Sub Inquiry Reportedly Focuses on Sonar Data

Investigators probing the collision between a U.S. submarine and a Japanese fishing trawler are reviewing whether the accident occurred because the sub’s commanding officer was given an incorrect interpretation from a sonar technician about the proximity of the trawler, sources close to the case said Thursday.

Civilians and Navy personnel in the control room of the submarine Greeneville have told National Transportation Safety Board investigators that Cmdr. Scott Waddle and officer of the deck Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen made repeated 360-degree periscope inspections.

When neither officer saw any ship within the immediate vicinity of the nuclear-powered submarine, Waddle ordered the sub to dive and then execute an “emergency blow” in which the sub rocketed to the surface.

The 5,500-ton sub collided with the trawler Ehime Maru, smashing its hull and sending it to the bottom within 10 minutes.

Twenty-six people aboard the trawler were rescued in the minutes after the Feb. 9 accident off Honolulu, but nine are missing and presumed lost, their bodies possibly trapped in the wreckage.

Investigators have been told that a senior enlisted sailor charged with calculating the location of other ships disregarded sonar data purporting to indicate that the trawler was within a mile of the submarine after the periscope inspections found no ship that close.

Instead, the sailor listed the trawler on a video display screen as being several miles away, a safe distance for the Greeneville to do a rapid ascent.

“Civilians think sonar is like radar, that it gives you an exact location,” said one source. “It doesn’t. It gives you data to compare with other data. When data contradict each other, you have to interpret.”

The NTSB this week received information from the sub’s data recording device that will indicate to investigators just what sonar information was available to the Greeneville crew.

Veteran submariners have said that a submarine accident during a surfacing maneuver is akin to an airplane crash during takeoff or landing. In both cases, they said, there are two main possible causes: equipment failure or human error.

The NTSB has already said that the sonar equipment on the submarine was functioning properly.

The Ehime Maru had been among several ships that the sub’s sonar technicians were tracking in the hour before the deadly collision.

But the trawler’s direction--headed directly toward the bow of the submarine--could have made getting clear-cut sonar information difficult.

The sub’s recording device will indicate what information was available about other ships in six categories: speed, heading, depth, pitch, roll and keel-to-bottom distance.

Radar records from Honolulu airport given to the NTSB have shown that the Ehime Maru was traveling at 11 knots (12.7 mph) when it was struck.

The Navy has ordered a court of inquiry into the incident to both determine the cause and decide whether any Navy personnel should face criminal charges. Three admirals will hear testimony, with a Japanese maritime force admiral acting as advisor.

On Thursday, the Navy delayed the start of the court of inquiry until March 5 at the request of Waddle’s attorney, Charles Gittins, a Virginia lawyer who has been involved in several high-profile military cases.

The issue of whether Waddle, as the commanding officer, should face criminal charges will be difficult from both a legal and geopolitical standpoint.

Some in Japan have loudly called for punishment.

But recent history suggests that the current chief of naval operations, Adm. Vern Clark, is reluctant to punish commanding officers unless he feels they did not show due diligence.

Clark opted against punishment for the commanding officer of the destroyer Cole, which was attacked by terrorists on Oct. 12 while refueling in Yemen. Seventeen sailors were killed.

In a message that was circulated to all Navy officers worldwide, Clark said that his standard for deciding whether punishment is warranted in such cases is “did he [the commanding officer] fail to take a directed or expected action which would have changed the outcome or eliminate the hazard to the ship.”

Clark said that, while the Cole’s commanding officer could have done more to safeguard his ship, it was not reasonable for him to do so, given what he knew about the “threat conditions” in the region.

In the Greeneville case, the Navy will have to determine whether it is reasonable that Waddle, given what he was being told by those around him, ordered the surfacing maneuver.

Complicating matters is the fact that aboard the submarine that day was the chief of staff to the admiral in charge of all submarines in the Pacific.

Just why Waddle and Coen failed to spot the trawler on the periscope is unclear, although one suggestion has been that their line of sight was obscured by choppy seas.

The rapid ascent was done as a demonstration for 16 civilian VIPs aboard the sub.

Two of those visitors were seated at the sub’s control positions at the time of the accident.

In Washington on Thursday, the Pentagon announced that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has decided to bar civilians temporarily from the controls of U.S. warships, aircraft and combat vehicles.

Navy Rear Adm. Craig R. Quigley, the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for public affairs, told reporters that Rumsfeld would order a moratorium within days, even as individual military services studied their policies on visits--and participation--by civilian guests in exercises.

The Navy and Army had already temporarily barred civilians from controlling ships, tanks and other combat equipment, in a step prompted by the Greeneville accident.

Quigley said that Rumsfeld still supports inviting civilians to witness how the armed services work in order to bolster support for the military.

Air Force and Marine Corps officials said they were studying their current policies but had made no changes yet.