President, Putin Should Talk Trash--Nuclear Trash, That Is

When President Bush sits down with Vladimir V. Putin for the first time on Saturday, he will focus on establishing a personal rapport and defusing big-ticket items, such as missile defense and the next round of NATO enlargement.

But Bush should not miss the opportunity to weigh in on a controversial Russian plan, potentially worth billions of dollars to both countries, to store thousands of tons of foreign-origin nuclear waste inside Russia. A constructive presentation by Bush on this issue could not only cut off dangerous Russian cooperation with Iran’s nuclear weapons program but also provide a major boost to Russia’s beleaguered democracy and teetering nuclear complex.

The Bush administration has a de facto veto over the Russian initiative, thanks to its control over the handling of all U.S.-origin spent reactor fuel--nearly 70% of the world’s supply. In addition to our own vast inventory, the administration also must approve any shipments by other countries (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) that use U.S.-origin fuel.

Not surprisingly, the Russian proposal has outraged Russian and Western environmentalists alike. They fear that Russia, which already does an abysmal job on nuclear waste management, could become a dangerous and unregulated dumping ground. Average Russians are also concerned--polls indicate that 80% to 90% of the public is opposed--but they have been brazenly ignored by the Kremlin and its allies.

Still, Bush should make clear to Putin that the administration is prepared to move forward based on the following conditions:

* A total cutoff of sensitive Russia-Iran nuclear cooperation. Iran’s aggressive nuclear weapons program and Russia’s invaluable technical support to it have set off alarm bells in Washington and Israel. However, the billions Russia could earn from nuclear waste storage far overshadow the money it currently is receiving from Iran for these sensitive projects.

Putin, who has rejected U.S. complaints about the Iran problem, will be a tough sell. The ground may be shifting in Moscow, however, as indicated by Putin’s recent firing of one of the main Russian proponents of clandestine nuclear cooperation with Iran.

* Firm Russian commitments to adopt stronger environmental safeguards and to spend any proceeds on threat reduction and nuclear clean-up projects.

The Bush administration must insist on the toughest possible environmental protections for nuclear waste storage. It also should require that any Russian profits be used to reduce nuclear threats, including stemming the brain drain of former Soviet weapons scientists to rogue states; dismantling nuclear warheads; and preventing “loose nukes” from getting into the wrong hands. Left to their own devices, the Russians simply will not prioritize such projects.

* Agreement on a long-term moratorium on reprocessing of spent reactor fuel. The Russian atomic energy ministry is keen to reprocess some of the spent fuel for future nuclear energy use and export. This plan is a disaster in the making and must be blocked. Reprocessing would generate new streams of proliferation-susceptible nuclear materials and toxic liquid waste.

* Clear U.S. support for a Russian popular referendum on nuclear waste storage. The Bush administration cannot afford to turn its back on the grass-roots Russian democracy activists and politicians, such as Grigory Yavlinsky, who are renewing calls for a referendum on this issue. Bush also must be mindful that the environment is one of the few issues that average Russians actually care about.

Last December, Russian authorities quietly scuttled a proposed referendum by invalidating the exact number of the 2.5 million signatures necessary to disqualify the petition. Putin now needs to hear directly from Bush that the Russian people must have a voice in this decision.

The details of any U.S.-Russia agreement will take months to iron out. But President Bush has a rare opening this weekend in Slovenia to make his mark on a nuclear security issue with far-reaching implications.

Ignoring it will only feed widespread fears in the U.S. and Europe that the new administration is not serious about deepening cooperation with the new Russia.