Why Fujimori Is So Hard to Beat

Only days before Peruvians were scheduled to vote in the second round of presidential balloting, the opposition candidate, Alejandro Toledo, declared that he will not participate because there is no guarantee that the elections will be free and fair. “We will not be lead to the slaughterhouse once again,” Toledo said Thursday. His sentiment captured the national and international outrage provoked by the electoral dirty war being waged by Peru’s president.

When thousands of Peruvians took to the streets to protest the systematic fraud in the first round of presidential elections, they were also crying out against the corruption that has been a central component of President Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian methods. While international observers focused on “irregularities” that impeded free and fair democratic elections on April 9, such irregularities have been the rule rather than the exception during Fujimori’s decade in power. Recent events indicate that the clash between authoritarian practices and popular will has only just begun.

When Fujimori was elected in 1990, he campaigned on a platform to end hyperinflation and defeat two guerrilla movements that had conducted an internal war throughout the 1980s. In fulfilling his promises, Fujimori used Draconian measures, staging a self-coup that shut down a recalcitrant Congress, rewrote the constitution and dismantled political parties and other institutional intermediaries in the development of his self-described “direct democracy.”

Popularity and personalist politics enabled Fujimori to handily win reelection in 1995. But his authoritarian impulses increased during his second term. To remain in power, he removed members of the Constitutional Tribunal who had blocked his illegal run for a third term in 1997 and reinterpreted the constitution to allow for the perpetuation of his presidency.

This was the backdrop for the more than 1,000 grave irregularities detected both before and on the day of the April 9 primary elections. Among the illegalities were the use of public funds for campaign purposes, manipulation of public-service employees and control of the mass media.

The Fujimori administration has resorted to more direct forms of pressuring voters. As part of our observation of electoral practices, we visited various cities and rural communities. The use of threats was universal. Representatives of Peru 2000, Fujimori’s political movement, planted the idea that if Fujimori didn’t win, all forms of support would cease. In a country in which 42% of the population and 70% of the rural population receive some form of social support from the government to satisfy basic needs, the threat to eliminate these programs was directed at the very survival of poor households.

The threats to economic livelihood were paired with ones against personal security. In Peru, 30,000 people have died in fighting between the terrorist group Shining Path, the Peruvian armed forces and the peasant patrols. Sowing rumors that opposition parties will release imprisoned guerrillas, confiscate arms from peasant-based civil-defense patrols and withdraw military bases from rural regions naturally trigger tremendous fear. As many peasants told us, “If Fujimori doesn’t win, they say the terrorists will come back here and slit all of our throats.”

The state’s terrorism even followed people to the voting booth. Many peasants told us that representatives of Peru 2000 told them that there were hidden cameras in the polling places that would take a photo of each person not voting for Fujimori so the government could punish them by taking away their aid. This was coupled with rumors that the computers used to tabulate votes can also identify voters by their identification number and track them down if they voted for the opposition. In a stunning twist, the threat that the “party has a 1,000 eyes and ears” no longer refers to the terrorists of Shining Path, but to the government itself.

The manipulation of fear is central to Fujimori’s authoritarian project, and draws upon the recent horrific past of his country. In Fujimori’s self-construction as Peru’s savior, he presents himself as the guardian of order preventing the country from sliding backward into an endless abyss. This juxtaposition of order and chaos, and of peace and violence, has been a key campaign theme and is used to delegitimize his opposition and its supporters.

But even the best-laid plans can go awry. Two months before the primary election, no one could have suspected that a former shoeshine boy from the Highlands would launch a serious threat to Fujimori. Even given the president’s virtual control of the mass media and all state entities, Toledo managed to channel the frustrations of an increasingly disgruntled populace. As the economic situation has deteriorated, more and more Peruvians are less swayed by the promise of continued patronage than they are by the promise of employment and the restoration of democratic institutions.

The symbolic importance of Toledo’s story cannot be overestimated. His dark skin and strong indigenous features have been assets in a campaign in which all sides have resorted to the slogan “A Peruvian just like you.” At his campaign stops, he blends with the crowds, easily passing as one more member of Peru’s large “cholo” population. Toledo has converted ethnic stigma into ethnic capital, a personification of success transcending the racist structures of Peruvian society.

Armed with his growing popularity and capacity to channel popular discontent, Toledo was the early leader in the exit polls April 9, and people began celebrating in the streets. Then, results of the tabulation shifted drastically, and suddenly Fujimori was headed for his third term.

In the following days, thousands of Peruvians of all ages took to the streets and challenged what they regarded as the flagrant theft of Toledo’s victory. Workers, retirees, homemakers and union members joined forces with students in massive mobilizations in defense of the popular will that had coalesced behind Toledo.

The announcements issued from Fujimori’s camp did not dampen the fervor of the protests. With his dismissal of the mass mobilizations as nothing more than the “residue of terrorism,” Fujimori repeated the pattern that has marked his assessment of popular mobilization throughout his presidency. Just as he has obscured the role of local initiatives in the defeat of Shining Path, so he continues to push popular will into the shadows. There is scant room for political participation in Fujimori’s authoritarian state.

Since then, coercion has escalated. Leaders of popular organizations under tremendous governmental pressure have issued multiple denials of threats of aid cutoffs. For example, organizers of soup kitchens nationwide have publicly decried threats that their supplies will dry up if their beneficiaries do not vote for Fujimori. Similarly, the media remain firmly under Fujimori’s control. On May 16, the Carter Center-National Democratic Institute, which sent observers to the first round of voting, expressed concern regarding the lack of measures taken by the government to correct the irregularities that distorted the first round of voting and continue unabated. These concerns have been echoed by the mission of the Organization of American States, whose director, Eduardo Stein, stated that the OAS could not place trust in a process that could not guarantee reliable results.

This fraud and coercion intermingle with protests of Peruvians who refuse to allow business as usual to silence their political voices. The presence of international observers in Peru is of great importance, raising the cost of political repression and electoral manipulation. As the U.S. ambassador to Peru, John R. Hamilton, recently stated, the right to free, fair and equitable elections is a universal one and represents the legitimate interest of the international community.

As the U.S. pushes to support struggling democracies in Eastern Europe and Asia, Latin America should not be forgotten. The international community should continue to monitor the electoral process in Peru, joining the millions of Peruvians who hope for change. *