Mikhail Gorbachev: The Way It Was in ’91

It’s been nearly 10 years since Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the first and last “president” of the Soviet Union, was driven from power by the very forces of democracy he unleashed. These days, he’s president of the Moscow-based Gorbachev Foundation, a nonprofit group dedicated to promoting disarmament and environmental causes. In the space above his desk, once reserved for the portrait of Soviet founder Vladimir I. Lenin, now hangs a touchingly large portrait his late wife, Raisa, who died two years ago. He recently spoke with The Times about his role in the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Question: Ten years have passed since the August 1991 coup attempt. Looking back, is there anything you wish you had done differently?

Answer: I think that, in general, the August events could have been thwarted-through reforming the [Communist] Party. ... I hoped it would be possible to resolve everything in a democratic way and through democratic procedures, including finding the right place and the right role for the party. ... If we had reformed the party, we could have prevented the formation of forces of resistance inside the Communist Party. But as it turned out, it was the people from my entourage, the people whom I had placed in the Politburo, who turned out to be the coup plotters. To me, betrayal is the most abominable of all things a person can do, be it to friends or to colleagues. Especially when it is done for personal gain.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was nothing but a catastrophe. Everything that is happening to us nowadays, the condition society is in--no less than half of that is connected with the collapse of the Union. ... [Former Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin] is a person who is committed to the cause of democracy least of all. Even when he spoke in defense of it, even though he preserved the achievements of perestroika during his 10 years in power, he did it only to look respectable. The main thing about him, his chief political creed, is super-centralized power, the same as [in Soviet times], with the only difference that back then there was the Politburo and the Central Party Committee, while here it was just Yeltsin alone. Unlimited power and autocracy. And I think the feelings he cherished led him to favor the collapse of the Union. ...

As they say, no man is a prophet in his own country. In general, I have no one to blame. I did everything I could to prevent [the collapse], but it did not work. It did not work, and I regret it very much.

Q: Some historians say it would have been better to opt for the so-called Chinese model: concentrate on the economy and postpone political reforms.

A: We were doomed to political reform. In fact, we actually started the Chinese way. We thought that the system could be improved. We intended to carry out large-scale scientific and technical changes, large-scale decisions to start using new technologies, raise productivity, improve quality. But the system obstructed everything; nothing worked. ... All innovations, all measures to encourage the development of initiative among [work] collectives, to make them compete, to commercialize the entire economy--all this was vehemently rejected by the nomenklatura.

Q: Did it take you a while to realize this was happening?

A: Yes. Even shortly after the 1986 Congress, and especially in the fall of 1986 and early 1987, it had become clear that democrats were making an effort at the top, while nothing was changing at the bottom. I toured the regions [and] saw that ordinary citizens supported me. How were they to be included in the process, if not by means of political reforms, free elections? That was the only way.

Q: Many people believe your most important decision was not to resist the reunification of Germany.

A: This is an erroneous opinion. I can tell you why it is erroneous, because my most important decision was to begin perestroika . ... Since free elections were held in the Soviet Union, we could not deny other countries an opportunity to do the same. ... When the Soviet Union was conducting political reform, when Central and East European countries started to change, how could we have denied the Germans the right to self-determination and freedom of choice? That is why perestroika was the most important decision.

Q: Was there ever a moment when you feared civil war could break out?

A: Only once. It was when the “Belovezh” agreements [that dissolved the Soviet Union] were signed. ... If I had gone along the path of repression, it could have split the country and a civil conflict could have ensued. But that would have been a mistake on my part. I needed to adhere to democratic positions to the end.

Q: But after events in Tbilisi and Vilnius [the capitals of Georgia and Lithuania, where unarmed street protesters were killed by Soviet troops], you lost support from many liberals.

A: These incidents ... were a manifestation of one of democracy’s assets--it exposes problems. In the past, they were hidden, hushed up.

Q: Did you trust these people?

A: I am often asked, “How come you did not see it? How could you not see that the forces of resistance were consolidating?” I thought we could handle them democratically. ... I was excessively self-confident. I went on vacation. If I had remained here, they would not have been able to do anything. This is for sure. I had a conversation with [Kazakh President Nursultan] A. Nazarbayev and Yeltsin prior to going on vacation, on either July 29 or 30, which was the catalyst [for the coup]. We said we would sign the [new Union Treaty redividing power between the Kremlin and the republics], and the day of signing was fixed. ... The issue came up that many people should be replaced [after the treaty was signed], those who had reached retirement age, who were a burden. And we listed names--[Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry] Yazov, [KGB chief Vladimir A.] Kryuchkov.

But they were recording everything. We were being wiretapped. When Yazov balked at joining [the coup plotters], Kryuchkov offered to play the recording to him to pressure him.

Q: Didn’t you guess the KGB was wiretapping the president?

A: The things I knew about that organization allowed for such things. However, officially, they did not have the authority to bug the president. It must have been done upon some sort of an internal instruction; a lot of issues were regulated by classified instructions.

Q: Did the United States, under either former presidents George Bush or Bill Clinton, make any mistakes during this period?

A: I think that the West could have given greater support to reformers at the turning point. But even the July [1991] summit in London [with then-President Bush] showed they were not ripe for that. To some degree, [the lack of support] may have indirectly stimulated those who ventured the coup, the forces against the reformists and against Gorbachev. They could say, “See, he did not get any support in London, either.” But this is just guesswork.

Q: What was the role of dissidents like Andrei Sakharov? Did their criticism influence your decisions? Did you ever consider them “enemies of the people”?

A: Oh, come on! Nothing like that. If this had been the case, they would not have come back [from exile]. ... What kind of a democrat would Gorbachev be, and what kind of democratization and glasnost would we have, if the people who were the first ones to raise those questions were sitting in distant provinces [in exile]? It was a matter of principle and it was clear: They were our allies, our comrades-in-arms.

Q: It was Lev Tolstoy who wrote that there is no such thing as a “great man,” that the forces of history are more powerful than the actions of any individual. Do you agree with that?

A: In general, he is right. ... However, I have a different opinion on the role of an individual in history. I think he was trying to emphasize that the people, the masses, play the pivotal role in history. But at the same time, I think it was his miscalculation not to give credit to the role a personality can play in history. What about Tolstoy himself, and the tremendous influence he has had? The role of the individual is tremendous. However, it can be positive only if he can figure out the direction of the current.

That is why, when we talk about the last decade of the 20th century, I think that those politicians who reached a common understanding in the mid-1980s that there was a real threat of a nuclear conflict, who managed to stop the arms race and agreed to reduce and destroy nuclear weapons, did capture the challenge of history and responded to it decently. I think that all my partners deserve credit. Each one had a role of his own, like an orchestra--someone plays the double bass, another plays the violin, no matter the first or the tenth, or a harp. But in any case, everybody played a big role. The world was lucky ....

Q: At what point did you understand that the USSR would collapse?

A: I believed to the end that there would be no disintegration. To the very end. It was not until after Alma-Ata, where unanimous agreement was reached to [dissolve the Soviet Union and] set up a Commonwealth of Independent States, that I realized [the USSR would collapse.] The press was silent, the intelligentsia was silent, the nation kept silent, too. I realized that they were probably right, that only Gorbachev needed the union. Well, let it be, I thought. I quietly [relinquished my post], within the framework of democracy.

Q: Are you an optimist or a pessimist on Russia’s future?

A: I am an optimist. Otherwise, there would not have been anything important and creative in my life. And I am even more optimistic now than under Yeltsin. I think times are finally changing and will continue to change. The inertia of the Yeltsin epoch lingers, and it is not easy to overpower this inertia. But there is hope that we will finally make our choice and find a way out of this difficult situation.