A Strategy on Land Mines Is Needed Now

Tens of thousands of land mines will be left behind as Serb forces withdraw from Kosovo, and nobody has a long-term plan for removing them. The international community must begin work together now to develop an integrated approach or prospects for peace and economic recovery in Kosovo will be thwarted.

Knowledge about the relationship between land mine problems, peace settlements and rebuilding shattered communities is scarce. Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq and the stabilization of affairs in Bosnia are experiences that can help shape effective planning for Kosovo. In northern Iraq, there were recognizable phases to the refugee operation. First, the military entered and secured the area. Mines were removed from refugee reception zones and core transportation routes. Then, international relief organizations came forward and restarted their local operations.

But the next step--taking these mines out of the ground--did not take place. Despite the valuable mine location information provided by area residents and some international relief workers, land mines were treated as an acceptable, if pernicious, danger to the population. Wise planners will include the accounts of local residents and international aid workers in Kosovo.

Large-scale mine removal normally occurs when the threat of violence has receded, armed forces have departed, and local governance has been restored. National and international organizations then work with local leaders to develop long-term aid plans and mine-removal programs.

In Bosnia, soldiers and civilians alike were aware of the land mine threat. Allied military forces, after several fatalities and traumatic injuries, made land mine awareness among the troops a high priority. These troops, however, primarily removed mines when it was necessary for force protection. International companies, local contractors and local forces tackled the larger mine problem, and they are still at work today. Not only do they compete for funding, they influence priorities as well. This is not a comprehensive master plan.

All five components of mine action--awareness; surveying, mapping and marking; removal; destruction; and victim assistance--should be an integral part of any comprehensive international operation. First, all minefield information must be given immediately to allied leaders. Should any of the combatants have only incomplete or inaccurate mine records, their soldiers should show the entering forces just where the mines have been placed. This will save lives. It was not done in Bosnia, and it exacted a high price. Human suffering remains, and economic output is still less than half of what it was in 1990.

In the initial phase of the Kosovo peace, international military forces will clear mines to protect themselves and allow for the necessary freedom of movement to accomplish their mission. This mine-clearing effort should also support the rapid return of refugees and the swift resumption of local commerce. Military mine-clearing and mine-awareness training should be supplemented by mine-awareness education for refugees and internally displaced persons. Assuring adequate medical supplies and attention for mine casualties should be a high priority.

Once the initial phase of a Kosovo deployment is completed, the international protection force is likely to limit and then stop its mine-clearance work. Civilian groups must then take over. International experts often are brought in to help train local residents in mine safety and removal. Local security forces can also be trained and equipped to participate. Despite the widespread belief that mine clearance is an integral part of post-conflict peace-building, economic revitalization and sustainable development, there is no agreed model for addressing or even coordinating these different needs and roles.

If the work in Kosovo is to be effective, international planners must develop a comprehensive strategy now. Otherwise, the fighting may cease, but the casualties will go on.