Dare We Lead in the Balkans’ Pocket of Relative Reason?

“Anation that cannot preserve itself ought to die, and it will die--die in the grasp of the evils that it is too feeble to overthrow.”

Sen. Morris Sheppard, speaking around the time of the first Balkan wars in 1914, might just as well be speaking about Macedonia today. The country teeters on the brink of all-out war between Albanians and Slavic Macedonians. With a deadline slipping away and a cease-fire crumbling, the sides are deadlocked in talks that will likely decide the country’s fate.What should the U.S. do about it? Should we let Macedonia “die” if its two main constituent peoples cannot come to terms?

Adamant about lowering our profile in the Balkans and skeptical about peacekeeping, the Bush administration is content to stay behind the scenes as Europe tries to broker a peace deal. The U.S. may, grudgingly, send its troops in a backup role to a NATO contingent, but only if there is an agreement. And we sure won’t put our prestige on the line to secure that agreement. If the Albanians, Macedonians and the Europeans are too feeble to overcome the obstacles, well, the administration seems to say “let them deal with the consequences.”

Unfortunately, so will we. Such fatalism about Macedonia carries serious risks: First, in the event of war, our troops in Kosovo will face having their main supply routes interrupted. Minor skirmishing in Macedonia during the spring forced the U.N. mission in the province to ration fuel. What will a full-scale blowout mean for the safety of troops controlling the Kosovo border? Second, if the situation in Macedonia completely boils over, it will radicalize Albanian politics in Kosovo. When the fighting gets fierce, Albanian leaders in the province will wholeheartedly support their brethren, putting Kosovars at odds with NATO. The climate for this fall’s elections will become charged, hardly encouraging Kosovo’s Serbs to participate. Third, war will polarize the region. Already, Russia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have been vocal in their support for Macedonian Slavs; Ukraine and Greece have provided helicopters. Just when regional cooperation, trade and investment finally seem feasible, war in Macedonia will complicate our goals. Indeed, if things go badly for the Albanians, then Turkey could be drawn into the fray, heightening tension with fellow NATO member, Greece. And if things go sour for Macedonian Slavs, then Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia may intervene to redeem their historic claims on the country.

In this context, what sense will it make for NATO to follow through on President Bush’s promise to expand the alliance? As during the war in Bosnia, NATO will be derided again as a “paper tiger”--good at building membership, but not so good at building stability. Some leaders are already mocking Macedonia’s associate membership in the alliance.

All in all, there are plenty of compelling reasons--reasons that have nothing to do with mushy humanitarian ideals or sentimentality about multi-ethnic states--to exhort Macedonia’s leaders to come to terms. Ironically, taking a leadership role in Macedonia carries far less risk than in any of the last decade’s conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milosevic and his ilk are gone. Macedonia is blessed with leaders who--at least by Balkan standards--act within the realm of reason. And both sides are generally aware of their all too obvious military limitations.

The problem is that in the over-heated atmosphere no leader can afford to look weak. A few months of sporadic conflict have dramatically polarized communities and incited bitter power struggles within them.

On the Macedonian side, there is great pessimism about reconciliation and suspicion about Albanian intentions; for their part, Albanians bitterly resent “Macedonian paranoia” about their aims. And there is serious question whether the rebel National Liberation Army would respect the compromises of Albanian party leaders.

Europe’s peacemaking effort has been creditable. What has been missing is the indispensable ingredient: American leadership.

At this decisive moment, it is the world’s only superpower that commands both the reverence of Albanians and the respect of Macedonians. The situation demands the personal engagement of the secretary of State, who should make clear that the U.S. sees a vital interest in a Macedonian peace and is willing to lead the way with political engagement and military support.

Bringing peace to Macedonia will not be easy but the consequences of war are too great for the U.S. to let fate take its course.