Next Comes a Pact With Syria

It is significant in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that Prime Minister Ehud Barak has succeeded in ending the special relationship between America and the Palestinians and American intervention in the peace process.

The Palestinian-American relationship was created by default to pressure the government of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end its stalling of the Oslo process. Unfortunately, Netanyahu made grave errors when he invited President Clinton to legitimize the Palestinian Authority by his presence in Gaza and invited the CIA to become the arbiter of Palestinian terrorism. This was nipped in the bud during Barak’s triumphant trip to Washington in August.

The reason the negotiations over Wye II were stalled for two months after the election of Barak in May was the effort by Yasser Arafat to reintroduce the United States as mediator and reaffirm the U.S. Palestinian special relationship. There was no reason for Arafat to refuse Barak’s revised Wye agreement when it was offered the day after his election. In fact, what was achieved in Sharm el Sheik was more or less what Barak originally offered. Once again, Barak demonstrated to Arafat and the United States that there is no need for American intervention. Chief advisors to Barak and Arafat successfully completed the negotiations before Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her team arrived.

Arafat had hoped to force the U.S. to replay its pre-Barak style of mediation. He failed and finally signed, realizing that the Clinton administration’s positive attitude toward Barak would end the advantage that Arafat had successfully exploited during Netanyahu’s tenure.

Barak is a man with a watch in his hand: He is racing toward the final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. He has no reason to delay. As a military strategist of the Rabin school, Barak’s effort to reestablish negotiations with Syria is intended to take advantage of the Syrian-Palestinian rivalry when it comes to the final status negotiations with the Palestinians. Barak also hopes to fulfill an Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian peace before the 2000 elections overwhelm and paralyze U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and in general.

Barak is convinced that it will be easier to come to terms with Syrian President Hafez Assad than with the Palestinians. Syria, a stable independent state, is dominated by an autocratic Assad who rules his semi-police state with an iron hand. The Palestinian Authority is a state in the making: unstable, headed by an ill Arafat whose successor is unknown. Only the Golan Heights stand between Israel and Syria. Between Israel and the Palestinians, however, are monumental obstacles: the future of Jerusalem; the Palestinian refugees’ return, which has been reaffirmed in the understanding between Arafat and his radical Palestinian allies; and the issues of water, boundaries and security of the Jordan River. The Wye II agreement represents a foothill at the base of this mountain of obstacles.

While the future of Syria is predictable, the nature, structure and future of the Palestine state are not. Thus the security arrangements between Israel and Syria pale in comparison to the obstacles facing Israel on the road to the eventual signing of a treaty with an unknown Palestinian entity. Syria’s claim over Israel is about a small, occupied territory. Even the claims by some Israelis of the strategic importance of the Golan Heights are not comparable to the Palestinians’ demands. The rise of a Palestinian state is the most serious challenge to Zionism in Israel since the 1948 war. Israel’s neighbors--Syria, Egypt and Jordan--are known quantities. The Palestinian state is not.

Therefore it is doubtful that Barak will achieve peace with the Palestinians in his self-proclaimed 15-month period. The debate in Israel and among the Palestinians as the final status arrives, as well as the negotiations themselves, will be wrenching, for they are directly connected to the nature of what Israel and Palestine are. Arafat’s advisors threaten that whether or not the final status negotiations are concluded by September 2000, they aim to proclaim an independent state, which was postponed due to pressure and promises by Clinton. One wonders what promises have been made to Arafat to lure him into signing Wye II.

It is doubtful that Barak and his left-wing government will be able to win a national referendum before the treaty is signed. This will depend on the details rather than the concept of the negotiations, since the nation as a whole will accept a Palestine state, but only under certain conditions. To meet those conditions is an awesome task facing Barak’s government and its future.