N. Korea: Hard Line Is Not the Best Line

Relations between the U.S. and South Korea will be put to the test today as South Korean President Kim Dae Jung meets with President Bush to push the United States on improving relations with North Korea. The mixed signals from South Korea over U.S. plans to deploy national missile defenses that emerged from Kim’s recent summit with Russian President Vladimir V. Putin complicate Bush’s first foray into East Asian security affairs. This potential conflict adds to the concerns sparked by recent statements from North Korea hinting at a restart of its missile and nuclear programs. By moving to engage North Korea and end its missile program, Bush can quickly move to secure the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance and improve the overall security outlook for the region.

North Korea’s development and export of long-range missiles continues to top the U.S.-North Korean agenda and will occupy much of the discussions between Kim and Bush. North Korea has signaled its willingness to eliminate this program if the United States will arrange for North Korean satellites to be launched by other countries. The U.S. rightfully opposed a suggestion that North Korea be given space launchers, which are virtually identical to long-range missiles. But the broader agenda of improved relations between the two states, as part of a larger opening up by North Korea, must also be pursued if the security picture in East Asia is to improve.

The risk of war on the Korean peninsula has existed almost unchanged for decades. Moves over the past two years by North and South Korean leaders, however, offer a radically different future on the peninsula. The historic summit last year has been followed by symbolic but important steps to reunite families and establish rail links between the two countries. Key to continuing this process is improved U.S.-North Korea relations, which require resolution of the missile and conventional military picture on the peninsula.

North Korean officials have shown their growing impatience with the slow pace of U.S. diplomatic moves, stating that “We promised not to test-fire long-range missiles during the duration of talks on the missile issue, but we cannot do so indefinitely.” Longtime observers of North Korea know such language is part of Pyongyang’s attempt to maintain U.S. interest in improving relations.

North Korea could reasonably interpret the lack of ongoing dialogue since President Bush took office as a sign that the winds in the United States have changed. Even analysts in the U.S. wonder what direction the new administration will take. Bush can quickly put these fears to rest by declaring his desire to pursue a comprehensive settlement with North Korea.

For all of the campaign criticism, progress can be made with the North if President Bush picks up where Bill Clinton left off. The major components of a missile deal were all but completed after Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit last year. Elements of a broader deal could include:

* Providing North Korea with access to satellite launches (but not the launchers themselves) in exchange for a ban on tests and exports of long-range missiles;

* Negotiating a final peace treaty to the Korean War if North Korea reduces the size and forward deployment of its armed forces;

* Orchestrating a large economic and agricultural assistance package to relieve the massive human suffering in North Korea.

The potential payoffs of engaging North Korea are enormous. Negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement, including the elimination of the North’s long-range missile and nuclear weapon programs, and a reduction in conventional forces on both sides of the demilitarized zone would reinforce positive trends on the peninsula, and reduce the tensions felt in Seoul, Pyongyang, Tokyo and even Beijing. It would also allow both sides to redirect major budget resources toward economic pursuits, helping the local and regional economic outlook.

Domestically, such a settlement could free up considerable resources for Bush’s military reform agenda. Ending North Korea’s missile program would reduce the need to rapidly deploy missile defenses and buy more time for researching more effective and less costly alternatives. Moreover, reducing the conventional military threat from North Korea would give Bush more flexibility in reshaping the U.S. military into a lighter, more mobile fighting force.

Some critics of Clinton-era engagement will surely push President Bush to maintain a hard-line attitude toward North Korea, and condemn these proposals as appeasement. But reaching a package deal with the North offers Bush several things he wants and needs, including stability in the region, greater freedom of action at home and one thing all new presidents want: foreign policy success to strengthen their image as a strong leader.