‘We Get It,’ NASA Chief Says; Sweeping Changes Promised

NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe, responding to a scathing report that blamed the Columbia accident on a broken safety culture, vowed Wednesday to make sweeping changes that would “reinvigorate” the beleaguered space agency.

But the immediate task of getting the shuttle to fly again -- perhaps as early as next spring -- could cost “hundreds of millions of dollars,” and complying with all the recommendations could cost immeasurably more, O’Keefe said in an interview.

O’Keefe, along with several outside space experts, also raised troubling questions about the panel’s conclusion that the agency’s flawed internal culture contributed to the Feb. 1 breakup of the spacecraft.

“I’m not certain we could have averted disaster even if all the checks and balances ... had been operating the way they should have,” O’Keefe said. “Would we have caught it? I don’t know.”

He reiterated, however, that he fully accepted the panel’s conclusion that NASA’s checks and balances did break down.

On Tuesday, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded that foam debris falling off the shuttle’s external tank opened a hole in the wing’s leading edge during liftoff, and that as the orbiter was returning to Earth, hot gases entered the internal structure causing it to break apart.

The 248-page final report also asserted that NASA’s culture stifled dissenting views and bred complacency over persistent risks, and played an equally important role in the tragedy that destroyed the $2-billion spacecraft and killed seven astronauts. The reported cited eight “missed opportunities” for NASA engineers to possibly have averted the tragedy.

But several analysts questioned whether the panel’s findings and recommendations would assure the safety of future shuttle flights.

Richard Blomberg, former chairman of NASA’s independent safety panel, said his group had closely examined the foam problem in the 1990s and was satisfied with the safety measures taken by the agency.

“We were comfortable that they had examined it at the right levels,” Blomberg said.

The fact that the foam debris analysis was wrong may say more about NASA’s technological resources than its lack of commitment to safety, he said.

“I don’t resonate with the phrase ‘broken safety culture,’ ” Blomberg said. “It implies that it was willful and visible. They have as high a priority on safety as any organization I have seen. Now, if you ask whether they could do a better job of protecting safety, that is a different issue.”

John Pike, executive director of the think tank GlobalSecurity.org, said that blaming the agency’s culture might not solve the basic engineering problems that contributed to the shuttle accident. Columbia investigators found that foam debris had fallen off in every shuttle mission.

“They are never going to say they did something really dumb,” Pike said. “Culture is the easy way out. Culture you can fix by willpower, not more money. They don’t have to upset the apple cart with contractors. It is a one-day story with the White House.”

Pike also sharply criticized the report for failing to speak on many key issues involved in the accident, such as NASA’s lack of a contingency plan for a crew rescue in space.

The accident report did not recommend that NASA develop such a plan, even though it appeared to criticize the agency for failing to mount a rescue.

O’Keefe, who described the events of the last seven months as a “seminal moment” in the agency’s 45-year history, appeared conciliatory Wednesday, noting how he had met with the investigators for four hours Tuesday to go over the findings and the recommendations.

“We get it. We clearly got the point,” O’Keefe said, vowing to comply with the 29 recommendations of the accident panel “without reservation.”

O’Keefe said it was too early to know precisely how much NASA would have to spend to comply with the recommendations, but that to get the shuttle flying again could cost “in the hundreds of million dollars range.”

The agency has already spent about $40 million in its effort to eliminate the specific foam problem on the external tank that caused the accident, as well as strengthen the leading edge panels susceptible to damage.

“Following through on some of these other recommendations, I don’t know what that number is going to look like,” O’Keefe said. The panel has recommended several long-range changes that could be costly, including completely recertifying that the shuttle’s systems are safe if NASA continues its plan to use the shuttle beyond 2010.

O’Keefe’s promise to make sweeping changes appears already underway: A NASA manager who oversaw the space shuttle’s faulty external tank was removed from his job Wednesday.

Jerry Smelser, external tank project manager at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, has been reassigned and will retire at the end of the year, the center’s director said.

Meanwhile, Air Force Brig. Gen. Duane Deal, a member of the Columbia investigation board, said he wrote a 10-page supplemental report urging NASA to strengthen shuttle inspections and correct mechanical problems unrelated to the disaster. Associated Press reported that the supplement will appear in an upcoming volume of appendices to the board’s final report.