The Time Is Ripe for Engagement

Give the Clinton administration--in concert with our Korean and Japanese allies--credit for what appears to be a breakthrough in the standoff with North Korea. Pyongyang has agreed to inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility in May and to resume talks with Washington on ballistic missiles. Although the White House says no quid pro quo is involved, the U.S. will send more food aid.

The time has never been better for the Clinton administration to engage North Korea in coordination with all major regional actors. Because past policies have failed to yield tangible results, the United States may find full engagement the last diplomatic recourse that it has in a situation that could easily lead to war by accident or miscalculation. Although North Korea would lose such a war, it would surely resort to missiles armed with chemical, biological and, perhaps, one or two nuclear warheads. Neither the United States nor our Asian allies have missile defense systems. That makes engagement all the more crucial and timely.

One of the urgent tasks the Clinton administration now faces is preserving the 1994 Agreed Framework, whereby Pyongyang would drop its nuclear weapons program in exchange for oil and two light water reactors. The pact’s shortcomings notwithstanding, it has become the cornerstone of Washington’s North Korea policy. Thus, Washington in the short term must focus on sustaining the agreement while building on it to construct a mid-to-long-term strategy establishing diplomatic relations.

Of course, many members of Congress will find it difficult to even think about normalizing relations with a rogue nation. Nevertheless, consider what the U.S. would gain were it to normalize relations to include diplomatic recognition and the lifting of the long-standing trade embargo against Pyongyang:

* U.S. recognition would eliminate the important source of North Korea’s bargaining power--its unpredictability and secrecy. Formal relations with Washington might force Pyongyang to release its tight control of information about its inner workings. Furthermore, a U.S. government and commercial presence in North Korea would enable Washington to collect more reliable intelligence about the reclusive North that would complement and verify the information gathered by spy satellites.

* Closer ties with the U.S. would make the leaders in Pyongyang increasingly dependent on U.S. aid and assistance to sustain their political control. With the North Korean economy paralyzed, millions suffer from hunger, malnutrition and disease. The North’s continuing dependency would enable Washington to exercise greater influence in prodding it toward desired economic reforms.

* Not wanting to be excluded, Japan would follow the U.S.-South Korea lead in normalizing relations with the North, and help to pull regional actors into a network of formal relations. Peaceful relations with neighboring countries would reassure Pyongyang of regime survival for the foreseeable future. Despite the contempt that many have for the North Korean dictatorship, the United States and others in the region share an unspoken short-term strategy not to topple this relic of a bygone era.

U.S.-North Korea normalization may not be the panacea for all the problems; establishing bilateral ties based on mutual trust could be a long, slow process. Nevertheless, U.S. recognition of the North would be a milestone in promoting transparency and confidence-building measures. Normalization could begin with North Korea’s agreement that formal relations with the United States are contingent on immediate and unequivocal verification of the North’s nuclear program, establishment of procedures leading to cessation of the development and sale of missiles, a clear timetable for North-South dialogue under the 1991 Basic Agreement and Pyongyang’s statement of intent to sign a permanent peace treaty with South Korea.

For the United States, engagement now may be the only credible option left to maintain peace and to guide the two Koreas toward peaceful unification. For North Korea, a speedy, positive response to a U.S.-proffered engagement policy is its best hope for avoiding isolation and implosion or war. We are approaching a “period of maximum danger” that can be avoided by swift exercise of U.S. leadership.