? We should make two points, being at pains to ensure they are heard clearly on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. First, we should reiterate our strong attachment to the people of Taiwan and underscore that we would take very seriously our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act should China launch an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. Second, just as we would not acquiesce tolerate an aggression by China in violation of our understandings concerning the three communiques, neither can we remain passive in the face of what amounts to an attack on them by Taiwan. Therefore, while we retain great affection and respect for Taiwan and its people, they cannot expect our support in dealing with the possible consequences of a unilateral abrogation of the “one China” policy which has been the basis of U.S. policy and of stability in the Taiwan Strait region for 27 years.