Spy-Hunting vs. Trust

In April 1985, CIA officer Aldrich H. Ames walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and offered to spy for Moscow. Six months later, U.S. prosecutors allege, FBI counterintelligence officer Robert Philip Hanssen anonymously offered his services to the KGB. There is no reason to think that Ames or Hanssen had any idea of what the other was up to. But between them they appear to have sold some of the nation’s most important intelligence secrets and been responsible for the deaths of a number of Russians spying for the United States. Ames was arrested in 1994. Hanssen was able to go on with his alleged espionage until last month.

Ames presented a special kind of scandal because he was allowed to get away with years of treachery even though his big spending and episodes of public drunkenness should have made him an early target of investigation. Hanssen was markedly different, an apparently deeply religious man who lived a quiet and conservative life. In fact that persona--and it remains to be seen whether it was merely a disguise--provided ideal cover for what he is alleged to have done.

The Ames and Hanssen cases raise anew a problem all intelligence agencies face: how to make sure that those entrusted with guarding a nation against its enemies don’t themselves cross over to the enemy camp. Ames’ reckless overt behavior inexcusably failed to trigger prompt and intense scrutiny. With Hanssen, the FBI seemingly didn’t have a clue until it was tipped off by a source within Russian intelligence that one of its high officials was a traitor.

What might seem the most obvious remedy isn’t necessarily an effective one. Keeping a tighter watch on employees might still have failed to detect someone like Hanssen. The intelligence services are also properly concerned about fostering a sense of endemic mistrust, which saps morale, discourages collegiality and diminishes performance. That’s one reason the FBI has long resisted even so routine a measure as requiring its employees to take periodic polygraph tests.

A middle way has to be found between creating a paranoid atmosphere in the intelligence services and assuming the unwavering loyalty of every employee. FBI and CIA applicants accept the need to be thoroughly vetted before they’re hired. It’s what a tiny number might be tempted to do after they are on the job that is the real cause for worry.