A New Basis for an Old Friendship

Turkish-American relations have reached a new low, and a key reason is that the Iraq war has undone two myths in Washington about Turkey.

The first was that Turkey was too important an ally to ignore in a war against Iraq. A pillar of U.S. containment of Saddam Hussein was U.S.-British enforcement of the no-fly zone over northern Iraq from the Turkish air base at Incirlik. Before the invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon sought to build on the relationship. It wanted Turkey to open up its territory to U.S. combat forces to create a second front. Convinced that the U.S. could not go to war without Turkey, Ankara first bargained and then refused. Yet, the easy military defeat of Iraq and the Kurds’ warm welcome of U.S. forces in northern Iraq have demonstrated to the administration that Ankara’s importance is limited.

The primacy of the two countries’ military-to-military relationship was the second myth to be deflated by the war. The Pentagon was traditionally the most pro-Turkey of all U.S. institutions, jealously guarding its special relationship with the Turkish military. But during negotiations to secure access to bases in Turkey before and during the war, the Turkish military was not helpful. It was telling that Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz blamed the Turkish military, not the new pro-Islamist government, for parliament’s rejection of the U.S. request for the second front. Then, during the war, the Turkish military on a number of occasions denied the U.S. permission to launch missions from Turkey to rescue imperiled American forces, infuriating the Pentagon.

The recent U.S. raid on the headquarters of the Turkish special forces in northern Iraq has further estranged the two militaries. The 11 Turkish soldiers arrested July 4 were suspected of training pro-Ankara forces to assassinate the pro-U.S. Kurdish governor of Kirkuk and stir up trouble. None were in uniform or carried any forms of identification, as required by agreements between the two countries. Although the administration believed that neither Ankara nor Turkish military leaders had directed or even had prior knowledge of any such operation, the incident only deepened Pentagon suspicions of Turkey’s intentions.

The Turkish military is equally suspicious of U.S. plans for the quasi-autonomous Kurdish enclave. After Ankara nixed the idea of a second front, Washington denied Turks entry into northern Iraq beyond their existing 1,500-strong contingent. Turkish soldiers were eager to help their Turkmen allies there and, more important, contain the ambitions of Iraqi Kurds. Having fought Kurdish rebels at home throughout the 20th century, Ankara feared that Kurdish autonomy in Iraq would encourage Kurds in Turkey to seek autonomy or even independence. Washington’s long-held belief that peace in Iraq depends in part on recognizing the distinct character of the Iraqi Kurds within a federal Iraqi state continues to make the Turkish military nervous as well.

In addition, the detention of the Turkish soldiers deeply offended Turkish pride and further fanned anti-Americanism in Turkey. Some Turks have compared the U.S. treatment of the soldiers to that received by U.S. diplomats in Iran during the 1979 hostage crisis.

Ironically, the current row between the two militaries may give a boost to political reform in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party, which took over the government last November, promised more democracy and membership in the European Union, the fastest and most efficient way to revolutionize Turkey. But the country’s secular military and civilian establishment distrust the party and its leader, Tayyip Erdogan, chiefly because of their Islamist roots. Yes, the party continues to harbor elements partial to anti-Western, Islamist and xenophobic rhetoric and is prone to mistakes that needlessly antagonize secular Turks. But it has made undeniable moves toward the political center. For example, the government pushed through parliament an EU harmonization package that included provisions eliminating restrictions on freedom of speech and reducing restrictions on minority languages and culture. Significantly, it accomplished this without going through the powerful National Security Council, which reflects the officers’ preferences. The government is now considering introducing a package that would further extend individual freedoms and reform the military.

All this makes the military deeply anxious, because the price of fulfilling Turkey’s EU candidacy may be a promise by the military to stay out of politics. A next step is addressing the divided island of Cyprus, where the military has so far blocked the government’s intentions to move toward a solution proposed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The Turkish government’s recent actions demonstrate that its commitment to a reform agenda is far more serious than those of its predecessors. For this, it deserves Washington’s support. Last week’s visit by the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, should ease the way for a visit by Erdogan, presenting Washington with an opportunity to acknowledge Turkey’s democratic ambitions and thus form a new basis for relations between the two countries. The administration’s invitation to the Turkish military to participate in peacekeeping operations in Iraq suggests that the two countries may be putting past disagreements behind them. It should take the added step of giving Ankara a stake in Iraq’s future by encouraging Turkish private-sector participation in the second round of reconstruction contracts and sending Turkish nongovernmental organizations to help rebuild Iraqi civil society.

The sooner Ankara, and especially its military, stops looking at Iraq through the narrow perspective of the Kurdish issue, the sooner Turkish-American relations will improve.