Don’t Press the Saudis Now

The new war on terrorism places the United States in an extraordinary position. It is depending on allies and former enemies alike, even putting out feelers to Syria and Iran, long regarded as chief sponsors of terrorism. But perhaps no country is more important to the United States than its longtime ally, Saudi Arabia.

The oil kingdom, an absolute monarchy, is the linchpin of American strategy. As the biggest oil exporter in the world, Saudi Arabia is the leader of the moderate Arab states. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia share a web of strategic and economic links.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. helped preserve the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and saved Saudi Arabia from a possible attack by Iraq. This is, however, a delicate relationship. The elderly King Fahd’s health is precarious, and Crown Prince Abdullah, who is not as pro-American, runs the country.

Washington hawks are gearing up to denounce the Saudis for resisting possible U.S. use of its bases against Afghanistan. But the Bush administration needs to act judiciously, weighing at what moment it should press the Saudis for such assistance on the ground.

Saudi Arabia faces many internal pressures. The monarchy is deeply corrupt and repressive. Its members often preach but do not practice the strict tenets of Wahabi Sunni Islam. The licentious behind-the-scenes lifestyle of the royal family has helped provoke an upsurge in Islamic fundamentalists who view the country as a vassal of the United States.

Osama bin Laden exhorted the Saudi government in 1990 to resist Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait by relying on Islamic fundamentalist fighters such as himself and was enraged when it didn’t. Now Bin Laden has targeted the monarchy for destruction, which would of course have drastic consequences for the U.S. and the rest of the industrial world.

Another Saudi problem is the resignation of Prince Turki al Faisal, (the brother of Prince Saud, the foreign minister) as head of internal security. This has raised eyebrows among Western intelligence experts because his successor, Prince Nawaf bin Abdel Aziz, is inexperienced. Ensuring that Bin Laden’s followers do not penetrate the security services is essential.

As the U.S. gears up to capture or kill Bin Laden and his followers, it will no doubt require fuller sharing of intelligence by Saudi Arabia than in the past. In the best-known previous case, the monarchy’s uncooperativeness hampered the FBI investigation of the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, the U.S. Air Force barracks. That must change.

But sharing intelligence is a far cry from demanding the use of Saudi military bases, a use that would anger fundamentalists just as did U.S. forces’ presence in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. This time, having U.S. Air Force planes based in Saudi Arabia may not be as necessary as during the defense of neighboring Kuwait. In a long and complex war, the U.S. must husband its resources. The time to push the Saudis has not yet arrived.