Sub’s Sonar Tech Says He Got ‘Lazy’

In a subdued voice, a sonar analyst with a 14-year career of exemplary service testified Monday that he got “a little bit lazy” and broke several safety rules, depriving the captain of the submarine Greeneville of information that could have averted the deadly collision with a Japanese fishing vessel.

While other testimony has indicated severe shortcomings on the part of several others aboard the nuclear-powered submarine, Petty Officer 1st Class Patrick Thomas Seacrest appears, by his own words, to be the single person most clearly responsible for the tragedy.

Seacrest, 34, from New Hampshire, was once designated as an official role model for younger sailors. He told a court of inquiry that he cannot explain why he acted so “poorly” in the moments before the Feb. 9 collision that killed nine crew members and students aboard the trawler.

Among other mistakes, Seacrest failed to tell Cmdr. Scott D. Waddle that sonar information indicated a ship was quickly approaching the area where Waddle was planning a rapid surfacing maneuver.

Seacrest testified that he did not believe the information and thus did not tell Waddle or the officer of the deck, Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen, even though he was required to do so.

Rear Adm. Paul F. Sullivan, a veteran submariner, in questioning Seacrest, said the analyst failed to do “even the most basic” things required of someone in his job.

“What happened?” Sullivan asked in an incredulous tone.

“I don’t know, sir,” Seacrest replied quietly.

Seacrest alone had information indicating that the Ehime Maru was steaming directly toward the Greeneville’s position. He testified that he did not believe the information because, during a periscope search, Waddle and Coen had not seen any vessels that close. But testimony has suggested that the periscope search was too brief and was hampered by a hazy sky and a choppy sea.

For nearly three hours, Seacrest, sitting ramrod straight, his hands folded in his lap, answered questions in a voice that was direct but deferential. As he described the collision, his eyes glistened momentarily.

Part of the questioning was done in closed session because it dealt with classified matters of how a submarine retrieves and stores information about other ships. Submarine technology is among the Navy’s most closely guarded secrets.

After his testimony, Seacrest asked the three admirals sitting as the court of inquiry to consider his 14 years of service and his several decorations before deciding whether to recommend that he be court-martialed for dereliction of duty.

Contradicting an earlier statement, Seacrest said the presence of 16 civilians in the control room played no role in his apparent decision not to provide what in Navy-speak is called “backup,” timely information to his superiors.

Interviewed by Navy and National Transportation Safety Board investigators in the days after the collision, Seacrest said the civilians were so tightly packed in the control room that he was prevented from making entries in a written log about surface ships.

Vice Adm. John B. Nathman, president of the court, noted that a review of the log indicates that Seacrest stopped making entries 30 minutes before the civilians, part of the Navy’s Distinguished Visitors public relations program, came into the control room.

Navy regulations require that a written log be kept in the control room so that officers can get up-to-the-moment information about any “close contacts.”

Seacrest testified that he failed to see a console readout indicating that a ship--later identified as the Ehime Maru--was closing at 4,000 yards.

When he saw a display moments later indicating the ship was at 2,300 yards, he did not believe it, he said, because the periscope search had not found any vessels that close.

The analysis of sonar information--which a submarine needs to avoid collisions, or, in time of war, to fire its torpedoes accurately--is a complex science requiring that raw data be fed into a computer for a “solution.”

The answers derived from the computer are not always precise, and experienced analysts such as Seacrest sometimes decide that the computer is incorrect, based on their own experience and other information, such as periscope searches.

After duty on three other submarines and as an instructor at sub school, Seacrest joined the Greeneville crew a year ago. He was assigned to improve the sub’s system of analyzing sonar data, known as the fire-control system.

He also was named by Waddle to act as a “command career counselor” to convince young sailors to reenlist in the submarine service despite the arduous work, modest pay and frequent deployment. Retention rates among enlisted ranks, particularly those with technical training, is a major concern to the Navy.

Among his other failings Feb. 9, Seacrest did not ask for more time to take sonar readings, even though he thought the ship lacked adequate information about one of the contacts, a ship other than the Ehime Maru.

He also disobeyed a standing order from Waddle that all contacts within 4,000 yards be reported and an order issued that day by Coen that all contacts be “forcefully” reported.

Under questioning by the three admirals, Seacrest said that he and the sonar operators were tracking three ships in the hours before the collision, a modest workload for trained personnel working with sophisticated gear.

Seacrest was given testimonial immunity by Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of the Pacific Fleet, to encourage him to testify. Such immunity means that his words cannot be used against him if the Navy decides to court-martial him.

Seacrest was the 31st witness Navy lawyers called. Neither Coen nor the executive officer, Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, opted to testify.

After 11 days of testimony about the arcana of submarining, the court of inquiry is nearing an end. Today, Waddle will announce whether he plans to testify or submit a statement. After that, opposing counsel will offer closing arguments.

On Monday, Fargo denied a request from Waddle for testimonial immunity.

Earlier testimony has suggested that “all the ingredients were flawed,” in the words of Rear Adm. David M. Stone, as Waddle prepared to execute an “emergency blow” to send the submarine rocketing to the surface and impress the civilians.

Testimony indicated that Waddle--a self-confident, sometimes headstrong, officer--had fallen behind schedule, was eager to show the civilians how the Greeneville could perform, and brushed aside Coen, known for a methodical, by-the-book approach.

Although Seacrest’s testimony may prove to mitigate the amount of blame placed on Waddle, Navy law and tradition still holds that a captain has total authority and responsibility for his ship.

Entering the courtroom at the Navy base here for the 11th day of the inquiry, Waddle, 41, and a Naval Academy graduate, turned to reporters and paraphrased a passage from sea novelist Joseph Conrad.

The passage, which hangs on the office wall of numerous commanding officers, says, “There is one who alone is ultimately responsible for the safe navigation, engineering performance, accurate gun firing and morale of the ship. He is the commanding officer. He is the ship.”

Coen, 26, on Monday was allowed to address members of the families of those killed in the collision. Several have attended every day of the trial. “I want you to know,” he said, “you’re in my thoughts and prayers at all times and you will be the rest of my life. I humbly apologize.”