The Iraq Divide

Saddam Hussein certainly understands now that it was a blunder to invade Kuwait before his scientists had finished building a nuclear weapon. As weapons inspectors later learned, the Iraqis were much closer to that goal than had been suspected. Hussein surely also realizes that there would be no talk of invasion now if he could threaten American forces or Israel with nuclear incineration. So even without the reports of ongoing nuclear development in Iraq, it would be safe to assume Hussein continues to push hard to get a nuclear weapon.

If he succeeds, then everything will change. Already, countries in the region are being more accommodating toward Iraq, and that trend would rapidly accelerate. The U.S. ability to defend its interests and those of its friends in the region would be severely hampered. Which country in the region would be willing to have U.S. forces stationed within its borders? Indeed, would the U.S. risk deploying troops within range of an Iraqi nuclear weapon?

The stakes have grown too large to bet on another round of modest U.N. weapons inspections, which might delay but not permanently divert Baghdad from achieving its objectives.

Likewise, containment is failing. Hussein has successfully whittled away at U.N. sanctions by, in essence, taking his own population hostage and saying that unless the international community loosens up, innocent Iraqi citizens will continue to suffer and die. The will to coerce compliance from Baghdad has dissipated in the face of such threats.

The U.S. can’t stand by and let things further deteriorate. The basic problem with Iraq is its regime, and all the weapons inspectors on Earth can’t fix that. Still, measures to end the regime must be carefully considered for potential costs and outcomes.

The nature of a post-Saddam Iraq will depend on how he leaves power. Changing a government is fundamentally a political--not military--action. So far the media have focused almost exclusively on military action--reporting on this or that leaked war plan. But this kind of focus misses the vital point that military action against Iraq would be in support of a political objective: a change of regime. Things were quite different in 1991, when our aim was the clear military objective of driving forces out of Kuwait.

Today, we need to first formulate solid political goals and then design military actions aimed at furthering them. Our first objective should be to distance Hussein and his clique from ordinary Iraqis, which would of course cause him to try to wrap himself tightly in the Iraqi flag. Washington needs to make clear that it does not seek to impose a handpicked leadership on Iraq: only to create circumstances where Iraqis can change their own leadership. We cannot allow Hussein to argue that the United States is seeking to place a puppet in Baghdad. But it must also be made clear that any new government will be judged by international norms. Iraqis and Iraqi institutions, including the army, should see their future as brighter under a different leader. This is a message we should be getting out to Iraqis at all levels now.

Military planning then needs to be matched to these political objectives. It may not make sense, for example, to strike the Iraqi regular army--far better if the army can be convinced that fighting for the current regime is not fighting for Iraq. Military targets must be selected to encourage such realizations. Careful coordination between political goals and military operations will significantly limit both lives lost and infrastructure damage.

My experience in dealing with Iraqis at all levels has been that they would like nothing better than to be reconnected with the rest of the world (including the U.S.), but they are also proud to be Iraqis. Our political and military aim should be to create circumstances in which Iraqis will see that the most patriotic decision they can make is to join with the international community and actively or passively oppose Hussein.

Setting the stage for this, the United States must continue to demonstrate that it is absolutely committed to a regime change. Audiences around the world--but especially in Iraq--must begin to realize that they will be dealing with a new government in Baghdad.

Hussein will persist in trying to divide the United States from the rest of the international community. Continuing to offer the hope of renewed weapons inspections is one such ploy. The United States can build international support around two simple notions. First, Iraq under the present regime is uniquely dangerous. It has a long track record of aggression and has demonstrated its willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against both external enemies and Iraqis. Second, given the unique nature of the regime, the Iraqi people will be able to change their government only with outside intervention. The Iraqis are an energetic and talented people, who through the accident of birth, live under horrible leadership. They will never achieve their enormous potential under Hussein.

The United States and other countries can help the Iraqis shape a new government by agreeing on specific standards by which to judge a new government in Baghdad. Progress toward these standards would serve as a basis for decisions on such things as removing sanctions, establishing security relationships and providing debt relief.

The United States has come under criticism internationally by those who fault it for arrogance in seeking to overthrow a government it doesn’t like. But the United States has a unique leadership role. We do not have the luxury of counting on someone else to fix the Iraq problem if we get it wrong. Are the French willing to deploy whatever force is needed to react to future Iraqi aggression--potentially backed by nuclear bombs--if we don’t act now?

The United States must try to build international accord but also be prepared to ultimately act alone. We must be ready to put whatever military force is necessary on the ground--always keeping in mind that the fundamental objective is to defeat a regime, not an army. Judging by his ruthless 1991 strategy of placing hostages at military targets and palaces, Hussein is likely to surround himself and his security forces with civilians. But this tactic could backfire, drawing the Iraqi people to our side.

Our political objectives demand that we make a clear distinction between Iraq and its despotic leader. Military planning should be aimed at separating him from the Iraqi civilians who have effectively become his hostages. It should be clear to the world and to the Iraqis themselves that, without Hussein, a strong, vibrant Iraq could take its place in the international community.