Zero-Casualty Policy a Zero With Analysts

A glance at the summer crop of military journals proves conclusively that generals do in fact relive the last war over and over. Kosovo is on the mind, obsessively so, but in a surprising way.

The authors of two major articles see the potential for future military disaster in the “zero casualty syndrome” that blossomed during last year’s 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia. The articles appeared in both Aerospace Power Chronicles, the Air Force’s top academic publication, and Parameters, its Army counterpart.

By precluding the use of ground troops at the onset and by flying aircraft at altitudes above the range of Serbian missiles and guns, U.S. civilian and military leaders gave a higher priority to avoiding casualties than to accomplishing the military mission, according to both articles. Although an assortment of authors argue from different points of view, they all worry that casualty avoidance has distorted military doctrine and foreign policy.

“The world’s only superpower sent the strongest possible signal that, while it is willing to conduct military operations in situations not vital to the country’s national interest, it is not willing to put in harm’s way the means necessary to conduct these operations effectively and conclusively,” writes Marine Corps Col. Vincent J. Goulding Jr. in Parameters.

By making protection of their troops the top concern, commanders from the platoon to the Pentagon deny themselves the ability to maneuver and thus surprise and destroy their foes, he says. “Lack of willingness to be unpredictable and take risks precludes total victory at any level,” Goulding concludes.

The “force-protection fetishism” evident in Kosovo has its roots in the fear of military embarrassment after Vietnam, argues Jeffrey Record, a veteran military scholar who now teaches at the Air War College. Fear of “a Balkan Vietnam” allowed Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to survive and spared his military from serious damage, Record writes in the August issue of Aerospace Power Chronicles.

“Does elevation of force protection to first place among all other operational objectives convey a seriousness of means?” Record asks. “Does it not instead signal to adversary and ally alike the presence of a frail will? Does it not encourage enemies to adopt the simple strategy of filling as many American body bags as possible?”

While there is a good deal of earnest soul-searching over the implications of the conduct of last year’s air war, there are also some very parochial political considerations.

The perennial competition for money among the military services will become more intense when a new administration takes over the White House. As part of the transition, the Defense Department will prepare a Quadrennial Defense Review for the new president, which will set long-term military strategy and budget priorities. In the preliminary bureaucratic skirmishes, the Air Force is already hailing its performance in the Balkans last year as proof that it deserves favor, while the Army, which was left out of the initial fight, is struggling not to be left behind.

So perhaps it’s not surprising that after a good deal of hand-wringing and deep thinking, Record writes that “to the extent that casualty phobia persists and to the extent it continues to promote--as it did in the war against Serbia--reliance on air power to the exclusion of ground-combat force,” then budget priorities must be reexamined. “If in combat the United States is going to be a one-armed superpower, then that arm should be as strong as possible,” he says.

Goulding concludes, “Long-range precision strike will always be an option, but to truly put future adversaries in the horns of a dilemma, the additional dimension of equally precise combined-arms ground operations is an absolute requirement.”