Indonesia Files Its Embezzlement Case Against Suharto

The government formally filed its case against former President Suharto on Tuesday, accusing him of embezzling $571 million, in a 45-page indictment that the attorney general said represents an airtight case. But it is unlikely that Suharto will ever see the inside of a prison.

The onetime strongman is 79, has suffered two strokes and has been under house arrest here in the capital for months. Almost every day during that time, students have rallied near his modest home, calling for him to be jailed or hanged. But Suharto seldom goes out anymore, and his attorneys, insisting that he is the victim of a political vendetta, say he is too ill to stand trial.

Asked when the trial will begin, Judge Lalu Muriyun, who is supposed to head a five-judge panel hearing the case, said, “God willing, this month.” But President Abdurrahman Wahid, although supportive of attempts to bring Suharto to justice, has said he will pardon the former dictator in the name of national reconciliation if he is convicted.

Atty. Gen. Marzuki Darusman, who brought charges last week, said he built his case around the huge tax-free foundations, run by Suharto’s family and friends, into which the former president diverted state funds. He said the actual amount stolen may have been much larger than $571 million but that by focusing on the charities alone he was able to gather irrefutable evidence of corruption.

Although Suharto never surrounded himself with the trappings of wealth, he and his family controlled business interests that ranged from tollways to airlines to cigarette and automobile factories. Time magazine reported last year that he was worth $15 billion. Suharto responded by suing for libel. The case was recently thrown out of court.

Having ruled with an iron fist for 32 years, Suharto was forced to resign in May 1998 in the wake of a student revolt that started as a protest against economic hardship and ended as a riotous demand for political reform that claimed 1,200 lives in Jakarta. His handpicked vice president, B. J. Habibie, took over for 17 months and was replaced last October by Wahid, Indonesia’s first democratically elected president.

But even in forced retirement, Suharto casts a giant shadow over Indonesia. On his watch, his friends grew rich, his generals powerful. And many have yearned for his return--or at least the return of the Golkar party’s ruling elite, who had kept Indonesia, for Suharto’s cronies anyway, peaceful and prosperous. They have had an interest in abetting the difficulties of Habibie and especially Wahid, an incorruptible Muslim cleric committed to democratic reform.

Politicians, soldiers and businesspeople with allegiances to the deposed ruling class are widely believed to be supporting with arms and funds the Islamic thugs who have gone to the Moluccas--also known as the Spice Islands--to wage war on Christians there. Street demonstrators in Jakarta and other cities are often paid by the same shady anti-government forces. The resultant turmoil roiling this nation of 17,000 islands nourishes, if not Suharto himself, at least the spirit that marked his rule and memories of the old days, when having friends in high places was a guarantee of power and fortune.

“I think most of the reason for the continued turbulence in Indonesia reflects the Wahid government’s inability to shed itself of the presence of the Suharto regime,” said political analyst Wimar Witoelar. “That’s especially true because Wahid prefers a gradual transition to democracy, and not revolution.

“The result is his reforms seem to go around in a circle, but this approach, as opposed to a more radical one, has spared us bloodshed.”

One of the questions that still perplexes analysts is why Suharto’s resignation led to more problems than it fixed. The reason, some say, is rooted in what Jeffrey Winters, an expert on Indonesia at Northwestern University, calls “politicus interruptus,” or the incomplete nature of the movement that forced Suharto to resign.

In virtually every case in the modern era when entrenched family dynasties have been deposed--the Pahlavis in Iran, the Batistas in Cuba, the Marcoses in the Philippines, the Mobutos in Zaire--the leaders fled the country, wives and children in tow. With the Suhartos, no one even warmed up the jets at the airport. There was no clear break from the past, and Habibie’s interim government gave the old guard breathing room to regroup and salvage much of its influence. Suharto stayed put under military protection, and the status quo endured.

“There’s one thing the elite in Indonesia agree on, and that’s that the people--the masses--should not be involved in politics, because they’re not trustworthy,” Winters said. Thus in 1998, it was a thin segment of society--students, by their very nature part of the elite--that forced Suharto’s resignation.

Regardless of what happens to Suharto next, the shadow of the former dictator seems unlikely to disappear. His presence, political analysts say, will continue to be a formidable one that influences how much maneuverability Wahid has and how fast reforms can proceed.