What Syria Really Wants

Peace between Syria and Israel is in the interests of both countries. Yet, such a peace may pose unexpected risks. If not managed wisely, peace with Israel, over time, could undermine President Hafez Assad’s hold on power and lead to civil war between Syria’s two dominant Muslim groups: the majority Sunnis and minority Alawites. Assad’s goals and expectations in the negotiations are especially relevant in calculating whether real peace between Syria and Israel can be achieved.

Syria has been ruled by Assad and members of his Alawite tribe, the Matawira, since 1970. While no one questions Assad’s political identity as a Syrian nationalist, his foremost loyalty has always been to the survival and prosperity of the Alawite community. The enduring state of war with Israel has supplied him with nationalist and ideological justifications that have helped keep Syrian society closed to the outside world, its economy tightly controlled and its large military and security forces available to defend the regime and fight Israel. These same factors also have permitted Assad to suppress internal dissent and preserve Alawite rule.

While the Syrian government does its best to downplay the ethnic divisions in Syrian society, as well as the importance of Alawite control of the state’s instruments of coercion, no one is fooled by this propaganda. Despite the appointment of Sunni Muslims to prominent government and business positions, Syria suffers from serious ethnic division and its society is rife with mistrust, injustice and inequality of opportunity.

In the wake of peace with Israel, domestic pressure on Assad to reduce the power and role of the military, open up the economy and tone down the favoritism enjoyed by the Alawite community is likely to intensify. The conundrum for Syria is that the benefits of peace may threaten Assad’s core interest of preserving the Alawite regime.

Whether and how Assad manages these competing interests and the inevitable social change that would accompany any relaxation of government control, poses the most fundamental challenge to his regime. Will peace with Israel diminish or exacerbate this condition? Can peace with Israel permit Assad to loosen his hold over Syrian society? Will social, economic and political divisions between the Alawite and Sunni communities be reconciled? Will Assad’s regime survive the social and economic changes that peace with Israel is likely to promote within Syrian society?

Throughout his rule, Assad has consistently demonstrated an uncanny ability to gauge the correlation of forces between himself and his opponents. It seems likely that he will try to find ways to achieve results that will enhance this ability, and that of any Alawite successor, to survive and flourish.

The regional balance of power shifted dramatically in Israel’s favor following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Without a superpower patron, or the economic means to purchase new armaments, Syria’s military ability to threaten Israel weakened considerably. Coincident with Syria’s military deterioration, the two Arab states that made peace with Israel, Egypt and Jordan, have received large infusions of sophisticated weaponry, training and economic assistance.

Other than preserving Alawite dominance, Assad craves international stature. Washington’s designation of Syria as a state sponsor of international terrorism diminished his image. Yet, Assad has apparently convinced the U.S. government that Syria no longer sponsors such terrorism, since Washington is expected shortly to remove Syria from the list. This will enhance Assad’s legitimacy as a leader on the world stage, while making Syria eligible to receive military and economic assistance.

To preserve his regime, Assad must be able to characterize U.S. aid as a victory for the Syrian military. At first, U.S. military assistance to Syria will most likely be defensive or nonlethal. Whatever form U.S. military aid eventually takes, it will undoubtedly follow a bruising political battle on Capitol Hill. Economic assistance to Syria is far easier for Washington and other countries to provide.

In the short term, economic aid is of greater domestic political value to Assad. He needs to deliver immediate, tangible economic benefits to the Syrian people to demonstrate the advantages of peace over war. His challenge is to improve Syrian living standards without loosening political, social and economic controls too quickly, which would destabilize his regime.

The return of the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for Syrian recognition of Israel is at the heart of the negotiations. Aside from its obvious military value, the area provides Israel with one its most important sources of water. In this part of the Middle East, water is more important than oil. Israel will be making a critical concession if it agrees to return all the pre-1967 Golan to Syria, even with assurances of access to water.

From the Syrian perspective, the symbolic and emotional importance of regaining the Golan Heights is equally hard to exaggerate. Assad’s stature at home and elsewhere in the Arab world will be affected significantly by his perceived ability to regain control of all Syria’s occupied land. Despite the barrenness of the Sinai Desert, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat did not give up one inch of the Sinai. Nor is Assad likely to compromise over portions of the Golan.

The potential fragility of Assad’s regime poses a dilemma for Israel. How, if at all, does Israeli behavior affect Syria’s internal politics? Does it make more sense to remain in a state of war with Syria and Lebanon, but hold on to the Golan Heights, if a peace treaty might destabilize the Syrian regime and lead to its downfall? Can a way be found to deliver security to Israel regardless of who holds power in Damascus?

Alawite-Sunni conflict predates the establishment of the state of Israel, and there are obvious limits to Israeli influence over the course of change in Syria. However, as with the Palestinians, the challenge for Syria and Israel is to find a way to become partners in peace with shared interests, not merely former antagonists who must live next to one another. Yet, Israeli and Palestinian political relationships have evolved despite the struggle between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas for control of the Palestinian Authority, and it appears that the Israeli-Palestinian peace will endure beyond Yasser Arafat. This change is a direct result of the attitudes and will of the political leadership of both parties, as well as the steady increase in day-to-day contact between Israelis and Palestinians. The same may hold true for Syrians and Israelis.

In choosing a peaceful settlement with Israel, Assad has undoubtedly calculated that he can manage the benefits and risks of peace. And if past is prologue, it appears likely that Assad will overcome threats to the Alawite regime. But it is still too soon to tell. *