Europeans Need Friendly Persuasion to Feel Secure

Driven as it is by U.S. domestic politics, the current debate over national missile defense has been strangely silent on its possible effect on American alliances. Yet there should be no mistake: A major transatlantic crisis could be looming over the issue. The allies feel that the threat it is devised to address--as well as the technology itself--is unproved and that the U.S. is hastily launching into a national missile defense for domestic political motives rather than for international stability.

No one in Europe is keen on Middle Eastern dictators being able to strike European cities, a more likely contingency than their attacking the U.S., but the risk is considered fairly limited. Less confident in the virtues of technology than their American allies, the Europeans also would prefer to see it tested more fully. Nothing is more dangerous than reliance on ineffective technology. If the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty is to be scrapped, it has to be for clear and incontrovertible reasons. European concern is widespread that the Chinese and others would use any U.S. deployment as an excuse for increasing their missile holdings to maintain their retaliation capability.

Still, it is clear that some form of anti-missile system deployment will take place, and it should be done in a manner compatible with alliance cohesion. The Clinton administration has not been forthcoming in informing the European allies about its rationale for national missile defense deployment. The threat presented by North Korea is widely seen outside the U.S. as unpersuasive, coming from a technologically backward country. No convincing evidence that the threat is real has been offered by Washington, according to consistent reports from the European intelligence communities. The first task before the administration therefore should be to provide U.S. allies--perhaps through NATO--with reliable information corroborating the North Korean threat.

This, however, will not suffice. Europeans, with longer historical memories than their American partners, are suspicious of the military claims of defensive systems. Few, if any, instances bear out such claims. The U.S. case would be made much stronger if it was presented as one part of a larger nonproliferation policy rather than the main thrust of U.S. policy. For years now, countries have been relying on international regimes such as the recently updated 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime to contain the spread of dangerous technology. Still, these and other international regimes should be ameliorated in keeping with technological and political developments, and the United States should demonstrate its determination to do so. This would reassure the world that the U.S. is in earnest in trying to strengthen global security rather than creating a purely national shield, as the very expression of “national” missile defense might lead some to believe.

A package should therefore be presented to the international community, with two complementary elements: defense and a deliberate enhancement of international nonproliferation regimes. This could bring the Europeans closer to the point of view of their U.S. ally. It would encourage stability by inducing the majority of nations to cooperate in reducing missile proliferation through the improved effectiveness of the regimes.

The allies would welcome any movement toward turning missile defense into a practical attempt to reduce concrete emerging threats. The key is theater missile defense, aimed at protecting forces during operations abroad. Making this a main component of U.S. policy would show that national missile defense, far from being an isolating element for the U.S., would encourage America to be present in international situations where its presence is crucial. All the European allies with troops in Bosnia or in Kosovo, where they represent more than 60% of the international presence, would welcome a chance to protect their forces from being threatened by a missile attack. This is where the U.S. could usefully offer to share technology with its allies as a reassuring sign of dedication to alliance cohesion.

It is in the U.S. interest to be open to the sensitivities of its best friends, rather than to launch into uncertain and unproved experiments.