Germans Spooked by History

For more than 50 years, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany stood together in defense of liberty and the proposition that the German people deserved to be reunited in a single state at peace with its neighbors.

Repeatedly tested -- by the Soviets during the Cold War and by France and Britain as the Cold War waned -- Americans remained steadfast in their commitment to Germany’s defense and reunification and the belief that Germany was a natural ally in the larger challenge of promoting order in a turbulent world.

Consequently, Americans are confused and disappointed by Germany’s opposition to the Bush administration’s plans for war in Iraq and an apparent rising tide of anti-Americanism in a country whose very existence was the product of American ideals, backed by economic and military might.

Some denounce German policy as perfidious and ungrateful. Even those who recognize that gratitude cannot provide an enduring guide to foreign policy are questioning the wellsprings of the German nein.

The categorical rejection of the use of force in Iraq, however, has less to do with Germany’s view of the U.S. than it does with Germans’ view of themselves. Debates over how to deal with international conflicts, whether in the Balkans or the Middle East, are in the first instance confrontations with German history.

Whereas Americans derive their foreign policy from a strong sense of the national interest informed by national ideals, Germans view international politics first through the prism of a national identity that is very much a work in progress. Germans of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s generation define themselves through their opposition to the political values of their parents and grandparents. Theirs is the generation that asked: What did you know? Their pacifist reflexes are genuine and flow from an acceptance of Germany’s historical guilt.

And so military intervention in Kosovo was not about promoting regional stability. It was all about Auschwitz.

In helping to bring an end to “ethnic cleansing,” Germans could finally get on the right side of history. Fischer was passionate: “This generation of Germans would not look the other way!”

The same was true after 9/11. This time Germany stood with the victims of aggression.

But to accept the logic of preventive war in Iraq raises the specter of historical continuity.

Preventive doctrines led to World War I. Concluding that an industrializing Russia would constitute a future military threat, Berlin was eager to force a showdown in 1914. Understanding that Paris would come to Russia’s aid, Germany preemptively violated Belgian neutrality and invaded France.

And in rejecting the use of force as a means for bringing democracy to the Middle East, this generation of Germans is reaffirming its rejection of earlier wars started by Germans in pursuit of grand geopolitical designs.

The search for national identity is further complicated by the fact that Germany remains a divided nation. Many forget that 20 million East Germans were socialized under communism and taught to believe that the West in general -- and the U.S. in particular -- is corrupt and inexorably bent on military expansion and economic exploitation.

More than 10 years after reunification, unemployment in the former East Germany remains close to 20%. As the young and talented migrate to cities like Munich or Hamburg, they leave behind a poorly skilled and elderly population that is resentful of the West’s arrogance and broken promises.

The rest of Eastern Europe celebrates newfound independence and measures current success against the deprivations of the past, but East Germans see themselves as second-class citizens who consistently come up short when measured against the wealth and self-confidence of West Germans.

It is here where Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder discovered his antiwar populism and successfully exploited latent anti-Americanism to secure a razor-thin victory in September’s elections. Without the East, Schroeder would not be chancellor. A majority of West Germans voted for the Bush-friendly Christian Democrats.

Of course, playing to latent anti-Americanism in the East and the historical insecurities of Germans in the West may make for good election politics, but it is no substitute for a coherent foreign policy, a fact that a majority of Germans now concede. Although they remain unconvinced that a war in Iraq is necessary for dealing with the security challenges posed by Saddam Hussein and although they are uneasy with what they regard as Washington’s unilateralist reflexes, Germans are increasingly vocal in their criticism of Schroeder’s conduct of German-American relations. Even when critical of President Bush, they are uncomfortable with the prospect of lining up with the China of Tiananmen Square or the Russia of Chechnya against the U.S.

Germans very much want to get it right: with themselves, with history, and with us.