An Unheeded Call to Action

The Afghanistan Foundation’s white paper, “U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Challenges and Solutions,” is an oddly prescient document. Published in 1999, it began by noting that, “Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has consistently underestimated its interests in Afghanistan, allowing terrorism, the oppression of women, narcotics trafficking, discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, and other problems to fester.” It then went on to lay out a policy path for the United States, much of which we are finally getting around to doing--but only in response to the attacks of Sept. 11. Viewed in retrospect, the report’s ultimate message is chilling: Ignoring the situation in Afghanistan, it suggested, could have devastating consequences.

What follows are excerpts from the report, which can be read in its entirety at www.afghanistanfoundation.org/docs/whitepaper.html.

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* “The continued radicalization of Afghanistan is destabilizing Pakistan. The Taliban’s ties to Pakistani Islamists combined with Islamabad’s other internal problems increase the possibility that Pakistan might become a failed state and turn further away from the West. Such a development would have untold grave consequences for U.S. national security... The Taliban has already hosted training camps for fighters who have spread radicalism to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Xinjiang, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. A lack of U.S. involvement may allow the Taliban to intensify this support and perhaps spread its extremist interpretation of Islam to other countries... The Taliban’s rhetoric is becoming more anti-Western.”

* “Islamabad will be reluctant to abandon the current Taliban leadership and may move further from Washington in response to a U.S. campaign against it. Even if U.S. pressure influences the government’s senior leadership, it is highly likely that elements of the military, intelligence services, and non-government religious organizations will continue to actively aid the Taliban.”

* “The United States must press Pakistan to support the new U.S. strategy and encourage Islamabad to stop supporting the Taliban as long as the Taliban pursues its current policies. Although influencing Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is difficult given divisions within Pakistan’s government and society on this issue, without Islamabad’s support U.S. initiatives are far less likely to succeed. Washington should deepen its dialogue with Iran and intensify talks with Russia, China, and the Central Asian states to gain cooperation.”

* “Although the threat from Bin Laden has drawn high-level attention, Afghanistan itself must stop being a minor foreign policy concern and become an administration priority... Because the United States commits few resources to Afghanistan and the region in general, it is not able to act to protect its interests... Washington could obtain considerable benefits without deploying military forces or spending massive amounts of resources.”

* “All the options are imperfect: the United States must recognize this and strive for the best, rather than the ideal, policy. In the opinion of the White Paper authors, the best course requires weakening and transforming the Taliban into a more moderate movement while laying out firm conditions that, if accepted by the Taliban, would lead to a U.S.-Taliban rapprochement.”

* “[One] U.S. goal should be to reduce the level of oppression and misery of the people of Afghanistan. Ending the repression of urban women, encouraging education for Afghans, including Afghan girls, and halting the mistreatment of ethnic and religious minorities is particularly important. Realistically, the objective should not be a Jeffersonian democracy but rather the return of a more tolerant spirit comparable to what prevailed in Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion.”

* “[The U.S. should] begin a public campaign aimed at Afghans to gain support for ... U.S. strategy and to weaken support for the Taliban. This campaign should exploit a range of media to communicate with as many Afghans as possible [in order] to build support, both among the Afghan diaspora and in Afghanistan itself, for U.S. objectives.”

* “[We should also] explore ways to assist foes of the Taliban in their struggle. This will involve both succoring current resistance groups and, more importantly, identifying and helping new anti-Taliban forces that have more support outside their immediate communities... Supporting King Zaher Shah’s recent initiative to bring together Afghan moderates is one appropriate step.”

* “[We must] examine how to work with moderate forces inside the Taliban. Alternative leaders should be identified, and fracture points within the movement noted... The United States and the international community should support measures to alleviate the suffering of the people of Afghanistan in the few regions outside the control of Taliban radicals.”

* “If the Taliban cannot be transformed, it must be replaced. This effort would entail the systematic engagement of various Afghan groups, both among the northern opposition forces and among disaffected Taliban elements. Washington should not neglect important figures in exile who might retain support in the country... The United States should in no way dictate the ultimate arrangement but rather help Afghan groups that are willing to work together and accept communal power-sharing.”

* “Recognizing Pakistan’s past role in helping defeat the Soviets and otherwise increase the respect shown for Islamabad [is essential]. Currently, the administration does not accord Pakistan a prominent place in its regional foreign policy.”

* “Gaining additional funding for measures to undermine the Taliban and preventing anti-U.S. terrorism are first steps in implementing the initiatives above. This money can provide support for anti-Taliban forces.”

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The report’s primary author was Dr. Zalmay M. Khalilzad of the RAND Corp. Other members of the writer’s group were Dr. Elie Krawkowski, president of EDK Consulting, and Don Ritter.