U.S. Muscle Can Push Serb Reform

The dramatic arrest of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic last weekend and the Bush administration’s decision to continue financial aid to Serbia close one chapter in recent Balkans history. The crucial battle, however, is just beginning, and the United States has a critical role to play.

The democratic coalition that ousted Milosevic now governs in Belgrade. Its problem is time. Serbia needs reform desperately. Without it, there will be few, if any, effective governmental institutions. Serbia’s economy, which could power the entire region, will be corrupted and slowed by a crew of Milosevic cronies and opportunists who have money and title to Serbia’s resources.

Serbia’s reformers know they need to force and win a quick battle for reform while they have the political upper hand. If they do not, reform will become mired in growing popular disillusionment and a worsening economic situation.

The reformers are held together by popular expectations of quick reform, but their unity is fraying. Real disagreements over the pace of reform are made worse by long-standing personality differences. For example, Yugoslav President Voijslav Kostunica and Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, the men most responsible for the coalition’s coming to power, split more than a decade ago while in opposition; today, they disagree openly on how fast to reform the country.

Opportunists are playing on the coalition’s divisions. Democratic political parties are reported to have many new members, some of whom were associated with Milosevic’s inside circles. Any of the challenges facing Belgrade--ethnic violence, economic collapse, the independence of Montenegro--could blossom into political crises and prevent reform.

If the democratic coalition cannot agree on a program, decisions about reform will depend on the swing votes of a motley assortment, including chauvinists of the kind who turned Serbia into a pariah in the 1990s and opportunists whose money connections were formed during the Milosevic regime.

Unfortunately, Serbian reformers probably lack the muscle to force the quick fight they need. Their coalition is tired and wary of the hard choices ahead. Some may believe that since U.S. aid is now assured, a pause is in order. A few others may oppose necessary reforms.

This is where the United States has a role to play. Washington can amplify the voices of those in Serbia who want reform sooner; it should know from experience that reform later often means reform never.

Serbian leaders recognize, however much some of them may dislike it, that U.S. approval is critical to their success. They will listen if the Bush administration, with support from our European partners, defines international expectations and provides clear incentives for meeting them.

The first requirement is for Washington, with backing from international lenders and Europe, to support economic reform. The administration should make it clear that it expects continued exposure, prosecution and removal from office of those connected to Milosevic (so that they cannot burrow in under the new coalition), and measurable progress in controlling government expenditures. Milosevic created a giant patronage scheme by obscuring how the government got and spent its money. No reform government should be tempted to try to do the same thing again.

Second, Washington should continue its strong stance on the war-crimes tribunal, with a twist. Serb leaders are united in wanting Milosevic tried domestically for crimes against Serbs, including corruption, abuse of office and maybe politically motivated violence. Since this helps reformers build the political support they need for reform, the U.S. should be supportive.

But Belgrade’s leaders also need to respect the tribunal’s decision on when and where Milosevic will be tried for his alleged international crimes. At issue is whether Yugoslavia’s Serbs are ready to take their place in today’s Europe.

Leaders willing to transfer Milosevic want to press ahead quickly so that Yugoslavia can become a normal, European state. They know this status would bring with it the accountability and strict rule of law they desire. They also recognize that a central duty of countries in today’s Europe is to comply with international norms on crucial aspects of state practice. For Serbia’s leaders, that means transferring Milosevic to The Hague.

Leaders who oppose Milosevic’s transfer appeal to a belief that Serbia should solve its own problems in its own way. This Serbian exceptionalism, however, risks disrupting the rest of the region, which fears Serb nationalism, and could lead to a Serbian separatism similar to what fueled the horrible wars of the last decade.

Milosevic recognizes the power of this issue. In his initial defense statement, he admitted to diverting government funds without authorization but said he did so to finance Serb security forces fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This defense almost certainly is factually wrong and legally irrelevant--but politically brilliant. It paints him as protector of Serb interests and may tempt a domestic court to adjudicate his alleged war crimes, a step that might put it in the position of second-guessing the tribunal.

The United States can help Serbia’s reformers win this debate by reducing Serbian concerns about the tribunal. For example, it could encourage the tribunal to try Milosevic in Belgrade (and perhaps elsewhere in the region) with appropriate Yugoslav participation.

The Bush administration also needs to know when not to listen. Kostunica is the most outspoken opponent of transferring Milosevic to The Hague. This stance bolsters him domestically while keeping the West on the defensive. He knows, as Washington does, that in his current job he has little, if any, legal role in the decision to transfer Milosevic. Because there is no penalty for opposing the transfer, Kostunica is not going to change his mind.

The West’s job is to be sure that those who disagree with Kostunica can be heard at home. Then the Serbian people can decide whether to support Milosevic’s transfer to The Hague. I believe they will. From October 2000 to January 2001, the number of Serbs who supported sending Milosevic to the tribunal increased from under 30% to roughly 60%.

The administration has the tools it needs to achieve these goals. It has withheld support for an international donors’ conference, worth potentially a billion dollars to Yugoslavia, until the country cooperates fully with the tribunal. It can influence international lending (more than $250 million is awaiting approval,) debt restructuring that could be worth billions, and Yugoslavia’s membership application to the World Bank (and the billions in loans that would follow).

Some, especially in the United States, might be tempted not to care now that Milosevic, the central figure in the decade’s wars, has fallen from palace to prison. This would be a mistake. Serbia unreformed would be a disaster for its neighbors and for Western Europe, which is working through the Balkans to build ties to Turkey and beyond. With reform, it can be a cornerstone for stability and prosperity throughout the region.

*

James C. O’Brien was special presidential envoy for the Balkans and advisor to the secretary of State in the Clinton administration.