Golden Summit for Two Koreas

Most summits are long on pomp, short on substance and soon forgettable. Quick, name all the stops on President Bill Clinton’s last trip to Europe that culminated in a ho-hum Moscow summit. Some summits can be dangerous--for example, President John F. Kennedy’s rough encounter with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in Vienna, which led to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Yet, a few are truly inspired, as was President Richard M. Nixon’s meeting with Mao Tse-tung in 1972.

Last week’s summit in Pyongyang deserves to be in that rare third category. It appears to have opened the way to a new era of reconciliation between North and South Korea, and gives hope to millions of Koreans that they may be able to see long-lost relatives cut off for a half-century. How did this come about?

The Pyongyang summit did not just “happen.” It developed as a result of careful planning in South Korea and of a convergence of several factors in North Korea. Even before his inauguration, South Korea’s President-elect Kim Dae Jung was laying the foundation for a new set of relationships with his neighbors, China, Russia and Japan. He was determined to bring them all “into the game” of reaching out to Pyongyang. His inaugural address, in February 1998, focused on creating a new dynamic with North Korea to remove the Cold War structure that had held the Korean Peninsula in its grip for half a century. As president, Kim has never wavered from this goal.

In February, a major conference was held in Seoul to discuss the efficacy of Kim’s “sunshine” policy toward North Korea. Representatives from China, Russia and Japan all expressed strong support. Russian Ambassador Evgeny Afanasiev put it best, “It should be mentioned with satisfaction that the Republic of Korea has become one of our most significant partners in the Asia Pacific [region]. . . . In this rare moment of history, the major powers of Northeast Asia are free from open regional rivalry and military confrontation. . . . One should not miss this window of opportunity.”

It appears North and South Korea have taken full advantage of this opportunity to reach out to each other, knowing their neighbors supported this process of reconciliation. The Pyongyang summit rested on a solid foundation of regional approval; the positive post-summit comments from Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo are clear proof of this.

Within North Korea, at least four factors contributed to Kim Jong Il’s decision to host the summit. First was the strength of his leadership position. After almost six years, Kim is clearly in charge. He felt free to leave his country to visit China, and his actions during the summit exuded confidence. He was ready for any opportunities it offered.

Second, the North Koreans finally realized that President Kim Dae Jung is the best available partner for them. They now seem to accept that he is not trying to undermine or swallow the North and is sincere in his expressed desire to improve North-South relations and help the North develop economically.

Third, North Korea received reliable advice from China, which has consistently acted as a good neighbor to both Koreas for the past few years. China urged Pyongyang to reestablish a strong dialogue with Seoul. This should be recognized and appreciated in Washington.

Fourth, and most important, North Korea needs economic assistance that only South Korea can provide. Its agricultural sector is a disaster, and massive aid and technical assistance will be required. China has helped with food aid, but the South will now become the main provider of aid and know-how. For Pyongyang, this was the key goal for the summit.

The United States has an opportunity to act constructively in the wake of the meeting by lifting economic sanctions against North Korea. This will make it easier for North Koreans to follow the advice Kim gave them about improving relations with Japan and the U.S. Ending sanctions will also enable North Korea to export goods to the United States and give U.S. businessmen a chance to find economically feasible ways of helping in North Korea’s development. The more the North Korean economy improves, the less need for Pyongyang to rely on missile sales as a source of foreign exchange.

The accord signed by both leaders was as significant for what it did not contain as for what it included. But positive points were: a specific date--Aug. 15--for the beginning of dispersed-family visits; the establishment of talks between government officials to implement points in the accord; and Kim Jong Il’s agreement to visit Seoul for a reciprocal summit.

While it has been reported from Seoul that President Kim discussed U.S. concerns and related security issues in his talks with Kim Jong Il, there was no mention in the accord of North Korean missiles, nuclear issues or the stationing of U.S. troops in Korea. Yet, this is all to the good, for it gives the parties maximum flexibility in the future. Security issues will need to be discussed, but they involve the interests of other countries, and did not require a prominent place in this first, all-Korean meeting.

Is there a downside to the summit? I do not see one, as long as all concerned are careful not to get carried away by the emotions of the event. That could lead to carelessness regarding the many difficult issues still to be dealt with.

The central fact is, the issues that make the Korean Peninsula one of the world’s most dangerous flash points are now being discussed by the people who can solve them: the Koreans. The greatest progress toward peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula was made from 1989 to 1992, when the two Koreas had an active dialogue, and a series of high-level visits. The Basic Agreement, signed by the two Koreas on Dec. 13, 1991, is regarded by Kim Dae Jung as “the bible for inter-Korean relations.” His key objective has been the full implementation of that agreement.

If the just-concluded summit starts a process of dialogue and reconciliation between Seoul and Pyongyang, it will become harder to hang the “rogue state” label on North Korea. This may discomfit some in Washington, who have been using North Korea’s past bad behavior as justification for pursuing the expensive and unproven missile defense plan. That is another significant benefit that may result from last week’s summit.

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KIM DAE JUNG: South Korean President writes that unity will come, and not by force. Page 5