Let the B-1 Fade Away
The B-1 bomber is a Cold War relic, designed originally in the 1970s to penetrate Soviet airspace at supersonic speed but plagued with a long series of technical problems. In the military budget he sent to Congress recently, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld proposed mothballing about one-third of the remaining 93 B-1s and putting the savings toward acquiring weapons better suited to new challenges. It’s a sound idea, though that hardly assures its acceptance by Congress. Congressional delegations from Georgia, Kansas and Idaho, where jobs would be eliminated if some of the B-1s are decommissioned, have made clear they will fight hard to deny Rumsfeld’s request.
It’s a familiar story. Congress insists it is all in favor of effective and rational defense spending but balks at steps to end irrational, ineffective and money-squandering programs. It refuses to allow unneeded military bases to be shut down, foists on the armed services weapons they haven’t asked for and resists cutbacks in redundant systems like the B-1.
Defense spending should be dictated by informed strategic planning based on careful assessments of what threatens the nation’s security. But defense budgets--the latest requests $329 billion for the next fiscal year--are also very much about creating and maintaining jobs. When Congress’ political need to preserve constituents’ jobs clashes with the Pentagon’s sense of what it really needs, politics too often wins.
The B-1 program was canceled by President Jimmy Carter in 1977, after four prototypes had been built, but revived by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 as part of his rapid defense buildup. It was intended as an interim bomber until the B-2 Stealth was ready and came at a stiff price. The Air Force says each of the 104 B-1s built cost more than $200 million.
Over time the plane was modified to carry conventional instead of nuclear weapons. But major problems, including a series of crashes, leaky fuel tanks and glitches in its all-important electronic countermeasures systems, kept the planes out of the Persian Gulf War. They did see some service in the air war against Yugoslavia.
Whether they might be used again is unknown. But the cost of keeping all remaining B-1s operational seems unwarranted given the plane’s uncertain history and the likely roles and missions facing the post-Cold War Air Force. Rumsfeld is seeking greater efficiencies in the military. A smaller B-1 fleet is one good place to look for them.
