CHINA: The Volatile Ties With Taiwan

At first glance, the stunning election of Taiwan opposition leader Chen Shui-bian, overturning five decades of rule by the Kuomintang, appears to be a political earthquake that could result in a military conflict with mainland China. After all, how can Chen, whose Democratic Progressive Party advocates formal independence, continue the “one China” policy that has guided official policy in Washington and Beijing, and remains in Taiwan’s constitution? It was this fear that drove China to threaten to use force. In the thick of Taiwan’s presidential campaign, Beijing issued a “White Paper” on Taiwan, followed by warnings aimed largely at Chen that “independence means war.” A nervous Clinton administration dispatched special envoys to both Beijing and Taipei after the March 17 election.

To hear many pundits tell it, we will be on an inexorable path to conflict as soon as Chen takes office in May. But don’t head for the bomb shelters yet.

Chen’s victory was a watershed event for Taiwan, punctuating the political ascendance of native Taiwanese (85% of the population) over Kuomintang mainlanders. But the election was not about independence. Taiwan is not Kosovo, but a prosperous middle-class society. While there is a growing sense of Taiwanese identity, opinion polls show that 85% of the population prefers the status quo of de-facto independence to the almost certain Chinese military response that a formal declaration of independence would trigger. With more than $40 billion invested in mainland China and $26 billion in annual two-way trade, Taiwan has a large stake in stability. In fact, despite Beijing’s ham-fisted bullying, Chen’s razor-thin victory was achieved by abandoning his party’s independence platform and moving to the center.

China’s paper missiles were a milder version of its tactics during the Taiwan presidential election in 1996, when Beijing tested nuclear-capable missiles within 20 miles of the island. Ironically, just as in 1996, Beijing’s tactics boomeranged, with indignant Taiwanese voters preferring Chen over Beijing’s choice, James Soong. But one important difference this time around was that Beijing’s White Paper added a new condition to previous statements that a formal declaration of independence would result in the use of force: Force could also be used if Taiwan does not engage in talks to peacefully move toward reunification. Thus, for the first time, Beijing hinted at a deadline, however vague, for reunification.

China’s actions are right out of the playbook of its ancient strategist Sun Tzu: “The greatest victory,” Sun wrote, “is to defeat the enemy without fighting.” How much of Beijing’s posturing is skillful use of political theater is not clear. The fear is that President Jiang Zemin, having presided over the return of Hong Kong and Macao, wants a trifecta before he retires in 2007.

In any case, Beijing’s latest escalation of threats is part of a cycle of rising tensions in which the actions and reactions of Taiwan, China and the United States have created a negative dynamic that could lead to confrontation. What lies at the core of the current China-Taiwan tension is the well-established political reality that Taiwan is a democracy. This is a fact of life Beijing refuses to formally acknowledge, and the Clinton administration would prefer to ignore lest it complicate its pursuit of a legacy-making strategic partnership with China. Instead, both continue to embrace a one-China policy, the assumptions of which are increasingly inadequate.

The current policy was formulated during President Richard M. Nixon’s opening to China in 1971. When the U.S. initiated ties with China in 1972, an artful political fiction was created to obfuscate the Taiwan problem. The joint communique declared, “The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” It added that, “The U.S. does not challenge that position.” Jimmy Carter’s administration reaffirmed this position when it normalized ties to China in 1978 and officially “derecognized” Taiwan. This was possible because both Beijing and Taipei claimed to be the government of all China. Congress responded by passing the Taiwan Relations Act, which governs unofficial relations with Taiwan.

The democratization of Taiwan and the increasing expression of a Taiwanese identity have steadily eroded the U.S. framework for cross-strait relations. Taiwan’s democratization led to the election of Lee Teng-hui in 1996, in the first direct election of a Chinese leader in 5,000 years. Lee first challenged China by visiting his alma mater, Cornell University, in 1995. Then, last July, he proclaimed that, in the future, Taipei would deal with the mainland on the basis of “special state-to-state relations.” China angrily rejected this “two state theory” and canceled a planned visit of its top negotiator to Taipei to renew cross-strait dialogue. Then, as Beijing’s threats mounted last fall, the House of Representatives passed the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which further stoked Beijing’s wrath because Chinese leaders feared that Washington might scrap the one-China policy.

Where does this all lead? If there is a lesson, it is that the old policy framework, which has enabled all three sides of the triangle to prosper since 1971, requires adjustment to account for the new factor: Taiwan’s democracy. There are hopeful signs on both sides of the strait. Underneath its heated rhetoric, Beijing has said it would negotiate with Taipei as an equal political entity, not as a province. Chen has offered to go to Beijing and even discuss “one China” if he is treated as an equal.

While a resolution of the Taiwan question is not possible before China democratizes, one can see the outlines of a new modus vivendi. As they did in 1992, China and Taiwan could agree to accept a one-China concept, though they have different interpretations of what that means. Beijing wants to forge direct sea, air and communication links with Taipei, something Chen and Taiwan businessmen are willing to consider. Both will join the World Trade Organization this year, Taiwan as a customs union, thus opening a way around the problem of sovereignty. A best-case scenario of talks on economic and other practical issues, coupled with a commitment to continuing dialogue on larger political questions, could tamp down tensions and lead to a compromise.

For the United States, any arrangement that the two sides arrive at without coercion should be acceptable. The one principle the U.S. must not budge from is: no unilateral change in the status quo. Taiwan remains a flash point. But a new administration in Taipei offers a window of opportunity for a way out of the current psychological warfare and political standoff if both sides pursue their enlightened self-interest and inject a dose of political imagination into the equation. Stranger things have happened.