Iraq Attack Would Distract Us from Al Qaeda

Since the president named Iraq part of an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address last month, the drums of war have grown louder in Washington. Senior administration officials, congressional leaders and pundits have taken aim at Iraq, insisting that military action will likely be necessary. Secretary of State Colin Powell, commonly viewed as a voice of restraint in the administration, now suggests that taking on Iraq militarily might be something the U.S. will “have to do alone.” Concurrently, the Pentagon is shifting its regional military command structures to the Persian Gulf.

Moving the war on terrorism to Iraq is tempting. Saddam Hussein’s ruthless and autocratic regime is both evil and dangerous. And the country presents a more concrete--and therefore attractive--target than an amorphous and diffuse terrorist organization. In Iraq, we could deploy the full firepower of the U.S. military and would not have to rely primarily on the CIA and special operations forces. Targeting Iraq would also rectify what many see as the mistake of allowing Hussein to remain in power at the conclusion of Desert Storm.

The problem with making Iraq the next target is this: It was Al Qaeda, not Iraq, that perpetrated the terrorism of Sept. 11.

While now largely dislodged from Afghanistan, Al Qaeda remains an active and potent force with perhaps thousands of operatives worldwide. As far as we know, Osama bin Laden is alive. His alleged chief of operations, Palestinian Abu Zubaydah, is believed to be actively plotting Al Qaeda’s next strikes. Further raising the stakes, documents recovered from Al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan indicate that Bin Laden has been pursuing the development of biological and nuclear weapons. Owing to the generous financial support of sympathetic Saudis and Kuwaitis, a cut of the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and funding through shell charities, Al Qaeda and affiliated radical Islamic organizations can draw on resources estimated at $5 billion to $15 billion. And the group’s primary focus is to inflict further harm on Americans.

As was made clear by last week’s FBI warning of an imminent attack by a suspected Bin Laden-affiliated group, Al Qaeda, not Iraq, is the primary threat we face. Acknowledging the primacy of this danger, CIA Director George Tenet stated publicly earlier this month that Al Qaeda remains “the most immediate and serious threat” the country faces. Military action against Iraq would distract from this threat.

Another problem with taking the war to Iraq is that it would undermine a strategic objective in the war on terrorism: to shape a more secure global system by raising the standards of global conduct. We are asking the world to buy in to an elevated set of global norms: the unconditional rejection of terrorism, respect for the rule of law and a ban on the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons materials. We’re pushing countries toward religious tolerance and more legitimate democratic processes. Why? Because bolstering these conventions gets at the roots of terrorism. How we conduct the next phase of the war will go a long way toward determining the extent to which these norms are advanced.

If we hope to change global norms, we must uphold the moral authority that the United States has historically held in the eyes of the world. By shifting the war on terrorism to Iraq, we open ourselves to charges of opportunism. This would cost us the support not only of our European partners, but also of our nontraditional allies in the developing world--allies indispensable to rooting out terrorists.

Support from the developing world will only grow in importance during the war on terrorism’s next phase. Al Qaeda will likely not reconstitute the nerve center of its operations in a single country, however convenient we might find that. Rather, it will evolve into an even less hierarchal organization, the better to blend into the social fabric of the nations in which it operates. While invaluable, our superior intelligence technology will be insufficient to the task of finding and neutralizing the group’s operatives. We need intelligence on the ground, people who can move in and out of these same communities, infiltrate and expose Al Qaeda cells. Such agents will not be Americans, but members of foreign intelligence agencies who can better blend in. The depth of our allies’ commitment to this effort (beyond pro-forma public pronouncements) will ultimately come down to how aligned they feel with the global order the U.S. is shaping.

While the U.S. military is certainly capable of toppling the Iraqi regime, taking such action now would damage our ability to lead. Genuine admiration for American values would be replaced by fear of an unaccountable superpower ready to throw its weight around with or without provocation. This would foster the creation of a new coalition of states--rich and poor--that would seek to undermine U.S. power at every turn.

A further strategic consideration in a war against Iraq is its impact on relations with our longtime rivals, Russia and China. September’s terrorist attacks so shook up international relations that a vision of common interests with both countries now seems both possible and desirable. If the U.S. were now to move on Iraq militarily without demonstrating that it has links to Sept. 11, domestic debates in both Russia and China would likely tilt in favor of hard-liners, effectively torpedoing nascent cooperative arrangements.

It’s possible, of course, that President Bush has evidence connecting Iraq to the attacks. But if this is the case, then such evidence must be presented. At the very least, the Bush administration needs to explain how Iraq represents a greater immediate threat to the United States than the as-yet undefeated Al Qaeda network. Otherwise, we risk letting our anger at Hussein get in the way of our strategic aims. We also jeopardize diffusing our military, intelligence and diplomatic energies in a way that prevents us from being successful against either Iraq or Al Qaeda.

In the days after the September terrorist attacks, when informed that Al Qaeda was operational in some 60 countries around the world, President Bush reportedly responded, “Let’s pick them off one at a time.” And he was right. Such an operation will require painstaking planning and execution, but it is crucial.

The American public, still seething over Sept. 11, has shown great willingness to support the commander in chief in whatever direction he decides to take this war. But with this trust comes a great responsibility on the part of the president and his advisors to keep the strategic picture in mind. Military action against Iraq might be more satisfying than restraint in the short term, but the president must be certain that such action at this time would be ultimately in the national interest as well.

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Joseph Siegle is a fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of “Democratization and Economic Development: The Contribution of Accountability Institutions.”