A Senate Sin

The United States, long the champion of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, now finds itself in the humiliating and self-wounding position of being unable to put its leadership behind its principles.

It became obvious this week that the Senate was not prepared to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a 1996 pact signed by the United States and 150 other nations to prohibit all nuclear explosions. It’s now painfully clear that next Tuesday’s scheduled vote would find the treaty without the support of even a majority of senators, let alone the two-thirds whose votes are required. As of Wednesday, President Clinton rightly was pushing, against all odds, for ratification. While all 45 Democrats appear to favor the treaty, only two of the Senate’s 55 Republicans have said they support the accord. Given those numbers, the only responsible course would be to delay a vote on the treaty until its chances for ratification might be brighter.

The treaty’s foes contend it would undermine U.S. nuclear strength. That worry is not shared by the nation’s most experienced military leaders, among them the current Joint Chiefs of Staff and four former JCS chairmen. All are convinced that the effectiveness and integrity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal can be maintained without further testing. That has been evident since 1992 when President George Bush imposed a moratorium on testing.

Critics also argue that cheating is possible because existing monitors might fail to detect some low-yield underground explosions. That is indeed possible. But low-yield weapons are of lesser strategic concern when measured against the opportunity the treaty offers to limit the development and spread of vastly more destructive weapons.

To buttress its ban on all nuclear explosions the treaty would establish a verification system involving more than 300 monitoring stations, including 31 in Russia, 11 in China and 17 in the Middle East. The treaty would permit “national technical means” for verification--spying by satellites and other measures--as well as on-site inspections. Any signatory would have the option to withdraw from the treaty if it decided its national interests were at risk.

The Senate’s responsibility to advise and consent on treaties assumes it will inform itself on what it is being asked to consider. In that responsibility the Senate has failed. In the two years since the treaty was sent to the Senate, the obstructionist chairman of its Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), has refused even to hold public hearings in which questions on the treaty’s provisions and significance to the United States could be raised and answered. Only this week, on the eve of a scheduled debate on the treaty, were Clinton administration officials invited to present their views. Many countries are waiting for the United States to ratify before they do, evidence of this country’s leadership role.

The treaty is not foolproof. But it is a powerful deterrent to proliferation, and it advances a goal that has been part of U.S. nuclear policy under nine presidents. It deserves ratification, most of all because it serves American national security.