Officer Visiting Sub Saw Signs of Haste, Admiral Says

The highest-ranking officer aboard a nuclear-powered submarine that collided with a Japanese trawler should have known that the sub’s captain was cutting corners in executing a dangerous maneuver for a group of civilians, according to testimony Tuesday by a Navy admiral during an inquiry into the crash.

Capt. Robert Brandhuber, chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet’s submarine force, was accompanying 16 visitors aboard the Greeneville when it struck the Ehime Maru off Oahu on Feb. 9, killing nine men and boys aboard the trawler.

In his capacity as chief of staff during the excursion, Brandhuber trolled the submarine’s narrow aisles, paying particular attention to a series of rapid turns that the Greeneville executed before surfacing in a dramatic maneuver called an “emergency blow,” Rear Adm. Charles Griffiths Jr. told the board investigating the crash.

Brandhuber spent much of the trip in the submarine’s control room, Griffiths said, and felt that the submarine’s captain was moving too fast in carrying out the necessary periscope checks before ordering the Greeneville to rocket to the surface.

Griffiths was the chief naval investigator into the crash, which has sparked international outrage, particularly among Japanese citizens and government officials. Griffiths interviewed Brandhuber during the course of his investigation.

“I think he should have had a sense that corners were being cut from wherever he was,” said Griffiths, who testified that Brandhuber “probably should have had some signals going off in his mind. . . . He brooded over this in my interviews with him.”

Griffiths testified Monday that, because lunch with the civilians took longer than scheduled, the Greeneville’s captain performed certain safety procedures faster than was normal practice. One periscope check to make sure the surface was clear of other vessels took only 80 seconds, rather than the usual three or more minutes.

But Brandhuber did not step in to override the captain’s orders, Griffiths said, because Brandhuber “specifically told me he did not see any action that met the threshold” for such a step.

Griffiths testified here before a panel of three U.S. admirals on the second day of a rare Navy inquiry into the mishap. The panel must decide what caused the collision, which sent the Ehime Maru to the ocean floor, stranding 26 of its crew members and students and killing nine others, including four teenagers. Their bodies have not been recovered.

It must also decide whether criminal charges should be filed or other punishment levied against Cmdr. Scott Waddle, the Greeneville’s captain, and two other officers on board when the sub smashed into the smaller fishing vessel, a teaching ship from southwestern Japan.

The Navy has said since the crash that the Greeneville was on a training mission, accompanied by participants in the Distinguished Visitors Program. But Griffiths contradicted that view Tuesday, basically saying that the trip was a way to show off for the visitors.

It was originally planned to be a training mission, he said, but that was changed in the weeks before the trip. In fact, Griffiths said, Waddle had at one point considered canceling the voyage, which was basically a public relations jaunt.

The primary mission of the trip was “to demonstrate the prowess” of the Greeneville to the 16 visitors from around the country. Griffiths was pressed by the admirals about whether the Navy had regulations to follow when the only mission is to transport so-called distinguished visitors.

“I know that in general, the practice is discouraged of getting underway only for that mission,” Griffiths said. “Higher authority has promulgated that, in general, these underways should have been concurrent with other requirements. This is an exception to the rule.”

During his testimony Tuesday, Griffiths painted a picture of a cramped control room overrun with civilians, three of whom were at various controls of the submarine when it executed the surfacing maneuver.

The 16 civilians were properly supervised by crew members of the Greeneville, Griffiths said, adding emphatically that the three who were at the controls “had zero impact on the collision.” They were “nondisruptive,” he said, and “completely cooperative.”

When asked directly by the admirals during the inquiry, Griffiths acknowledged that a “central question” of the investigation was whether the civilians got in the way of safe operation of the 6,500-ton attack submarine.

During his interviews, several crew members--also known as watch standards when they operate certain pieces of equipment--said they were not able to see some equipment or indicators of the trawler’s location because of the crowding caused by civilians.

“If they intruded, if they impeded, it would be merely from their presence, the fact that they took up visual and standing space,” Griffiths said. The result was “less ability for the normal watch standards to operate and back each other up.”

The second day of the inquiry began aboard the Greeneville itself and then moved to the site of a submarine simulator, so that the three admirals hearing the case could better understand what happened leading up to the collision.

Actual testimony, which did not begin until the afternoon, touched on a variety of intertwined issues central to the mishap. Griffiths told the panel of admirals that Waddle could have maneuvered the periscope higher above the ocean’s chop to make sure the surface was free of other vessels.

“The skipper had eight more feet to use and he didn’t use it,” Griffiths said. “It was available for free.”

Griffiths was pressed by the admirals about who should have or could have known that the Ehime Maru was above them. He was asked about each man in a position of responsibility and that officer’s awareness of the trawler’s location, known as Sierra 13 for its sonar position.

Executive officer, officer of the deck, sonar supervisor, chief of staff, commanding officer--none knew the fishing boat was there.

Waddle, Griffiths said, “didn’t correctly understand the parameters of Sierra 13 at the time.” The officer of the deck “had an even lesser understanding.” The only man who had spotted the trawler, an as-yet-unidentified fire-control technician, “clearly was in a position to influence” his superiors but did not.

Griffiths on Monday had testified that the fire-control technician thought that Waddle had spoken with sonar operators and had updated information about the Ehime Maru.

For all of the missteps that led to the crash, Griffiths still described the Greeneville as “a very experienced and competent ship, used to success.” And he said that Waddle was well-respected and deeply in charge. That combination, however, is “imperfect,” he said.

“One of the potential implications of a ship that operates this way is that the commanding officer does not get a lot of corrective input from subordinates,” Griffiths said.

“He’s busy giving directions, and the ship has had a lot of success when he has done so,” Griffiths continued. His crew has “respect for his abilities and a willingness for, if he says, ‘That’s the way to do it, that’s OK for me.’ ”