Don’t Count on a New Revolution

Iran’s revolution is approaching its quarter-century anniversary, and some in Washington seem to be yearning for an encore. Their reasons are manifold: concern about Tehran’s continued support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, anxiety about its purported development of weapons of mass destruction and dismay that Iran’s reformers have either lost the battle to the conservatives or never genuinely intended to wage it.

As a result, they believe that the best catalysts for change in Iran are Iranians dissatisfied with their economic condition and eager for democracy. In short, they seem to be counting on a second Iranian popular upheaval--against the clerics the first one brought to power.

There is considerable reason for the international community, not to mention Iranians themselves, to be frustrated with the situation in Iran. The overwhelming election in 1997 of President Mohammad Khatami, a liberal cleric, and his reelection in 2001, coupled with a string of victories by pro-reform candidates in parliamentary and local elections, seemed to herald a new chapter in the country’s history.

Yet, powerful conservative clerics and security officials retain control of key centers of power, including the military, intelligence services and the judiciary. They use covert means to circumvent their rivals’ nominal management of foreign policy. Khatami has been unable to undertake meaningful economic reform, significantly curb the power of the security services or open up the system to allow genuine freedom of speech and political participation. Iranians suffer from political repression, censorship and the arbitrary dispensing of justice.

Real democratic advances, in other words, have yet to produce fundamental policy shifts in Iran. The ties between conservatives and reformers are complex; neither group is homogenous and both have been forced to compromise to preserve the regime’s stability. Ultimately, the difference between them is probably not as great as originally hoped.

But the difference between the two camps is almost certainly not as small as currently feared. Reformers continue to expand the space within which civil society can operate, understanding that the overall public momentum for reform is their greatest resource.

Under Khatami, both the number of authorized newspapers and their circulation have quadrupled. These advances have produced a limited, but noteworthy, relaxation of social restrictions, more frequent contacts with the outside world and the government’s de facto acceptance of ideological and religious dissent, despite repeated and heavy-handed attempts to suppress its most potent expression. Forms of democracy unknown to the rest of the Middle East have appeared, and the once all-powerful conservative clerical elite must contend with competing actors and institutions.

How this clash will play out is difficult to predict, making it tough to define how the international community should respond. The policy of critical dialogue--coupling engagement with the Iranian government with expressions of concern about human rights, support for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction--has not yielded conclusive results. Outright intervention in favor of the reformers may seem logical, yet it risks exposing them to the accusation of being agents of foreign design.

But one thing appears evident: A policy that depicts Iran as part of an “axis of evil,” lumps reformers and conservatives together and banks on a popular uprising by the Iranian people will at best be ineffective and at worse will backfire. It is based on two faulty assumptions: that conservatives have neutralized the reformers, and that there is a clear divide between an entrenched and uniform “regime,” on the one hand, and a dissatisfied populace, on the other. Yet, unlike the situation that existed in the 1970s under the shah, the current regime enjoys genuine support from considerable segments of the population, including some who strongly object to its policies.

A policy of wholesale denunciation of Iran underestimates the important political battles occurring in the country’s leadership. It glosses over the significant differences between the conservatives and the reformers. It constricts the political space in which the reformers can operate and undercuts the democratic process that twice led to Khatami’s victory. Such an approach may have the unintended effect of forcing reformers to close ranks with the conservatives in the name of national unity, thereby facilitating the hard-liners’ efforts to perpetuate a domestic climate of crisis that allows them to justify draconian security measures.

The burden of bringing Iran fully back into the mainstream of the community of nations must principally fall on the shoulders of Iranians. But the U.S. and the West can greatly facilitate, or hinder, this process. They should insist that Iran meet its obligations to act as a responsible international player and remain willing to engage the country more constructively on political, economic and social policy fronts.

The political struggle within the country, and the strong expression of views to which it is giving rise, is unparalleled in the Middle East. In that sense, the country’s political evolution concerns more than its own people. How Iranian and international actors deal with this battle for the revolution’s soul will be of critical importance to the region as a whole.