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Coming Change Bodes Ill

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Said K. Aburish is the author of "Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge" and "The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud."

The signs were there before Sept. 11. But now it’s become even clearer that Saudi Arabia will soon undergo dramatic change. The question is, can the West afford the consequences?

The House of Saud, Saudi Arabia’s ruling royal family, finds itself threatened by a variety of forces, including a strong and organized fundamentalist Islamic opposition. It faces unrest over social inequities, which have been brought into sharp relief by declining oil revenues. These things, when combined with escalating divisions within the ruling family, have produced a seriously unstable Saudi Arabia. And while there are no forces strong enough to replace the royal family, there are signs of internal disintegration within its ranks and open rebellion without.

Saudi Arabia has been the West’s most valuable Arab ally. The vast desert kingdom, has 25% of the world’s known oil reserves, which enables it to control supply. And, unlike most Arab states, it has opened its doors to U.S. military bases. But the U.S.-Saudi alliance is increasingly strained. Some of the perpetrators, along with the alleged mastermind, of the Sept. 11 attacks were Saudi Arabian, and the Saudis have been reluctant to actively embrace the anti-terror coalition. As a result, the West has begun to see Saudi Arabia as a major Middle East trouble spot. And for good reason.

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Even if militant Muslims outside the country are crushed, things are likely to fall apart in the desert kingdom after the death of ailing 80-year-old King Fahd. The eventual accession to the throne of 78-year-old Crown Prince Abdullah will produce a three-way battle for power among royal, moderate and militant Muslims. But regardless of the outcome, one thing is certain: None of the warring factions is likely to adopt the pro-West political moderation that Fahd inherited in 1982 and has kept in place until now.

There is much impetus for change in Saudi Arabia. Corruption, already at stifling levels before Fahd, has increased dramatically during his reign. Controls on all aspects of public and commercial life have been tightened. Saudi Arabia’s influence in Arab Muslim and international affairs has decreased. The country has debts of over $100 billion, and its revenues have declined dramatically, leaving the government no longer able to afford the lavish welfare programs its people have come to expect. Jobs are becoming scarce, and unemployment among recent college graduates is over 25%. The gap between rich and poor is widening, and the royal family--with 9,000 adult male members--continues to treat itself lavishly. The lowliest prince is said to command a salary of $40,000 for each member of his family, and most of them have four wives and more than a dozen children. King Fahd’s ostentatious celebration in early November of his 20 years on the throne is reported to have cost $2 billion.

Two main movements have coalesced in opposition to the House of Saud. While both are made up of fundamentalist Muslims, one is fairly moderate while the other is extreme. The well-established moderates have the sympathy of most citizens. They want a peaceful change in government and the introduction of an Islamic democracy with broader rights and greater equality (except for women). They believe this can come about through popular pressure on the royal family to change its ways and relinquish its monopoly on power.

The moderates, though largely unorganized, do have several groups representing their point of view, including the Committee for the Defense of the Legitimate Rights (CDLR) and Hezbollah of Saudi Arabia. Because all media in the closed kingdom is under strict royal control, the organized groups resort to modern means of transmitting their message. They use oversea offices to send messages by fax and e-mail. They produce video and audio cassettes, pamphlets and even cartoons. CDLR has even initiated a monthly bulletin called Prince of the Month. In it, the social, financial and sexual misdeeds of one prince per issue are examined in detail. One recent issue looked at Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister and second in line to the throne after Abdullah. “Psychologists would surely find Sultan very interesting,” the issue deadpanned.

Except for Al Qaeda, once called the Advice and Reformation Committee, the extremist groups are small. They operate secretly within Saudi Arabia, tend to cooperate with militant Muslims in other countries and are committed to violence. They dismiss the programs of larger, more moderate groups as wishful thinking. Among the militant organizations are the Committee for Islamic Change (something akin to a Taliban in the making), Ansar Allah (Backers of Allah) and Nimour Al Khalij (Tigers of the Gulf). Some of them are suspected of having cooperated with Bin Laden on the November 1995 bombing of the American military mission in Riyadh (in which six people were killed and more than 60 injured) and the June 1996 bombing of an American housing compound at Al Khobar (which killed 19 and wounded more than 300).

Both clusters of fundamentalists have strong ties (as does the House of Saud) to the Wahabi sub-sect of Sunni Islam. The more liberal Shia Muslims of the country fear these groups more than they do the House of Saud and have announced an end to their anti-regime activities. But officially the royals still describe Shiites as “heretics and idolaters who should be eliminated.”

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Unlike its Western protectors, the House of Saud has been acting against the militant and moderate threats for more than five years. But since the Saudis are religious people, the royal family has elected to try to neutralize the opposition by embracing its own brand of conservative Islam. The result, which annoys Western governments and confuses the average person, is royal fundamentalism. In fact, there is no argument between the Saudi government and the Islamic opposition regarding the imposition of Islamic law. The differences between them have to do with the country’s oil and foreign policies, particularly with regard to the West.

The Saudi government is using the country’s religious police to enforce Islamic teachings more strictly than ever before. More than one-third of radio and television programs are devoted to religious affairs. The Committee for the Advancement of Virtue and Elimination of Sin (CAVES), a volunteer police organization with more than 30,000 members, was recently given new powers that enable it to operate as a virtual state within a state.

Like the Taliban, members of this committee roam the streets enforcing instant justice. They use sticks to punish women who dare to expose their ankles. They destroy television satellite dishes. Christians are not allowed to wear crucifixes or have Christmas trees and face prison sentences if they do. Recently CAVES has been involved in an underground war against foreigners who operate secret pubs frequented by royals. CAVES efforts have been so successful that the price of a bottle of whiskey is now about $280. Even smoking in public is prohibited.

Meanwhile, the danger of the militants to Western interests keeps expanding. Having begun by demanding the departure of U.S. forces stationed in the country, they now want to reclaim Jerusalem and form a pan-Islamic alliance against the West. Their rhetoric against a “morally corrupt West” grows ever more aggressive.

Despite differences with the militants, the House of Saud has found it safer to make concessions to home-grown militant Islam than to tie itself to the West’s apron strings. But even if the West continues to look the other way while this is being done, the government’s policy of paying lip service to fundamentalists while at the same time remaining allied to the West cannot last.

Islamic fundamentalism is already deeply embedded in Saudi Arabian politics and daily life. Inevitably, it will impose itself on Saudi Arabian foreign policy as well, pushing the country away from the West. Up to now, President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have shown signs of accepting royal fundamentalism. But ultimately, the battle for the hearts and minds of Saudis will be fought on the streets of Jeddah and Riyadh. And it will not be easily won.

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