For Arafat, It’s Always Been All or Nothing

Barely two months ago, the notion that Israel would offer the Palestinians sovereignty over parts of East Jerusalem and virtually the entire West Bank (and compensatory territory within Israel proper for those West Bank areas that would remain under Israeli control), as well as accept some form of refugee return to pre-1967 Israel, was considered utopian. Yet that is precisely the deal that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat has just rejected. In fact, he has been consistent since the peace process began: For Arafat, it has always been all or nothing.

According to an Israeli press report, Arafat told President Clinton during the summit that he wouldn’t agree to any compromise that would place him at risk of being assassinated by an Arab. Imagine Prime Minister Ehud Barak declaring that he wouldn’t sign any deal that Yigal Amir, the assassin of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, couldn’t live with.

For Arafat, the risks must always be taken by Israel; his scenario isn’t reconciliation based on mutual compromise but Israeli surrender. Indeed, he fully expected to emerge from Camp David an Arab hero who conceded nothing, while Barak would violate every Israeli bottom-line negotiating position, embitter half the Jewish people and be forced to augment his personal bodyguard.

The Palestinians justify their intransigence by insisting that they are the blameless victims of the Middle East conflict and that the burden of concessions rests entirely on aggressor Israel. A Palestinian spokesman once explained to me why he refused to accept any responsibility for creating the conflict or for resolving it: “When the Jews and the Germans negotiated the issue of reparations after the Holocaust, no one expected the Jews to offer concessions to the Germans. The Germans were the aggressors; the onus was entirely on them. It’s the same between Palestinians and Israelis.”

An Israeli colleague, sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, told me about a recent dialogue group she attended between Israeli and Palestinian journalists. Each participant was asked to state what he or she required from the other side to make peace. “I expect Israel to apologize for existing,” one Palestinian journalist told the stunned Israelis.

Palestinian leaders insist that they cannot compromise on the 1967 borders because they have already conceded the three-quarters of historic Palestine that became Israel after the 1948 war.

In fact, the Palestinians have conceded nothing; instead, they have consistently brought tragedy on themselves. The Palestinian leadership rejected the U.N. partition plan in 1947 and then joined the Arab world’s attempt to destroy Israel; and not until nearly half a century later did the PLO finally accept the fact, if not yet the legitimacy, of Israel’s existence. That is the reason why Israel exists in its current borders.

Ironically, the uncritical sympathy that the Palestinian cause has enjoyed in the international community has only encouraged Palestinian self-righteousness, making compromise that much more elusive. Perhaps if the Palestinians had been called to account for at least partly creating their own refugee problem--a direct result of the Arab attempt to destroy Israel at birth--Palestinian leaders might have displayed less self-pity and more responsibility at Camp David.

Like the late Syrian leader Hafez Assad, who dismissed Barak’s offer to withdraw from almost the entire Golan Heights, Arafat will accept nothing less than everything. Barak, who set out to end the 100-year conflict between Arabs and Jews, has instead proved that, at least for now, the Arab world isn’t prepared to offer the most minimal compromise for peace.

In fact, Barak inadvertently contributed to Arab intransigence by revealing an eagerness for peace that the Arab world interpreted as weakness. His withdrawal from Lebanon was widely seen among Arabs as proof that Israel was losing its nerve and could be extorted to make concessions once considered inconceivable. Barak failed to understand that, in trying to make peace with dictators, he needed to couple flexibility with firmness. The Camp David failure, then, is partly his fault.

In the coming weeks, Arafat may well initiate mob violence, and journalists will once again earnestly and foolishly speak of the “frustration of the Palestinian street.” Yet, unlike the original intifada, which expressed genuine outrage against the Israeli occupation, this round will be an orchestrated farce. Once again, the Palestinians, in Abba Eban’s memorable phrase, haven’t missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity. And while the tragedy of the Palestinians will continue and perhaps deepen, they have finally forfeited the role of blameless victim.