Prospects for Peace Remain Elusive

Soon after the first NATO cruise missiles screamed into Yugoslavia in a riot of deafening explosions and molten orange fire March 24, a din of troubling questions began to reverberate throughout the West: What exactly were the goals of the alliance’s most extensive combat operations in its half a century of existence? How long would the war against a European neighbor go on, and how would it end?

Nearly six weeks into Operation Allied Force, the war is still gearing up. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic appears no closer to capitulating to demands that armed allied troops be allowed into Kosovo to protect ethnic Albanians from slaughter. And the list of questions has grown:

Will an air war alone do the job?

Will NATO enter into a ground war?

Will Serbian forces rise up against Milosevic to oust him in order to save the country from destruction?

Or will there be a negotiated settlement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Milosevic?

However the war unfolds, the ultimate question is what will happen to Kosovo in the aftermath of the allied campaign. By many calculations, the international community is looking at a long and costly engagement in a Kosovo “protectorate,” a presence of tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel for a decade at least.

As the weeks of bombing tick on, political and military analysts wonder just how deep American sympathy for the plight of ethnic Albanians runs, and whether they will tire of paying their share of a $200-million-a-day war in a land that many still cannot locate on a map.

Europe, which is unable to fight a large-scale air or ground war on its own, asks whether Americans will see righteousness as sufficient grounds to stick out the war--particularly if U.S. body bags start to come home.

The resolve of other NATO countries is equally uncertain when it comes to ground troops or a prolonged and messy conflict. When will the din of questioning rise to a clamor to get out of Kosovo? And if it does before Milosevic folds, is there a way out that does not spell defeat?

All of this sounds an alarm not only for Americans who remember Vietnam, but also for Britons who have their own history of prolonged engagements.

“Let me tell you a story,” said Charles Heyman, a retired British army major and editor of Jane’s World Armies. “In August 1969, I was sent to Northern Ireland to keep peace between Protestants and Catholics, and we were all told we would be home by Christmas. Thirty years later, my son was in the same place I had been. And we found a photograph of my father there in 1926.”

The parallel is not exact, but the point is well taken. There are no easy solutions in Kosovo, no endgame that is cost-free, no quick exits. The immediate question, however, is not how to get out of Kosovo, but how to get in.

I: AIRSTRIKES

Many of the obvious targets have been hit: the air-defense installations and military barracks, the bridges and oil refineries. Not-so-obvious targets, such as Milosevic’s Serbian Socialist Party headquarters in Belgrade, a Serbian state television building and one of the president’s homes, also have been bombed. Damage is calculated to be in the tens of billions of dollars already, and Milosevic has not backed down.

President Clinton says Milosevic will.

“A vigorous prosecution of the air campaign, intensification of economic pressure, along with our continuing diplomatic efforts, I believe, is the correct strategy--and I believe it will succeed,” Clinton said.

At some point, either Milosevic will decide that the damage is great enough or the Yugoslav armed forces will make that decision and compel him to change course, the argument goes.

“Milosevic may be irrational. His generals aren’t,” a White House official said. “How long will they stand for seeing all their military assets destroyed?”

NATO asserts that the Yugoslav armed forces are weakened. The Serbian air-defense system has been reduced; fuel and ammunition have been diminished along with command-and-control centers. The goal is to cut Serbian forces off completely, leaving them stranded in Kosovo without the ability to resupply or receive reinforcements.

“Milosevic is reeling from the air campaign now,” a British Foreign Office official said. “The more desperate he becomes, the more concessions are likely.”

But figures pieced together from U.S. and European militaries paint a grimmer picture to date. The Yugoslav army still has three-quarters of its most sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, 60% of its MIG fighter planes and at least partial use of five of the eight major roads in the province, allowing them to resupply. The military also has two-thirds of its petroleum reserves and 80% of its military barracks and ammunition depots.

Most Western military analysts argue that air campaigns alone do not win wars. The Allied bombing of Germany did not break the Nazis’ will in World War II, and Hitler’s blitz of London did not change the minds of Britons. There is much doubt that bombing alone will force the Serbs to give up the land they regard as their Jerusalem, the core of their civilization.

NATO says that an escalated air war will succeed. The alliance made the decision to step up the bombing campaign at its 50th anniversary celebration in Washington a week ago, and it intensified its nightly number of sorties beginning Thursday. But military analysts add that the strict rules of engagement also will have to change.

“We won’t change the balance of forces with simply 24 Apaches [helicopter gunships],” said Maurice Schmitt, the general who commanded French operations against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

NATO planes have been flying at 15,000 feet to avoid taking casualties, which has meant that they cannot find the hidden pieces of Milosevic’s war machine they must attack. They are hitting fixed targets--buildings instead of tanks and troops.

Not only will NATO have to fly lower, says Andrew Brooks, an air force specialist at the International Institute for Strategic Studies here, but it will also have to widen its range of targets to make life miserable for average Serbs, risking more civilian casualties.

“You have to hit more power stations. The lights are still on. When they pick up the phone, there should be nothing. When they turn on the TV, nothing. The refrigerator, nothing,” Brooks said. “You have to bring it home that this guy is not worth sticking to. Eventually you make it so wretched in Belgrade that people say, ‘You have to go.’ ”

But an air war alone could take months, if not years, to achieve its objective, and meanwhile, Brooks said, the Serbs could be transformed from the villains of this conflict--in the mind of NATO members--to the victims.

“The question is, would Western public opinion be willing to watch the slow degradation with all of the media hype, the starving pensioners and hospitals without lights or medicine? Is it politically sustainable?” Brooks asked.

Time works against NATO in other ways, military and political analysts say. A lengthy air war would increase the chances of instability in neighboring countries and of a broader regional war. It also would damage NATO’s image. The longer NATO is unsuccessful--or fails to succeed--the weaker it looks.

Some analysts say that, to win an air war, NATO would have to prepare for ground troops, which, according to classic military doctrine, would follow an attack by Apache helicopters and the multiple-launch rocket system that go with them. Perhaps if Milosevic is convinced that a ground war is imminent, he will give in.

Other political analysts note that Milosevic proved himself capable of waiting out times of trouble during the mass demonstrations against electoral fraud in early 1997 that threatened to topple his government. He will likely try to wait out the NATO campaign too, hoping that Western public opinion turns against it and that NATO countries will begin to divide.

Before there is an erosion of NATO’s political landscape, military experts argue, the alliance should bomb for another four to six weeks, then send in ground troops.

“I don’t think it is realistic to envisage a scenario with no land component at all,” said Jean-Marie Guehenno, chairman of the Institute of High Studies of National Defense in Paris. “I think the debate now is how permissive should the environment be before these land troops move in. So that is a matter of degree.”

At NATO’s military headquarters in Mons, south of Brussels, some officers concur. The airstrikes could go on as long as September “until something cracks,” one said. “If nothing cracks, then ground troops.”

II: GROUND TROOPS

British Prime Minister Tony Blair has led the charge for the preparation and possible use of ground troops to force the Serbs out of Kosovo, but even he says that NATO does not want to fight its way into the separatist province against the more than 40,000-strong Yugoslav army and police that the alliance says are dug in there.

Blair says NATO’s bombing campaign is designed to create a “semi-permissive” environment in Kosovo--a change from the “permissive” situation, or one in which there would be no resistance from Serbian forces, that he originally said was necessary--to permit ground troops to go in.

He didn’t convince all of his colleagues of the necessity for a ground war during NATO’s recent 50th anniversary party in Washington, but he did put the issue on the table and force NATO to reexamine its contingency plans. Although many NATO countries--the United States, France and Germany among them--have qualms, the terms of debate are changing.

“No Western government is going to send troops there as an invasion. Ground forces would only be deployed in the context of a political solution,” French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said in an interview with the International Herald Tribune. But he added, “That ‘solution’ doesn’t necessarily imply ‘agreement’ ” on the part of Milosevic.

No one argues that determining a “semi-permissive” environment or moving a ground force into Kosovo against Milosevic’s will would be simple. The terrain is rugged, the weather harsh beginning in early autumn, and there is still an ethnic Albanian population in the province, albeit much reduced.

Milosevic is a canny enemy who has had time to hide his tanks and antiaircraft missiles throughout Kosovo. Ethnic Albanian refugees reported seeing them hidden in the shells of houses belonging to their former neighbors.

NATO claims air superiority, but its planes and helicopters would be at risk.

“There may be a couple hundred tanks there and up to a thousand armored vehicles,” said Heyman of Jane’s World Armies. “NATO is claiming they hit six to eight SA-6s [antiaircraft missiles]; well, the Serbs have about 60 of them. Of those, 20 or 30 are in Kosovo.”

The Serbs would also have 200 to 300 smaller, shoulder-fired missiles in Kosovo, Heyman said. “There is a lot of equipment to knock out, and . . . they have to get in as early as they can or they will run into a messy war. The last thing they want is to get bogged down in rain and cold. Winter is on the side of the enemy.”

Estimates of the numbers of ground troops that would be required to beat back the Serbs vary widely. About 30,000 to 70,000 troops would be needed to take on “isolated pockets” of resistance in Kosovo, according to military experts, increasing to 150,000 to 200,000 if NATO encountered a fierce fight or wanted to take the battle all the way to Belgrade, the Yugoslav and Serbian capital.

Getting the troops into Kosovo is a problem. The easiest way in logistically would be through Greece and Macedonia, but they have refused. Greeks share the Christian Orthodox faith with the Serbs, and most of them oppose the war; Macedonia fears tangling with Milosevic.

The easiest route in politically is from Albania, which has welcomed NATO troops, but it is the most difficult logistically, with poor ports, airfields and roads, and a mountainous border terrain that already has been mined by the Serbs.

Another possibility would be to move troops from the Adriatic Sea through the republic of Montenegro, but Montenegro is part of Yugoslavia, and Milosevic has increased the number of his troops stationed there.

Romania and Bulgaria have offered their airspace, and Slovakia has said its roads and railways could be used as a transit point to Hungary--a NATO country--into the open plains in the north of Yugoslavia.

While this would be the best route for heavy armor, NATO is not expected to launch a full-scale assault from the north because that would entail taking Belgrade.

Some military strategists and political analysts argue that the only way to bring lasting peace to the Balkans is to seize Belgrade and topple Milosevic.

“What Serbia needs is total de-Nazification, like Germany after World War II, and you can’t have that without total military and psychological defeat,” said a Belgrade political analyst in exile.

But many, if not most, of the 19 NATO countries would oppose overthrowing one of Europe’s elected leaders, making this an unlikely option.

Still other analysts say troops should be placed on Hungary’s border with Yugoslavia to force Milosevic to divert some of his forces from Kosovo, which is in the south of the country.

“You have to create an environment where Milosevic is totally unsure where the main thrust of the military force is coming from, so he keeps his forces dispersed,” said Phillip Mitchell, a defense expert at the Strategic Studies institute here.

Albania and Macedonia, to the south of Kosovo, remain the most likely entry points for a ground war, even though Serbian forces are dug in along the borders, which they have mined.

NATO already has 12,000 British, French and German troops in Macedonia. Although originally conceived as the vanguard of a peacekeeping operation once agreement was reached between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians, they have tanks, armored personnel carriers and helicopter-borne units and could form an armored combat force.

The United States has deployed an Apache antitank helicopter unit and rocket artillery to Albania, along with a contingent of infantry to provide security. Additionally, a force of military engineers and logistics, medical and transport personnel from other NATO countries--soon to number 7,500--is based there and could be used to support combat troops.

The United States would be expected to provide about half the troops for any ground force, according to military experts. They could be assembled from the U.S. Army’s 18th Airborne Corps--which conducted Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989--and infantry from the 82nd and 101st Airborne and 3rd Mechanized divisions.

But they will encounter resistance, and they will take casualties--a number that NATO undoubtedly estimates but does not release. Most defense analysts are unwilling to speculate on possible casualties. One retired British officer, Maj. Gen. Ken Perkins, wrote in the News of the World newspaper that NATO could expect 250 dead in a ground war involving about 60,000 NATO troops.

A study by the Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank opposed to a ground war, warns that a four- to six-week campaign to expel Yugoslav forces from Kosovo would require 50,000 to 70,000 troops, half of them American, and could result in 500 to 2,000 U.S. casualties, including dead and injured.

The problem in determining the level of Serbian resistance to NATO ground forces is that Serbian forces have been trained in both conventional war and guerrilla warfare, such as they employed against the Germans and Italians in World War II.

“The Yugoslav army will fight,” warned Heyman of Jane’s. And then the Serbian soldier will “retire to the hills to fight and survive and become a guerrilla like his father was.”

But unlike most guerrilla armies, the Serbs do not have a significant civilian population to assist them in Kosovo. There are a couple of hundred thousand Serbs there at most, and the ethnic Albanians have been expelled or are hostile.

NATO, meanwhile, will have a guerrilla force on its side, the Kosovo Liberation Army, to use as either an advance team or a diversionary force. Untrained and underarmed, the ethnic Albanian KLA nonetheless knows the terrain and has a deep level of commitment in the aftermath of Milosevic’s “ethnic cleansing.”

The “KLA is useful for us from an intelligence point of view,” said Mitchell of the Strategic Studies institute. “Even if they are not well trained, if they do half a job they can keep the Yugoslav army tied down.”

Military analysts also note that the Serbs are hardly undefeated. Slovenian forces beat the Yugoslav army in 1991. The Serbs withdrew rather than fight the Croats in the disputed Krajina region in 1995, even though it meant the expulsion of 150,000 Serbs. And the Bosnians fought off the Serbs in 1995, with the help of NATO air power.

NATO’s vast military power should be able to push Serbian troops out of Kosovo, military analysts say. NATO could win the war. But that would be only the beginning of its costly involvement in Kosovo.

III: OUSTER

Within Yugoslavia, both supporters and opponents of Milosevic generally view his ouster as an unlikely scenario, particularly through a popular uprising. Serbs either support Milosevic’s nationalist stance or are afraid to act.

“Milosevic has gotten the reputation of being very dangerous for anyone to shake his throne,” said Montenegrin Deputy Prime Minister Dragisa Burzan. “I do not see anyone in his immediate vicinity who would dare to tackle him.”

But in every situation there is a wild card, such as Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic. Last week, he publicly accused his government of lying to the people and called for the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

“The men running this country must tell the people clearly where we stand and with whom we stand, tell them what will become of and what will remain of Serbia in 20 days if this dreadful bombing goes on,” Draskovic said in a television interview.

Days later he was fired from his government post, and it is unclear whether his move might land him in jail, in a grave or at the head of an unexpected movement against Milosevic.

If there were to be a coup, however, it would be more likely to come from the army, with a military man as Milosevic’s successor, Yugoslav political analysts say.

“There is a theoretical possibility the Yugoslav army and police make their own cost-benefit analysis and decide to overthrow Milosevic themselves,” said a Belgrade analyst in exile. “But after so many purges and everything inside the army and the police, I can’t see it. Most probably, some conspiracies are being made now. Statistically, it’s probable. But I don’t see how they can organize themselves successfully.”

Still, a coup is a serious hope of some U.S. officials. They suggest that some in the military or political inner circle could decide that they do not want to be destroyed with Milosevic, that they do not want their institutions crippled and the Serbian state seriously weakened.

“The goal is to cut off the army and let it know it has no future,” said a well-placed U.S. official in Washington. “The long-term message is: ‘Stay there, and eventually you die. That’s the future.’ It’s meant to confront the military with a stark choice.”

Asked about the possibility of Milosevic being ousted, Bratislav Grubacic, editor in chief of the independent Belgrade-based V.I.P. Daily News Report, said that “so far, there are no signs of such a thing. But you can never know. After two more months of the air campaign, which is already devastating the country, something might change.”

IV: NEGOTIATIONS

The objective of this war is to get the enemy back to the negotiating table, and anything short of a crushing military victory by NATO or Milosevic is likely to end in a deal. The terms of that agreement will depend on what brings the two sides to the table, and how bruised they are when they get there.

A Milosevic forced to negotiations by a punishing air or ground war is apt to make more concessions than a Milosevic facing a divided NATO arguing over whether to continue bombing.

The United States and its NATO partners are encouraging Russia to play the role of intermediary, not only to assuage Moscow’s anger over the bombing and to keep it from lending military support to its Slavic brothers in Serbia, but to increase the chances of a diplomatic solution.

With Russia on board, the U.N. Security Council could be brought in to apply more pressure on Milosevic and to give international legitimacy to an armed action that many countries reject as illegal.

Milosevic is offering to meet face to face with Clinton to resolve the conflict, according to the Rev. Jesse Jackson, who met with the Yugoslav leader in a bid to secure the release of three captured American servicemen.

But there was no indication that Milosevic had changed his position on either of the two fundamental issues in negotiations--the composition of an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo and political control over the province in the future. NATO and Milosevic are worlds apart on both.

On the issue of peacekeepers, NATO insists that an armed, international force under a NATO chain of command move into Kosovo to allow ethnic Albanians to return home and protect them afterward.

Milosevic says he will accept an unarmed force under the aegis of the United Nations or another organization, but not NATO. And no foreign guns in Kosovo, which is part of Yugoslavia.

Russian special envoy Viktor S. Chernomyrdin maintains that Milosevic, during their recent negotiations, agreed to the deployment of an international military force, but Belgrade subsequently denied this, saying that only civilian observers would be allowed.

Weeks of bombardment apparently have not moved Milosevic on the issue of peacekeepers any more than weeks of negotiations in France did in February and March. At that time, the United States and Europe crafted an agreement that would let armed NATO peacekeepers into Kosovo, which would remain under Milosevic’s rule. The guerrilla KLA, which seeks independence, reluctantly agreed to the deal, but Milosevic rejected it despite NATO’s threats of war.

Now, even if a solution on peacekeepers can be found, Milosevic’s hold on Kosovo is at stake.

The Yugoslav strongman apparently still envisions retaining the province as a part of Yugoslavia under Serbian administrative and military control. But after the brutal expulsion of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, the murder, rape and destruction in the province, NATO insists that this is impossible.

“There is no question, we can’t go back to Rambouillet, which envisioned a continued role for the Yugoslav army and police in Kosovo,” a British official said. “We want the withdrawal of all security forces . . . and a transitional international administration in what some call a ‘protectorate.’ ”

Serbian politicians and commentators suggest that Milosevic knows he will not get everything he wants. They say he is seeking one of two options: either an autonomous Kosovo run by the pacifist ethnic Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, with a Serbian deputy; or a partitioning of the province, holding on to the north, which includes Serbian historical and Orthodox religious sites as well as the bulk of the region’s mineral wealth.

“Belgrade will try to find a solution for Kosovo with Rugova, who is unfortunately by himself in Kosovo,” said Grubacic, the V.I.P. Daily News Report editor in Belgrade.

Rugova, who opposes the armed struggle for independence, is the only ethnic Albanian leader remaining in Kosovo. He has been pictured on television with Milosevic and is believed by many in NATO to be held against his will.

Belgrade will argue that no international military presence is needed in Kosovo because Rugova is capable of handling the situation, Grubacic predicted. “That will be the starting position of Serbian authorities, definitely. What compromises they can make, we shall see.”

Grubacic added that partition is another option for Milosevic. “People here do see partition of Kosovo as a solution,” he said. The part of Kosovo closer to the rest of Serbia, including the provincial capital, Pristina, could be Serbian-controlled territory, “and the rest could be Albanian,” he said.

Many Western officials and political observers say partition is no solution.

“It is probably the most destabilizing result possible,” a British government official said. “It is very understandably not acceptable to the Kosovo Albanians, and it is not going to lead to peace. But I think it is there in the back of Milosevic’s mind.”

As bad as this option may be, Western political analysts do not rule it out because it might be the only one available if NATO is unable to bend Milosevic with the air war or is politically restricted from pursuing a ground operation, as evidenced by a House vote last week that would limit Clinton’s ability to send in ground troops.

An exiled Serbian political analyst says this would be a victory for the Yugoslav president.

“That’s exactly what I’m afraid of--some halfway thing like they did in Bosnia,” said the analyst, who spoke on condition he not be identified. “Those ideas of partition of Kosovo, for example, will give Milosevic a fantastic opportunity to claim victory and say he saved Serbia from occupation and saved at least a piece of Kosovo.”

Such an outcome would be a partial victory for the Serbs’ “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo and would effectively spell the end of NATO, argued Dana Allin, a Balkans expert at the Strategic Studies institute.

“What NATO is doing in the Balkans is its substance,” Allin said. “If it fails at that, it would not be the successful organization that won the Cold War. It would be the organization that was defeated by Serbia.”

V: PROTECTORATE

The preferred option for Kosovo, many NATO diplomats and political commentators say, would be an internationally guaranteed protectorate similar to what now exists in practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 30,000 peacekeeping troops have been deployed to oversee security along with thousands of civilian and nongovernmental administrative personnel and a reconstruction cost of $5.1 billion.

“The best case is a protectorate,” said Lawrence Freedman, head of the Department of War Studies at King’s College in London. “Given what Kosovo has been through, you can’t give it back to Serbia, and the Kosovo Albanians are not organized to cope with it. Besides, it is an international responsibility. You can’t walk away from it.”

That would be an enormous undertaking, according to most experts. The hundreds of thousands of refugees would return to the province in an emotionally fragile state and with virtually nothing to their names. Many have witnessed the brutal killing of family members by Serbian police and paramilitary forces, or lost them on the battlefield. Others have been beaten and raped. Their identity papers, houses and crops were destroyed. They have no jobs and, in most cases, no money.

The war-ravaged province will have to be rebuilt at a cost that European Union officials already calculate in the tens of billions of dollars. The international community would have to run Kosovo until an autonomous government and new institutions could be established. Security would be an ongoing concern, not only guarding against possible renegade Serbian attacks, but also ensuring that ethnic Albanians do not seek revenge against any Serbs who would remain in the province.

“It’s possible that when NATO goes in there will be no institutions in Kosovo at all. There will have to be a transitional international administration. At least initially, they could be running everything in Kosovo,” a British official said. “We could be in there with a heavy civilian and military presence for years.”

NATO peace-enforcing troops have been in Bosnia since a 1995 accord ended its war and in Cyprus for more than a quarter of a century. Historically, the Balkans have lived in peace when there has been an overarching power to ensure stability--the Ottoman Turks, the Hapsburgs, a Communist regime. Many in the West argue that that job now falls to an international peacekeeping force.

But a protectorate would have to have the backing of Russia, they say. Imposing a NATO protectorate against Russia’s will could incite suspicion and hostility among the Russian people. It could increase the likelihood of an anti-Western successor to Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin and lead to further instability in the region.

A protectorate also does not resolve the long-term dilemma of Kosovo. Will Yugoslavia abandon its claim to the territory? Will it become an independent state? This is the KLA’s goal but not NATO’s, which fears more destabilization in the Balkans. Will it unite with Albania, as some of the countries in the region fear?

“Who knows?” said Freedman at King’s College. “Right now there is a lot of reconstruction and politics to be done.”

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Times staff writers David Holley in Podgorica, Montenegro; John-Thor Dahlburg and Joel Havemann in Brussels; Richard C. Paddock in Moscow; Tyler Marshall, Doyle McManus, Robin Wright and Paul Richter in Washington; and Sarah White in The Times’ Paris Bureau contributed to this report.

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX / INFOGRAPHIC)

What Happens Next?

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues bombing Yugoslavia, U.S. and European officials are weighing the possible directions the campaign could take in weeks to come.

* Continued Air Campaign

No war has been won with an air campaign alone. Could Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic hang in long enough for the American public’s perception of his forces to change from villains to victims?

* Ground Assault

A ground assault might be the only way to force Yugoslav troops out of Kosovo. But is there sufficient political will in the West to sustain heavy casualties?

* Milosevic’s Ouster

One hope of U.S. officials is an internal coup that would oust Milosevic from power. There are, however, no likely candidates among his inner circle ready to attempt such a takeover.

* Negotiated Settlement

NATO’s main objective in Yugoslavia is to get Milosevic back to the negotiating table. But Russia would be needed as an intermediary and to lend the legitimacy of the U.N. Security Council to the alliance’s actions.

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX / INFOGRAPHIC)

Kosovo’s Fate

However the war unfolds, the ultimate question is what will happen to Kosovo in the aftermath of the allied campaign. Possibilities include:

INTERNATIONAL INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

An appointed administrator would take the reins of the disputed territory and run a temporary, impartial government. Backed by peacekeeping forces, the administrator would oversee everything from disarming opposing sides to the return of refugees. The administrator would also set up police, courts, housing and health programs.

* A transitional administration would have to remain for a clearly defined, short period of time, perhaps a year or two.

* An election or referendum by the residents of the territory could be held, after which the temporary administration would disband.

* Security would be needed to guard against renegade Serbian attacks and prevent revenge by ethnic Albanians.

PARTITION

This less desirable outcome would put the northern part of the province-- including the capital, Pristina, valuable mineral deposits and Serbian historical sites--under Serbian control and the south under the control of ethnic Albanians. Many analysts see partition not only as destabilizing, but as a victory for Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s campaign of “ethnic cleansing.”

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Compiled by JANET WILSON Los Angeles Times