There’s Much Ado About Moscow . . . as Usual

The endgame in Russia seems well underway: Bombs going off in Moscow, the country’s criminal ways being placed under a microscope by the entire foreign press corps and at least three U.S. congressional committees, a new conflict in Chechnya in the offing and a corruption scandal involving the president’s family and one of his most trusted aides. Even Boris N. Yeltsin’s good friend Bill Clinton seems to have turned his back on the Russian president.

Out of all these interconnected crises and the attendant pressure they place on a worried and defensive Kremlin comes a buzzing welter of rumors and speculation that:

* Yeltsin may declare a state of emergency and cancel upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

* Yeltsin may seek to extend his term in office, and thereby his protective shield over his family and friends, by striking a quickie bargain with Belarus on unification. This is the so-called Milosevic scenario, which allows Yeltsin to remain in power as the president of the newly formed union.

* A political reshuffle is in the works that could send recently appointed Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin and/or scheming Chief of Staff Alexander S. Voloshin into early retirement.

* Yeltsin himself may step down either as a concession to the opposition in return for their promise to take the heat off him and his daughter or in an attempt to derail the opposition’s election strategy.

If you haven’t been following the story, it can all seem terribly confusing. If you have, it’s just business as usual in the rough and tumble of Russian politics. To simplify matters, three scenarios can be effectively ruled out. Here’s why:

* Yeltsin hasn’t got the political clout to declare a state of emergency and cancel elections and get away with it. To do so, the president would need the backing of the upper chamber of parliament, the Federation Council, which has already declared its strong opposition to the move under anything less than the most dire circumstances--which it doesn’t foresee. The Federation Council is made up of regional governors and heads of regional legislatures who, since their free election to power several years ago, have been gaining in strength and independence from Moscow.

* The Milosevic scenario is doubtful because Russia, despite its mini-economic surge in the first half of 1999, cannot afford to take on the economic burden of unification with a backward, strapped and badly mismanaged Belarus. The prospect of unification on equal terms has strong opponents in Russia and could provoke secession from the federation by some of Russia’s more independent-minded constituent regions like Tatarstan, while incorporation into the existing federation of Belarus’ six constituent regions would be unacceptable to the vast majority of Belarusans. And there is a new “party of power” in Russia headed by former Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri M. Luzhkov, who together expect to dominate the next Duma, or lower house of Parliament, and possibly occupy the Kremlin after July 2000. They will present a formidable obstacle to any plan Yeltsin may hatch for unification.

* If we learned one thing from the experience of the crisis of August 1998, it is that no matter how high the heat, Yeltsin will not voluntarily leave the kitchen. To leave would be contrary to his character, his interests and his reputation. To leave today, under the weight of a widening corruption scandal involving possible kickbacks by a Swiss construction firm to the Kremlin’s head of administration, Pavel P. Borodin, and Yeltsin’s daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko (and, as the net closes in, possibly the president himself), would only validate the claims being made against him and open him up to potential indictment by Swiss authorities. It is not even clear with whom he might strike a bargain to escape this ignominious fate, since Primakov and Luzhkov are not the forces behind the Swiss investigation and would, most likely, prefer to see Yeltsin serve out his term so they can proceed in an orderly fashion to first win the Duma and then the presidency.

Finally, there is the scenario that has the Kremlin seeking scapegoats and reshuffling the deck one more time before the end of the year. This scenario fits neatly with Yeltsin’s past behavior, the costs are calculable and acceptably low, and the likely degree of resistance from parliament or the Russian people is minimal. Putin has already blundered sufficiently in his handling of the conflict in the north Caucasus, where he promised that the whole matter would be cleared up in a matter of two weeks, to warrant his removal from office. Moreover, the recent dispute over leadership of the country’s oil pipeline monopoly, Transneft, which Putin lost in a head-to-head battle with Yeltsin family favorite First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Y. Aksyonenko, suggests strongly that the prime minister could soon be replaced.

A small degree of comfort should be taken in the fact that such a turn of events hardly would be cataclysmic. The economy probably will keep ticking along as it has been in casual disregard of palace politics, and Yeltsin’s farewell party can be put on hold.

Business as usual.