War Is Likely if Musharraf Stays

The smell of war is in the air. Like helpless actors, India and Pakistan are inexorably moving in the direction of a deadly conflict. Once again, the United States and the international community are involved in firefighting a potential nuclear conflict.

The chance of such a war was predicted by the American CIA chief in March. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, George Tenet said: “If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of an Indian counterattack.”

The international community has high stakes in the region.

Pakistan is now a key ally of the U.S.-led forces in neighboring Afghanistan. The last situation the U.S. wants to see develop is the war against terror deflected by war between India and Pakistan.

But if the militants wanted to deflect attention away from allied forces fighting against Al Qaeda in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan, they succeeded. The fight that began in Kabul last year, triggered by militants flying planes into the World Trade Center, has every possibility of turning into a fight for Kashmir, triggered by militants determined to provoke an Indo-Pakistani clash.

The international community made a critical error when it concluded that a military dictator could defuse tension between India and Pakistan or prevent the tidal wave of extremism that is now engulfing the region.

Pakistan’s military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the great white hope in the fight against terrorism, is sinking in a quicksand of his own making. His tenure has been marked by the rise of extremism, militancy, terrorism and regional tension.

He missed an opportunity in 2000 to sign a confidence-building treaty with New Delhi. He carries the baggage of being the architect of the last major battle along the Line of Control near Kargil, which nearly led to an Indo-Pakistani war in 1999. His “lone ranger” politics pit him against domestic political forces polarizing the country.

Given this history, it’s unlikely that dialogue proposals can halt the inexorable march to war now taking place.

There is one way that war can be prevented, and that is a change of regime.

Regime change in Islamabad offers the possibility of halting hostilities to permit a new government to make a fresh start. The voices of the international community, as well as the Pakistani armed forces, are critical determinants as to the calculations made. They will determine whether Musharraf resigns to defuse the crisis or clings to power in a show of nuclear brinkmanship.

The view of Pakistan’s powerful ally, the U.S., is pivotal too. The White House was vocal in its support for Musharraf. President Bush has called him “my friend.” Now the U.S. will have to choose between a man who is considered a friend and risking a limited war that could get out of hand.

New Delhi will reflect before starting a military action that lacks the support of Washington. But it enjoys far greater freedom of action than Islamabad did during the Kargil fighting. Then, President Clinton could dictate to debt-laden Islamabad, held hostage by the International Monetary Fund. President Bush might find it difficult to dictate to New Delhi because its economy is largely independent.

Bush does have one weapon that can deter New Delhi. That is the threat of international mediation for the Kashmir cause. New Delhi is opposed to such intervention.

A military setback would mean trouble for Musharraf. Far better for him and the region that he agree to a regime change to prevent the start of armed hostilities that could trigger a nuclear nightmare.

And far better for New Delhi to accept such a regime change as face-saving than allow a limited war that could spill out of control. New Delhi should consider that Islamabad could do well in a war that is limited in area and time. Pakistan’s military is well equipped.

During his testimony before the Senate committee in March, the CIA director said the decision to turn Islamabad into an ally in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks “was a fundamental political shift with inherent risks.”

Those risks are now evident as the South Asian region teeters on the brink of a violent tomorrow.

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Benazir Bhutto is former prime minister of Pakistan and leads the largest opposition party, the People’s Party.