FAA Culture of Bureaucracy Stymies Security Reform Efforts, Critics Say

As Congress debates broad reforms of an air security system seen as still vulnerable to terrorism, Federal Aviation Administration whistle-blowers warn that lawmakers risk perpetuating management flaws of the past.

Members of a loose-knit group of former and current security agents say the new system must make a sharp break with an institutional philosophy they allege has led the agency to overlook problems in order to avoid conflicts with the airlines.

The critics say that FAA managers have tipped off airport security companies about upcoming inspections, downplayed concerns that planes and other secure areas are vulnerable to intruders and discouraged field agents from pursuing enforcement cases.

The FAA declined to make senior security officials available to rebut the complaints, saying they are too busy dealing with the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. “Our FAA security agents are out every day testing security at the airports,” spokeswoman Rebecca Trexler said. “When we find a problem, we make sure those problems are immediately fixed.”

‘The System Is Still Vulnerable’

The critics disagree.

“There’s a culture of career bureaucrats within FAA security, and it is this culture that continues to promulgate a facade of security,” said Brian Sullivan, who retired in January after 10 years as an FAA special agent. “Regardless of what the FAA says, the system is still vulnerable.”

A current FAA security official added: “My anger is not toward the terrorists, because I know there are evil people in the world. My anger is with management, because they knew there were major vulnerabilities.” The official asked not to be identified for fear of being fired.

Some of the critics are veterans of the FAA’s “red teams”--small, secretive units specifically created to probe for security weaknesses. Formed after the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, red teams are supposed to constantly try to foil FAA and airline security officers.

A current official complained that red team findings are not acted on. “One of the big frustrations, particularly on the red team, is that we write reports . . . and they don’t do anything.” He believes field agents should have the authority to immediately shut down an operation if they discover a significant security breach.

Until now, airlines and airports have had primary responsibility for aviation security, under FAA supervision and guidance. Airlines traditionally have been concerned that too much security could lead to delays, upsetting the complex choreography of flights. Next week, Congress is expected to resume debate about reforming the system, amid widespread anecdotal evidence that security remains uneven.

Experts say that measures taken by the FAA after Sept. 11--such as only allowing ticket holders past security--undoubtedly have helped. But “the system is still not secure,” said Patricia Friend, president of the Assn. of Flight Attendants. She blamed “virtual control” of the FAA by the airlines.

So far, much of the attention in the congressional debate has centered on whether security checkpoint screeners should be federal employees. But the FAA whistle-blowers say that how the new system is managed may be a more important issue.

Lawmakers agree that a new security agency should take over responsibility from the FAA and the airlines. But while some would place the new agency within the Transportation Department, others believe it would be more effective as part of the Justice Department.

Some of the whistle-blowers say there’s an even more fundamental issue. “What we need is accountability and remedies,” said Steve Elson, who was an agent during the 1990s.

A former Navy SEAL and FAA red team member, Elson said he has spent thousands of dollars of his own money traveling to Washington from his Louisiana home to meet with congressional aides. He once startled congressional investigators by showing up for a meeting with a fistful of the special baggage tags that airline gate agents use to send last-minute bags to the cargo hold. A staffer who was present said Elson was trying to show how easily a terrorist could have gotten the tags.

Firms Were Tipped Off to Security Operations

The whistle-blowers also allege that:

* FAA officials notify private security companies of undercover inspections at passenger checkpoints.

Elson provided copies of 1997 FAA communications in which a headquarters official acknowledges telling the companies of upcoming inspections. The acknowledgment came in response to queries from surprised field agents who discovered that the companies were waiting for them. However, the headquarters official wrote that the notification was part of a strategy to see how well security screeners could do if they knew they were being watched and that it would not be repeated.

“I hope that puts everybody’s mind at rest,” the official wrote. “There’s a plan; just have patience.”

Still, Sullivan and Elson said they have been involved in other inspections during which they either suspected or later found out that security companies had been tipped off.

* Chronic problems in preventing unauthorized access to planes and secure airport areas have not been resolved.

In 1999, the Transportation Department’s inspector general’s office reported to Congress that its agents had breached airport security zones in 117 of 173 tries, even boarding planes without being challenged.

The FAA reassured lawmakers, saying it had cracked down hard and that its own testing showed its agents were being caught 96% of the time. The inspector general, however, challenged the FAA’s comparison as “misleading.”

Sullivan and others say there still are gaps, particularly when it comes to guarding airplanes on the tarmac late at night.

“There is no requirement that at the end of the workday, each individual aircraft be locked up,” a current FAA official said.

Moreover, Elson has circulated copies of an internal memo indicating that FAA testers breached security zones at a major airport on 446 of 450 tries in 1998.

* Managers discourage agents from initiating enforcement actions.

Sullivan alleges that a new enforcement policy outlined earlier this year was misconstrued by mid-level managers, who began citing it as justification to block cases.

The policy was outlined in a May 30 memo from then-FAA security chief Michael Canavan. In the memo, Canavan said the FAA should not fine airlines and airports if a security violation is “unaggravated” and the problem has been permanently fixed.

“I want to continue to give our partners a realistic opportunity to comply with the regulations and to work with us,” Canavan wrote.

But Sullivan--by then retired--said field agents told him that managers were misinterpreting the order. Agents were being told not to pursue fines as long as there was a written plan to address the security problems, Sullivan said.

“We have a paper fix,” he wrote in an Aug. 16 e-mail to Canavan. “Nice looking plans, but no real fix.”

Six days later, Canavan sent back a terse reply: “From what I have been able to see and hear, you are right. This is being fixed.”

What was done to resolve the issue remains unclear. Canavan was not available for comment for this report. The former Army general, hired at the FAA in December, recently left the agency.

*

RELATED STORY

Security screenings: Background checks are not required of shuttle bus and limo drivers at LAX. B1