Does Al Qaeda Need Osama Bin Laden?

During the Iran hostage crisis, a wishful group of foreign-policy analysts believed that when the shah of Iran died, the reason for Ayatollah Khomeini’s hostility would also die, and the U.S. hostages at the American embassy in Tehran would be released. Their fantasy neglected Khomeini’s need for an enemy to unify his following. So, as the shah withered, Khomeini adroitly shifted the animus from him to the United States, the “Great Satan,” and the hostage crisis continued--for 444 days.

There is a similar fantasy circulating in some Washington circles today that when Osama bin Laden is taken “dead or alive,” a mortal blow will have been struck at the Al Qaeda network, which will waste away and die, and no longer pose a threat. But fantasy it is, for Bin Laden’s role and character differ markedly from those of other charismatic leaders of terrorist organizations.

Two recent examples come to mind. When Abimael Guzman, the charismatic founder and leader of the Peruvian terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path), was captured in 1992, a mortal blow was struck at his movement; when Turkish forces caught Abdullah Ocalan, founder and leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party, the Kurdish separatist terrorist group, in 1999, his movement was severely wounded, and changed course. Both organizations were highly hierarchical, with authority resting solely in the paramount leader. In neither case was there a clearly designated successor.

By contrast, Bin Laden’s leadership style is more akin to that of the chairman of the board of a holding company, which may be a product of his education in business management at King Abdul Aziz University in Jedda, Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Al Qaeda, a collection of semi-autonomous terrorist groups, has a flat organizational structure, with cells reportedly operating in at least 30 countries, perhaps as many as 55. Bin Laden has grown his corporation by mergers and acquisitions, so that, for example, the previously autonomous Islamic Jihad of Egypt has essentially fused with Al Qaeda.

Unlike Guzman and Ocalan, Bin Laden has shared power with Ayman Zawahiri, a founder of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt. In addition to being Bin Laden’s designated successor, Zawahiri is Al Qaeda’s CEO, in charge of daily planning and management and is believed by U.S. authorities to have planned the Sept. 11 attacks. It was with Zawahiri that Bin Laden jointly founded Al Qaeda, “the base,” in 1991. Zawahiri’s role underscores the distinction between Al Qaeda and other terrorist movements: It is a two-headed organization. Furthermore, Zawahiri is considered to be even more apocalyptic, and more charismatic, than Bin Laden, so that while it appears to the outside world that Bin Laden is the charismatic force driving Al Qaeda, in fact, within the organization the two leaders are experienced as a charismatic duo. Zawahiri’s death, which has been reported but not confirmed, would be as significant for Al Qaeda as Bin Laden’s. But the fact that Al Qaeda is not dependent on a single leader bodes well for its survival.

Charisma does not really rest in an individual or individuals. Rather, it is a system, a lock-and-key fit between a leader with certain personality traits and his vulnerable followers who thirst for someone who has the answers and who can lead them to a brighter future. The Al Qaeda terrorists who carried out the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11 were fully formed adults, several with higher educations, a number from comfortable middle-class homes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who had lived for years in the West. They were “true believers” who subordinated their individuality to the cause as articulated by Bin Laden and Zawahiri. Called to give their lives while taking thousands of casualties, they did so without questioning the guidance of their leaders.

A leader does not become a leader until he encounters his followers, and Bin Laden’s leadership experience during the struggle in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion was assuredly a transformational experience. Ascetic in life style, often living in caves, Bin Laden gave generously of his fortune, building hospitals and clinics, purchasing weapons and ammunition. Inspirational in his rhetoric, he won the adulation of his Afghan freedom fighters. The defeat of the Soviet Union, a superpower, was confirmation that Allah was on their side. But success left Bin Laden without an enemy. His return to Saudi Arabia provided one: America, whose troops were stationed on sacred Islamic land.

A series of Bin Laden triumphs--the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Khobar Towers in 1996, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, last year’s attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen and the most spectacular terrorist act in history, the events of Sept. 11--further confirmed for Bin Laden and his followers the righteousness of their holy cause, for surely their small group of committed Muslims could not possibly have struck these blows against the one remaining superpower unless God was on their side. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have taken pains to say their war against terrorism is not against Islam, but Bin Laden has sought to frame it as a religious war and has laid claim to the title of commander in chief of the Islamic world, heroically confronting the commander in chief of the secular, modern West, George W. Bush. During this dizzying series of triumphs, Bin Laden’s messianic sense of mission has expanded, and his charismatic attractiveness increased.

Many Bin Laden watchers have suggested that his charisma is “manufactured,” expertly created by Al Qaeda’s highly effective public relations department. In person and in speaking style, he does not convey a particularly powerful impression. The charismatic aura often attributed to leaders like Bin Laden is not experienced as powerfully by followers in his immediate vicinity. Accordingly, those within Al Qaeda’s leadership circle probably respond at least as strongly to the personal force of Zawahiri’s leadership.

There are at least four scenarios regarding the future of Al Qaeda:

In the event of Bin Laden’s death or capture, Al Qaeda’s flat, dispersed organizational structure, the presence of a designated successor, Zawahiri, who is charismatic in his own right, and the appeal of Al Qaeda’s radical Islamic mission--all suggest that the terrorist network would survive. Bin Laden’s loss would assuredly be a setback, but since Zawahiri is already running Al Qaeda’s daily operations, his transition to the top job would be virtually seamless, assuming he survives Bin Laden.

Early last week, there were a number of reports that Zawahiri had been killed or seriously injured in a bombing raid. A number of inner-circle members were also said to have died. Should Zawahiri, in fact, be dead or incapacitated, and Bin Laden survives, Al Qaeda would be dealt a major, probably crippling setback, especially if other inner-circle executives were killed, too. But because it has systematically promoted individuals to leadership positions, Al Qaeda, with Bin Laden alive, would eventually recover and continue.

If both Bin Laden and Zawahiri, as well as other key leaders, were killed or captured, in effect eliminating the leadership echelon, this would probably be a fatal blow to the terrorist network.

Finally, should Bin Laden disappear, the myth of the hidden imam would probably be infused with mythic power, and others might well speak in Bin Laden’s name in attempting to continue Al Qaeda’s terrorist mission.

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Jerrold M. Post is professor of psychiatry, political psychology and international affairs at George Washington University. He is also co-author of “Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred.”