Hapless Hussein Opposition Has U.S. Looking Elsewhere

Despite millions of dollars in U.S. aid, the leading Iraqi opposition group has proved so hapless in making use of the money, accounting for it, finding recruits for Pentagon training and preventing its own fragmentation that the State Department is searching for alternatives.

The Iraqi National Congress is also now so out of favor in the Arab world and in Turkey that all but one of the states bordering Iraq have made clear to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and other U.S. officials that they won’t allow the group to operate out of their territories, officials say.

“Leaders in the region say that the INC now has no meaningful support left inside Iraq and even less ability to threaten, much less topple, [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein. They see them as the gang that couldn’t shoot straight,” said a well-placed administration official. “So they see our involvement with the INC as a clear sign that we’re not serious about changing the regime in Baghdad.”

Although the INC still has support in key quarters of Washington, the growing questions about it mark a reversal of fortunes for a group once heralded as the “future liberators” of Baghdad led by the “George Washington” of Iraq.

In an attempt to prove the group’s bona fides, INC leader Ahmad Chalabi was in Iran last week to set up an office in Tehran, to be paid for by U.S. aid--a move that required a special waiver from Washington because of American sanctions against Iran.

The opposition group hopes to use Iran as a base from which to send about 100 operatives into northern Iraq in three-person teams to gather news and “political intelligence,” according to U.S. officials and former intelligence agents who still have contact with the group.

But even this plan--which would be based out of the last front-line state to consider allowing the group to use its border with Iraq--has frustrated U.S. officials because the INC has not taken advantage of Pentagon training that might significantly enhance its ability to carry out this and other operations.

Many slots available for a wide variety of training courses have gone unfilled, according to U.S. officials. For other slots, the group came up late with names of Iraqi candidates, leading to a scramble to get them visas and accommodations.

One of the most contentious issues, however, is funding. The INC was so slow to submit proposals for $4 million from the last administration that the grant ran out last month after only half was spent. The INC had to reapply for it.

So far, only $3 million of the $97 million in Pentagon training or used equipment, allocated by Congress in the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act, has been used. An additional $25 million in funding managed by the State Department is available to the group, but again its plans have stumbled on specifics and accounting.

One senior State Department official blamed some of the problems on a “learning curve” and said a still unfinished audit on the first part of the $4-million grant had “no major problems with embezzlement.”

Questions Whether Aid Will Continue

But a U.S. official familiar with the funding said “serious questions” remain about whether the group has the ability to provide either “an overall game plan or an accounting of its costs that would warrant that kind of ongoing cooperation.” Citing the delicate diplomacy involved, most officials contacted for this article asked that they not be quoted by name.

The United States has tried to help by providing a lawyer, grant writer and accountant to assist in outlining how the group could use U.S. aid and how to account for funds after they have been spent, as U.S. law requires. But the INC still has major problems in meeting U.S. specifications, officials acknowledge.

The CIA, which played a major role in backing the INC from 1992 to 1996 when they both had headquarters in northern Iraq, has ongoing questions about how tens of millions of dollars in earlier funding were used, according to former intelligence agents who worked with the group. The INC was forced to abandon most of its operations in 1996 when Hussein’s troops swept through northern Kurdistan.

“There’s still a black cloud over the INC because of the black hole that money seemed to go into,” a former intelligence official said. Because of past disputes over funds, as well as tactics and goals, the U.S. intelligence community is now loath to get involved with the group, he added.

The growing frustration has led the Bush administration to look for a wider group of Iraqi dissidents either to change the group’s leadership or to give them some of the U.S. aid from the $25 million that the INC has assumed it will receive.

Assistant Secretary of State Edward Walker met last week with three leading Iraqi dissidents outside the INC. He and other U.S. officials plan to talk to additional exiles.

“We’re not walking away from the INC. We’re broadening our scope,” the senior State Department official said. “We want to include those elements not in the INC, particularly Sunni Muslim interests and those who represent military interests in Iraq. If we are going to be serious about this, we have to seek broad representation inside and outside Iraq and work to enhance the efforts of everyone.”

Comparisons to Nicaragua Effort

The INC still has strong support in Republican quarters in Congress and in both the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney’s office.

“We support the INC 100%. The goal of our policy has to be the overthrow of Hussein, and the INC is the umbrella group willing to take the risks to do that,” said Marc Thiessen, spokesman for Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations committee chaired by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.).

“Our strategy in Iraq must be the same as in Nicaragua, which was to provide the means and training necessary for the Contras to take back their country. Every argument used against the INC was used against the Contras. Until the U.S. got serious about helping, the Contras also weren’t any more organized than the INC. And with the Contras, we eventually overthrew a dictatorship together.”

The INC’s new Iran operation is critical as a way to prove that the group can be effective and deserves additional support.

“This program is a test of the INC’s ability to operate in an effective way, and then we’ll see what the options are for further activities,” the senior State Department official said.

If the group succeeds in its field operations, expands both leadership and membership, and accurately accounts for its expenditures in better-designed proposals, it could gain U.S. approval to open offices in Syria, Egypt and the Czech Republic, where Radio Free Iraq is based--pending approval of the three countries.

But even supportive U.S. officials acknowledge that the group is no longer the only outlet to challenge Baghdad.

“I have confidence that the INC could be a productive element in an overall U.S. program on Iraq,” the administration official said. “But exactly how to get regime change will depend on a whole host of considerations, only one of which could be the INC.”

Another of the most contentious issues is Chalabi himself, whom critics now refer to as a “limousine insurgent” or an “armchair guerrilla with homes in Georgetown and London.” For at least three years, the United States has been trying to get Chalabi to share power, without success.

Leader Called More Liability Than Asset

A former U.S. diplomat who had extensive dealings with Chalabi described him as “personally brave, very resourceful, extremely smart,” but said he also has many negatives that increasingly make him more of a political liability than an asset.

“Most influential Iraqis don’t see him as an acceptable leader,” the envoy said. “And he isn’t highly regarded by key states in the region, on which he has to depend to conduct meaningful operations against the regime.”

Arab envoys interviewed last week used scathing or derisive language to describe Chalabi. One diplomat called him a crook. Chalabi was indicted in Jordan on charges of embezzling millions from Petra Bank, which he once headed. Chalabi claims the issue has been quietly resolved, which Jordanian officials dispute.

Chalabi is also a Shiite Muslim, which has increasingly given his group a Shiite flavor as it has fragmented.

“There are virtually no major Sunni figures in the INC. Kurds are there in name only, and they’re doing nothing to bring down the regime now. And other Shiites are not really players,” the former intelligence official said. “So it’s really just Chalabi alone.”

Including Sunnis in either the INC or an alternative opposition force is critical because Hussein’s inner circle and the political elite are predominantly Sunni. For a decade, U.S. intelligence has argued that the most likely regime change will be made by Sunnis close to Hussein, not exiled opposition groups.

To explore a role for Sunni exiles, Walker met last week with Gen. Najib Salihi, Hatem Mukhlis and Mudar Shawkat--all three Sunni Muslims. But U.S. officials fear that Chalabi may once again manipulate efforts to expand the INC or create alternative Iraqi opposition forces.